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ABSTRACT 
‘Nec ancilla nec domina’: Representations of Eve in the Twelfth Century 
 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate the extent to which the figure of Eve operated in 
twelfth-century commentary on Genesis as a crucial means by which to examine some 
of the most fundamental and problematic areas of the hexaemeron and fall narratives.   
Amid the twelfth-century’s flourishing corpus of writing on the creation and fall of 
mankind, Eve emerges not as an expedient model of female iniquity or a credulous 
victim of diabolic casuistry, but as a valued equivalent and peer to Adam (‘nec ancilla 
nec domina sed socia’, in the words of Hugh of St Victor). Moreover, Eve lies at the 
heart of twelfth-century debate surrounding the challenging issues of how and why 
mankind was created, why the existence of sin and evil was permitted, the action of 
temptation and sin, and the composition of the created world.  
However, there has been no substantial treatment of representations of Eve in the central 
middle ages, and modern scholarship has frequently been content to assume that 
medieval responses to the first woman are universally misogynistic. This thesis aims 
both to address this historiographical lacuna, and to examine the hitherto neglected 
function of Eve as a means by which to elucidate some of the major theological and 
philosophical preoccupations of this formative period. 
In order to do this, the thesis examines representations of Eve as the first woman 
(Chapter I), the first wife/mother (Chapter II) and the first sinner (Chapter III) in a 
corpus of texts centred around six of the major twelfth-century treatments of Eve and 
the creation/fall narrative. These are Guibert of Nogent’s Moralia in Genesim, 
Abelard’s Expositio in hexameron, Hugh of St Victor’s De sacramentis, Hildegard of 
Bingen’s Scivias, Peter Lombard’s Sentences, and the Anglo-Norman Mystère d’Adam.  
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INTRODUCTION 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
During the early years of her lengthy career as abbess of the Paraclete, Heloise wrote to 
Abelard to request his assistance in teaching the opening chapters of the Book of 
Genesis.1 In order to instruct her charges at the Paraclete, Heloise requested a treatise 
that would elucidate the exegetical and doctrinal complexities of the creation narrative; 
one that would focus on literal and historical interpretation of the text. Abelard’s 
response came in the form of the Expositio in hexameron (‘Exposition of the six-day 
work’; that is, the first six days of creation).2 In the epistolary preface which precedes 
the Expositio, Abelard informs his estranged amica, addressed with the poignant epithet 
‘once dear in the world, now most dear in Christ’, that she is right to emphasise the 
difficulty of teaching the hexaemeron, and that he will attempt, as requested, to devote 
his expertise to explaining this complex material to her and to her ‘spiritual daughters’.3 
Abelard describes the hexaemeron as being one of the three most difficult areas of the 
Bible to interpret, and one which was so potentially controversial that, according to 
Jerome’s commentary on Ezekiel, previous generations of scholars were prohibited 
                                                          
1
 Constant Mews and John Marenbon both assert that whilst the exact dating of this request and its reply 
is unclear, the commentary was produced shortly after c.1133. The original letter sent by Heloise is no 
longer extant, but Abelard recounts her request in his reply. See Constant Mews, ‘On Dating the Works of 
Peter Abelard’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge vol. 52 (1985) pp. 73-134, pp. 
118-19; John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997) p. 76. 
2
 Abelard, Expositio in hexameron: Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica vol. 5, ed. Mary Romig and David 
Luscombe, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis [hereafter referred to as CCCM] 15 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2004).  
3
 Abelard, trans. Wanda Zemler-Cizewski, An Exposition of the Six-Day Work, CCCM in Translation vol. 
8, CCCM XV (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), p. 32. ‘Supplicando itaque postulas et postulando supplicas, 
soror Heloysa, in seculo quondam cara, nunc in Christo carissima, quatinus in expositionem horum tanto 
studiosius intendam quanto difficiliorem eorum esse constat intelligentiam, et specialiter hoc tibi et 
filiabus tuis spiritualibus persoluam’, Expositio, 4, 30 - 34. 
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from working on it until they were at least thirty years old.4 
Describing the difficulties of interpreting the scriptural account of mankind’s 
creation and fall, and the exegetical tradition of this task, Abelard declares that the 
textual inheritance faced by Heloise is so complicated that very few scholars have even 
attempted to compose a literal commentary on the subject.5 Many have engaged in 
allegorical exegesis of the text, Abelard warns, but St Augustine is the only person ever 
to have produced a successful literal interpretation. Moreover, Abelard recounts that 
even Augustine himself declared that within his own literal commentary, ‘more things 
are sought than discovered and of those that are discovered few are certain, in fact the 
rest are set down as if they were yet to be found out’.6  
This prefatory letter thus offers a glimmer of insight into some of the methods 
and motivations which sustained twelfth-century interpretation of the opening chapters 
of Genesis, and into the use of the Patristic commentaries which preceded and informed 
it. Useful information though this might be, it nevertheless seems quite far removed 
from the specific issue of how the figure of Eve might be represented in twelfth-century 
thought. However, it is helpful to begin by discussing this neglected and ostensibly 
unremarkable letter, because it provides a prelude to a remarkable representation of the 
first woman and the first act of sin. There are two suggestions discernible in the sections 
of the letter quoted above which set the scene for this portrayal, offering some early 
indication that the subsequent interpretation involves something rather more complex 
than a predictable assembly of caveats concerning apples, snakes and women of 
                                                          
4
 ‘Nam nisi quis apud eos etatem sacerdotalis ministerii, id est xxx annum, impleuerit, nec principium 
Geneseos, nec Canticum Canticorum, nec huius voluminis exordium et finem [i.e. Ezekiel] legere 
permittitur, ut ad perfectum scientiam et misticos intellectus plenum humane nature tempus accedat’, ibid., 
3, 25 - 29. 
5
 ‘Quanto eius difficultatem ceteris constat esse maiorem, sicut expositionum raritas ipsa protestatur’, 
ibid., 4, 39 – 40. 
6
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 32. ‘Plura quesita sunt quam inuenta, et eorum que inuenta sunt pauciora 
firmata, cetera... adhuc requirenda sint’, Expositio, 6, 53 - 54. 
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questionable virtue. 
First, with the phrase ‘once dear in the world, now most dear in Christ’, Abelard 
invokes the idea of a fall from grace being followed by a merciful redemption.7 This 
process of reversal is mirrored in the syntactical inversion of the antimetabolic phrase 
‘by pleading you demand, and demanding you plead’.8 Second, Abelard’s consistent 
emphasis on the deserved fame of Augustine’s work on Genesis – well known and 
notable for its description of the fallen Eve as ‘such a great good’ (‘tantum bonum’) - 
tacitly establishes a judicious Patristic precedent for his own redemptive representation 
of Eve and her transgression.9 These two features of the letter allude to the conception 
of Eve in the text which follows them; a portrayal which is predicated on the premise 
that on account of her transgression, Eve became dearer to God than many thousands of 
sinless men. ‘In fact, one woman’, Abelard writes of Eve, ‘is now worth more to God, 
and appears more pleasing to him through merit than might many thousands of men, if 
they had persevered forever without sin’.10  
Regardless of any preliminary suggestions or intimations, this seems an 
extraordinary claim to make. Eve’s transgression may have been redeemed by Christ, 
but nonetheless she seems a deeply unlikely candidate for outright praise. The Genesis 
narrative makes it indisputably clear that Eve was responsible for corrupting mankind, 
                                                          
7
  Cf. the seventh letter to Heloise in which the same formulation is sused in a similar reversal of the 
status of a fallen woman: describing the transition of Mary Magdalene from prostitute (a position with 
which Heloise also famously claimed to identify) to saint, Abelard writes ‘Libet denique, ut ad fideles seu 
christianas redeamus feminas, et divine respectum misericordie in ipsa etiam publicorum abjectione 
scortorum, et stupendo predicare et predicando stupere. Quid enim abjectius quam Maria Magdalene vel 
Maria Egyptiaca secundum vite statum pristine? Quas vero postmodum vel honore vel merito divina 
amplius gratia sublimavit…’, ‘The Letters of Heloise on Religious Life and Abelard’s First Reply’, ed. J. 
P. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies vol. 17 (1955) pp. 253 – 281, p. 259.  My italics. 
8
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 32. ‘Supplicando itaque postulas et postulando supplicas’, Expositio, 4, 30. 
9
 ‘Non fieret, inquiunt, mulier. Hoc est dicere, non fieret bonum: quia et ipsa utique aliquod bonum est, et 
tantum bonum, ut Apostolus eam gloriam viri esse dicat; et omnia ex Deo’, Augustine, De Genesi contra 
Manichaeos ed. Dorothea Weber, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [hereafter referred to 
as CSEL] 91 (Vienna, Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1998), 2.28. Italics 
mine.  
10
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113.  ‘Plus quippe una femina modo apud deum valet et gratior ei per 
meritum existit quam multa milia hominum facerent, si semper sine peccato perserverassent’, Expositio, 
454, 2721 - 2. 
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and for destroying the earthly paradise of prelapsarian humanity. Eve’s actions bought 
sin into the world, and with it apparently came the Christian archetype of the base and 
fallen woman – when dissecting the corpus of medieval misogyny, it seems logical to 
expect to find the figure of Eve at its heart. 
Whether or not this misogyny was in fact endemic in medieval representations 
of Eve, it is widely assumed to have been so. The expectation of antifeminism 
dominates and distorts the only study ever published on the figure of Eve in the twelfth 
century: volume three of Georges Duby’s trilogy Women of the Twelfth Century. 
Throughout this brief tract, the author maintains that high medieval representations of 
Eve reveal nothing more than the embittered vitriol of the male cleric, intent on using 
the gender of the first sinner to justify his intransigent insistence that  
The woman could serve no purpose except to make children, “as the 
earth is a helper to the seed” - the image of a woman open like a 
ploughed field to a man, who alone was active, embedding the seed, 
coming immediately to his mind.11  
 
Duby’s expectation of misogyny, however objectionably it is expressed, is far from 
atypical.12 It is widely assumed that medieval representations of Eve, particularly those 
formulated by twelfth-century male clerics, are almost by definition misogynistic, 
perpetuating the image of Eve as a weak and malleable plaything of the devil who lured 
man into damnation through her credulous disobedience. This expectation, and the way 
in which it distorts approaches to representations of Eve, has remained virtually 
unchallenged and unquestioned since Jean M. Higgins identified its problematic 
                                                          
11
 Geroges Duby trans. Jean Birrell, Women of the Twelfth Century: Eve and the Church (Cambridge: 
Polity Press and University of Chicago, 1998) p. 32. 
12
R. Howard Bloch, Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), is particularly helpful on critiquing the expectation of misogyny and 
the way in which it is considered ubiquitous but is rarely analysed - passim but helpfully summarised in 
pp. 1-3. For specific examples and further detail, see historiographical survey below. 
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influence in a single article in 1976.13 
Abelard’s representation of Eve clearly presents something of an obstacle to the 
expectations with which the modern reader approaches medieval discussions concerning 
the first woman and the first sin. To find so optimistic a description of Eve, and the 
fallen human state that she represents, is both unexpected and unexpectedly challenging. 
Admittedly, Abelard is hardly renowned for shying away from controversy, but even so, 
his description clearly demonstrates that misogynistic loathing of Eve was not 
ubiquitous, even among the male theologians whom Duby is so swift to condemn.  
Indeed, Abelard’s arguments go substantially beyond the idea that Eve’s sin was 
forgivable, or that she was a recipient of divine benevolence in spite of her sin. His 
analysis of the line ‘masculine and feminine he created them’ voices his conviction that 
the human soul, regardless of gender, is capable of reason and capable of engaging not 
only with divine love, but with divine wisdom.14 He states clearly that Eve was dearer to 
God on account of her merit and inherent worth, even after she had transgressed the 
boundaries of divine mandate. The lines which follow this initial assertion go so far as 
to say that the first sin was in fact beneficial to humanity as a whole, stating that Eve 
was actually dearer to God because she sinned, since it was that first sin which 
necessitated the glories of the Incarnation and the Redemption. ‘O happy fault’ Abelard 
                                                          
13
 Jean M. Higgins, ‘The Myth of Eve: The Temptress’ Journal of the American Academy of Religion vol. 
44, no. 4 (1976), pp. 639-647. The notes to p. 639 mention that ‘this article is part of a book [Higgins] is 
preparing on The Myth of Eve’. To the best of my knowledge, this book has unfortunately never been 
published. It would be inaccurate to state that the problem identified by Higgins has never been 
challenged; see the two following exceptions: Alcuin Blamires’ chapter on ‘Eve and the Privileges of 
Women’ in The Case for Women in Medieval Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 96-
125, and John Flood’s Representations of Eve in Antiquity and the English Middle Ages (London: 
Routledge, 2011). However, as is discussed in further detail below, whilst both these texts do indeed offer 
alternatives to the conception of Eve as a vehicle of, and justification for, misogyny, both insist that 
representations of Eve can really only illuminate conceptions of gender. In addition to the fact that these 
are really only intended to be brief surveys, neither of these texts seeks to examine the more broadly 
influential theological, ethical or philosophical impact of the figure of Eve within medieval thought.  
14 ‘Masculum et feminam creavit eos’, Genesis 1.27. ‘Capax est rationis et sapientie divini amoris 
particeps’, Expositio, p. 61. 
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writes, quoting the Easter vigil, ‘that merited such and so great a redeemer’.15 As far as 
Abelard is concerned, mankind would not have encountered Christ had it not been for 
Eve’s sin. Moreover, in defining what it meant to sin, Eve, necessarily, also defined 
what it meant to be virtuous. He maintains that Eve’s transgression improved human 
nature by providing the opportunity to become actively virtuous as opposed to 
remaining only passively sinless, since it is impossible to exercise genuine virtue 
without having experienced genuine temptation: ‘after [this first] sin we are better’, he 
writes, ‘for if there were no fight against adversity, where would be the crown of 
victory?’.16  
 
MOTIVATIONS AND AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The wider ethical and theological implications of Abelard’s claim will be discussed in 
greater detail below, but it is clear that, even at first sight, Abelard’s representation of 
Eve provokes numerous questions. The most obvious initial issue is that of how atypical 
Abelard might be in formulating so positive a representation of Eve, and in negotiating 
the apparent paradox of advantageous sin beyond the well-established notion of felix 
culpa.  
The possibility of tracing a tradition of positive representations of Eve, or at 
least a tradition of constructing nuanced treatments of her transgression, may seem at 
first seem unlikely. However, whilst Abelard’s florid and outright praise of Eve is 
indeed something of a rarity, the Expositio is not alone in its formulation of a measured, 
insightful and even generous account of Eve’s creation and sin. 
Examples of this level of exposition can be found in numerous texts roughly 
                                                          
15
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘O felix culpa que talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem’, 
Expositio, 455, 2728. 
16
 Exposition, trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘Post peccatum, meliores ex hoc efficimur… si enim nulla esset 
aduersitatum pugna, ubi esset uictorie corona?’, Expositio 454, 2718 - 2723. 
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contemporary with Abelard’s Expositio. Throughout Hildegard of Bingen’s treatment of 
the creation and fall narratives in her visionary opus Scivias, Eve is depicted as a white, 
wing-shaped cloud. The cloud is filled with stars which indicate the lives of her future 
offspring, immediately invoking Eve’s status as ‘mother of all the living’ rather than her 
role as temptress and sinner, and she soars above the world in stark contrast to the 
terrestrial and prosaically human figure of Adam, already prone on the earth like the 
serpent whose blandishments he heeds. 17  The creation scene in the Anglo-Norman 
Mystère d’Adam has God stridently declaring to Adam that Eve has been created as ‘his 
wife and peer’, with an equal share in their status as the crowning achievement of the 
process of creation.18 
Balanced and positive representations of Eve can also be found in some of the 
most significantly formative and widely-read texts of the high middle ages. Hugh of St 
Victor’s De sacramentis, for example, describes Eve not as an inferior being but as 
Adam’s equivalent, and a vital participant in their ‘mutual association in love’.19 He also 
states his approval of the frequently employed idea that Eve’s being created from the 
side of Adam represents a typological precedent of the Church’s being created from the 
side of the crucified Christ. 20  The Sententiae of Peter Lombard borrow Hugh’s 
description of Eve as being created to be ‘nec ancilla nec domina’, ‘neither slave nor 
mistress’, to Adam, but as his equal, created from his rib to signify their parity.21 
Moreover, Lombard echoes Abelard’s assertion the fall allowed mankind to progress 
                                                          
17
 Hildegard of Bingen ed. Adelgundis Führkötter and Angela Carlevaris, Scivias, Corpus Christianorum 
Scholars Version 43 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003) 1.2, 55-64. ‘Mater… cunctorum viventium’, Genesis 3.20. 
18
 ‘Co est ta femme e tun pareil’, Leif Sletsjöe ed., Mystère d’Adam: Édition diplomatique accompagnée 
d’une reproduction photographique du manuscrit de Tours et des leçons des éditions critiques, 
Bibliothèque française et romane (Paris: Klincksieck, 1968) line 10. Translations are my own. 
19
 ‘In consortium… dilectionis’, Hugh of St Victor ed. Rainer Berndt, De sacramentis Christiane fidei, 
Corpus Victorinum, Textus Historici vol. I (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008) 1.6, 35.  
20
 Ibid., p. 155. 
21
 Peter Lombard ed. Ignatius C. Brady, Sententiae in iv libris distinctae, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 
– 5 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010) 2.28, 2. Hugh wrote that ‘quia ergo viro nec ancilla nec domina parabatur 
sed socia; nec de capite nec de pedibus, sed de latere fuerat producenda’,  De sacramentis, 1.6, 35.  
10 
 
spiritually, from remaining merely untempted to becoming actively virtuous, because it 
is impossible to exercise virtue without experiencing temptation, and without 
understanding the consequences of sin.22 
It is clear even from these brief excerpts that sufficient evidence can be 
marshalled to demonstrate that whilst Abelard’s praise of Eve might be forthright, it is 
not an isolated occurrence. Given the ingrained expectation of misogyny in medieval 
representations of Eve, this is in itself notable. However, when examining twelfth-
century texts which devote a substantial amount of attention to the figure of Eve, it 
quickly becomes clear that discussions of Eve during this period are concerned with 
considerably more than conceptions of gender. A closer reading of the texts briefly 
excerpted above demonstrates that their representations of Eve reveal more about 
twelfth-century conceptions of human nature than they do about attitudes toward 
women.  
This is not to suggest that twelfth-century responses to Eve are entirely free from 
the patriarchal mentalities of the era in which they originate. It should be made clear 
from the outset that the texts quoted above do not, even at their most generous, amount 
to a full scale vindication of Eve. None of these authors go so far as Abelard in praising 
Eve’s sin. None of the texts, Abelard’s included, are unequivocally in favour of Eve’s 
actions. None of them argue that Eve’s prelapsarian parity of status should be extended 
to women in general, and neither do they dispute the notion of the male and the 
masculine being stronger and more authoritative than the female and the feminine. The 
claims of parity and equivalence do not exempt Eve from her husband’s governance, or 
challenge his axiomatically greater strength. It is vital to emphasise the fact that these 
are not feminist, or ‘proto’-feminist, texts. 
                                                          
22
 Lombard, Sententiae, 2.24, 1. 
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However, this does not mean that they contain nothing but the vacuous 
sophistries of misogynist polemic. Representations of Eve were both the subject and 
object of extensive disputation and debate during this period. They demonstrate a 
hitherto unacknowledged level of complexity and provide valuable insight into some of 
fundamental theological and philosophical questions of the central middle ages. The 
complexity and utility of these texts have been unfairly obscured by the inflexible 
insistence on gender and misogyny which persists throughout modern scholarship 
which reduces the medieval figure of Eve to a mere emblem of antifeminist prejudice. 
As will be discussed in the historiographical survey below, modern scholarship has 
frequently been content to assume that medieval representations of Eve reveal only 
entrenched antifeminism, particularly in the twelfth century. This assumption explains at 
least in part the absence of any substantial modern treatment of the figure of Eve in the 
twelfth century, or in the middle ages more widely. This thesis seeks to question this 
assumption, and to demonstrate that whilst representations of Eve do to some extent 
elucidate conceptions of gender during this period, the figure of Eve was principally 
employed in order to explore and critique the nature and status of mankind as a whole, 
in both its prelapsarian and fallen states.  
The thesis thus has four principal objectives. It aims to demonstrate the twelfth-
century figure of Eve to be a fundamental element of medieval theology and thought. It 
also aims to identify twelfth-century commentary on the creation and fall of mankind as 
a valuable and hitherto overlooked source of insight into the intellectual methods and 
preoccupations of this formative period. In addition, it aims to draw attention to the 
historiographical lacunae which exist in terms of scholarship on Eve and on medieval 
Genesis commentary more generally, and to offer some insight into the ways in which 
these mystifyingly neglected texts might be useful in elucidating twelfth-century 
12 
 
thought more widely. Finally, the thesis is intended to question the extent to which Eve 
functioned as a convenient antifeminist topos.  
 
 
THE CORPUS AND ITS CONTEXT 
Interpreting the opening chapters of Genesis was an exegetical undertaking which had 
preoccupied Christian thinkers long before the twelfth century. As Abelard informs 
Heloise in the preface to his Expositio, the extant material concerned with interpreting 
the creation and fall narratives, particularly the influential work of Augustine, is so 
dense and problematic that ‘the very interpretation seems to require interpreting’.23 The 
hexaemeral writings of the Church fathers became, essentially, a canonical textual body 
almost as respected as the Bible itself; reams of exegesis so fundamental as to require 
exegesis themselves. 24  Whilst Patristic commentary on Eve is subject to as many 
cultural sensitivities as the medieval, some of the more generous twelfth-century 
arguments about Eve comprise an element of the inheritance bequeathed to the medieval 
West by the early Church Fathers, in the main part from the Latin tradition. 
For example, the idea that the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib can be read as a 
typological representation of the creation of the Church from the side of the crucified 
Christ was first discussed by Tertullian.25 The notion that Eve’s being the first human to 
be created within paradise itself indicated her superiority in the order of creation, 
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 Exposition, trans. Cizewski, p. 32. ‘…Ut ipsa rursus expositio exponenda esse censeatur’, Expositio, 7, 
55. It is Augustine’s commentaries on Genesis to which Abelard and Heloise are referring in particular 
here.  
24
 The only full length survey of Patristic hexaemeral texts remains that of Frank Egleston Robbins, The 
Hexaemeral Literature: A Study of the Greek and Latin Commentaries on Genesis (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1912). 
25
 ‘Si enim Adam de Christo figuram dabat somnus Adae mors erat Christi dormituri in mortem, ut de 
injuria perinde lateris ejus vera mater viventium figuraretur Ecclesia’, Tertullian, De anima ed. J. H. 
Waszink, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [hereafter referred to as CCSL] 2 (Turhnhout: Brepols, 
1954) 43, 62 - 64. 
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originates in the work of Ambrose.26 However, by far the most significant identifiable 
Patristic influence on twelfth-century approaches to the figure of Eve was Augustine.27 
Particularly influential is his allegorical interpretation of Eve, in which Eve is presented 
as a component of every human soul, regardless of the gender of the body in which it 
resides.28 As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, Abelard’s high opinion of 
Augustine’s exegesis of Genesis was widely shared - of all the extant Patristic writing 
on the creation and fall, none is so frequently alluded to, quoted, referenced and relied 
upon as that of Augustine.  
Regardless of how well-trodden this exegetical path might have been by the 
central middle ages, the twelfth century witnessed a proliferation of interest in the 
narratives of the creation and fall. In his survey of the images which accompany high 
medieval hexaemeral commentaries, Johannes Zahlten has calculated that over the 
course of the extant twelfth-century evidence, there is a nine hundred per cent increase 
in texts concerned with the hexaemeron and fall when compared to that of the eleventh 
century.29 John Flood has observed that the number of texts from this period which 
‘involve substantial treatments of Genesis is such that even an enumeration of them 
                                                          
26Ambrose, ‘Denique extra paradisum factus, hoc est, in inforiore loco, vir melior invenitur; et illa quae in 
meliore loco hoc est, in paradiso facta est, inferior reperitur’, Exameron & De paradiso, ed. C. Schenkl, 
CSEL 32, 1 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1897), De paradise, 1.4. Ambrose is 
also credited with writing the ‘felix culpa’ section of the Easter vigil which declares the fall to have been 
beneficial to mankind – on this attribution see Victor Y. Haines, ‘The Iconography of the Felix Culpa,’ 
Florilegium vol. 1 (1979) pp.151—158 and Gerard Lukken, Original Sin in the Roman liturgy: Research 
into the Theology of Original Sin in the Roman Sacramentaria and the Early Baptismal Liturgy (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1973). 
27
 Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus, and De Genesi ad 
litteram libri duodecim. The last three books of the Confessiones also deal with Genesis but devote little 
attention to the figure of Eve. For Augustine’s influence on medieval theology more generally see 
Edward King and Jacqueline Schaefer ed., St. Augustine and His Influence in the Middle Ages, Sewanee 
Medieval Studies, No 3 (Tenessee: Sewanee Medieval Colloquium, 1988) and Jaroslav Pelikan, The 
Growth of Medieval Theology, 600-1300, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of 
Doctrine no 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
28
 E.g. De Genesi ad litteram, 3.22 
29
 Johannes Zahlten, Creatio mundi: Darstellungen der Sechs Schöpfungstage und 
naturwissenschaftliches Weltbild im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979) pp. 25-6. The accuracy of 
these calculations has been verified more recently by Conrad Rudolph in his ‘In the Beginning: Theories 
and Images of Creation in the Twelfth Century’, Art History vol. 22, no 1 (1999) pp. 3-55; see 
particularly p. 20, and notes 5 and 6 on p. 47. 
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would be a considerable enterprise and amount to a who’s who of medieval theology’.30 
Giles Gasper has more recently drawn attention to both the creativity and breadth of 
extant twelfth-century treatments of the hexaemeron, and to the extent to which these 
texts have been curiously neglected by modern scholars.31 
Interpreting the opening chapters of Genesis was an exegetical challenge 
undertaken by many of the most significant and well-regarded scholars of the central 
middle ages – in addition to the writers already mentioned, the impressive list of 
scholars who produced commentaries on Genesis during this period includes Rupert of 
Deutz, Honorious Augustodunensis, Stephen Langton, Thierry of Chartres, Peter 
Comestor, Hugh of Amiens, Petrus Cantor and Robert Grosseteste.32 As Abelard asserts, 
the difficult opening chapters of Genesis provide the key to understanding the nature 
and arrangement of the world (‘dispositio mundi’) in its entirety, and the volume of 
twelfth-century commentaries on the creation and fall narratives suggests that this 
interpretative challenge was readily accepted.33 Amid the twelfth century’s flourishing 
intellectual activity, exegesis of the hexaemeron and fall provided both a vehicle and an 
impetus for submitting the enigmas of the creation and fall to systematic analysis, and 
the figure of Eve in particular raised numerous problematic questions regarding the 
nature of free will, why human beings are tempted, and indeed why sin and suffering 
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 Flood, Representations of Eve, p. 65. 
31
 Giles E. M. Gasper, ‘ “Oil upon the waters”: On the Creation of Light from Basil to Peter Lombard’, 
Archa verbi 8 (2011) pp. 9 – 31; see particularly pp. 9 – 11.  
32
 Rupert of Deutz, Commentariorum in Genesim, PL vol. 167; Honorius Augustodunensis, Hexaemeron 
and also Elucidarium, liber I, PL vol. 172; Thierry of Chartres, ‘Hexaemeron’, in Nikolaus M. Häring ed., 
Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1971); Peter Comestor, ed. Agneta Swylan, Scolastica Historia: Liber Genesis, 
CCCM 191 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005); Hugh d’Amiens, ed. F. Lacoste, ‘Un commentaire scriptuaire du 
XII
e
 siècle: le Tractatus in Hexaemeron de Hugues d’Amiens’, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et 
littéraire de Moyen Âge, vol. 25 (1958) pp. 227-294; Petrus Cantor, ed. Agneta Sylwan, Glossae super 
Genesim (Goteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1992); Robert Grossesteste, ed. Richard C. Dales 
and Servus Gieben, Hexaemeron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). There is no edition of 
Langton’s commentary; Emmanuel Bain advises that MSs Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 355 and 14414 are 
the best extant manuscript witnesses; see Bain, ‘ “Homme et femme il les créa”: Le genre féminin dans 
les commentaires de la Genèse au douxième siècle’, Studi Medievali, vol. 48, no 1 (2007) pp. 229-270, p. 
233. 
33
 Abelard, Expositio, 9, 72. 
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were permitted to exist at all. 
The treatment of the figure of Eve in these texts reveals much about the 
developments and changes in the intellectual priorities and methods of this period, and 
the various ways in which the narratives of creation and fall were approached. 
Discussing the figure of Eve offered, or perhaps even demanded, the opportunity to 
examine and rationalise the state of mankind after the fall in a way which focused less 
on gendered divisions than on the universally significant issues of sin, virtue, temptation 
and the construction of the human soul. 
The question of Eve’s connection with misogyny thus obscures a potentially 
more significant area of discussion. The texts with which this thesis is concerned 
destabilise the apparent certainty that the figure of Eve provided a locus for gendered 
disapprobation, and thus they demand a more nuanced approach to twelfth-century 
conceptions of the first woman, sinner and mother than an inflexible insistence on 
misogyny can accommodate. If twelfth-century writing demonstrates evidence of a 
tendency to provide sympathetic readings of Eve, the implications of this surely extend 
to something rather more complex than an incipient vindication of women, or an early 
contribution to the much discussed querelles des femmes. Rather, as a cornerstone of 
one of the most significant biblical texts within Christian thought, Eve was crucial to 
explorations of sin and virtue, temptation and free will, the construction of the human 
body and soul, and the place of humanity within the divinely ordained hierarchy of the 
created universe. 
This thesis focuses on a corpus of six key texts, most of which were quoted 
briefly above: Abelard’s Expositio in hexameron, Guibert of Nogent’s Moralia in 
Genesim, Hugh of St Victor’s De Sacramentis, Hildegard of Bingen’s Scivias, Peter 
Lombard’s Sententiae and the Anglo-Norman Mystère d’Adam. The representations of 
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Eve discussed throughout this thesis date from the turn of the twelfth century to the 
1150s, and therefore range chronologically from the beginning to the peak of high 
medieval hexaemeral output. These comprise six of the most substantial treatments of 
the hexaemeron and fall narratives produced in the twelfth century, and the various 
disparities and differences within this group of texts serves to highlight the extent to 
which the figure of Eve provided a keystone throughout twelfth-century responses to 
prelapsarian and fallen human nature. Despite their different genres, purposes and 
circumstances of composition, these texts are all marked by their profound concern with 
the figure of Eve, and they are united by their measured and analytical presentation of 
Eve as an emblem of mankind’s state and composition. This thesis seeks to make clear 
that such complexity exists in representations of Eve which emerged from a variety of 
genres and provenances, and thus close reading across genres forms a crucial 
component of the methodology employed throughout.  
The earliest of these texts, Guibert of Nogent’s Moralia in Genesim, was begun 
around 1084, and completed, after some significant revision, around 1113.34 Guibert is 
best known for his autobiography, De vita sua, and also his Gesta Dei per Francos, but 
his little-known Genesis commentary, with its revealingly evolving representation of 
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 Guibert of Nogent, Moralia in Genesim, PL vol. 156. Translations are my own. There is some difficulty 
with dating the commentary and the different extant redactions of it. Guibert writes in his De vita sua that 
he edited and moderated the Moralia as a result of his contact with Anselm of Canterbury; see PL vol. 
156 cols 875 C – 876 A. Guibert recounts in his autobiography that the Moralia was begun whilst he was 
at the abbey of St Germer de Fly. Anselm, then abbot of Bec, was a frequent visitor to the abbey at Fly, 
and Guibert describes the assiduous intellectual attention Anselm supposedly devoted to him, and the 
impact that Anselm’s exegetical methodology had on his work in general; see De vita sua, cols 874 A – 
875 A. Jay Rubenstein has demonstrated, based on the discovery of an earlier manuscript containing the 
Moralia (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 529), that the later extant copies of this commentary represent 
a text significantly modified in the light of the formative teaching Guibert received from Anselm. As 
Rubenstein notes, the earliest complete copy of the Moralia is dedicated to Bishop Bartholomew of Laon, 
who did not become bishop until 1113, and thus BN lat. 529 is, he suggests, the earlier 1080s version of 
the commentary which Guibert describes as having been later revised. See Rubenstein, Guibert of Nogent: 
Portrait of a Medieval Mind (London: Routledge, 2002) pp. 28 and 39-44, and also Giles Gasper, St 
Anselm and his Theological Inheritance (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004) pp. 67-8. 
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Eve, deserves more attention that it has hitherto received.35 It is particularly useful for 
comparative purposes, since it predates the other texts employed here, in terms of 
chronology and tradition, and offers a sustained but rather less generous account of Eve 
and her transgression than the later treatments. Guibert’s principal concern throughout 
the Moralia is tropological or allegorical exegesis, and the first two books of the text are 
devoted specifically to interpreting the creation and fall in this way.36 His representation 
of Eve undergoes some significant development over the course of the text. The 
commentary demonstrates a shift in intellectual priorities, moving from a simplistic 
concern with corporeal temptation and lust, to a distinctly more nuanced analysis of the 
mechanics of free will and reason within the action of sin. 
Similarly concerned with these issues is Abelard’s Expositio in hexaemeron, 
written approximately twenty years after Guibert’s Moralia around 1133. 37  The 
Expositio comprises a literal interpretation of each of the six days of creation, up to 
Genesis 2.25.
38
 Almost half the text is devoted to the sixth day, for which Abelard also 
provides a brief moral and allegorical interpretation. Whilst Abelard is enormously 
well-known and much of his oeuvre has been extensively studied by modern scholars, 
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 Other than Rubenstein’s work on the Moralia outlined in the note above, there has been very little work 
devoted to the Moralia. It is mentioned in Rubenstein, ‘St. Anselm’s Influence on Guibert of Nogent’ in 
Anselm - Aosta, Bec and Canterbury: Papers in Commemoration of the 900
th
 Anniversary of Anselm’s 
Enthronement as Archbishop ed. G. R. Evans and David Luscombe (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1996) pp. 296-309, and in Gasper, St Anselm pp. 67-8. The short text on preaching which provides an 
introduction to the Moralia has been examined by Cizewski in ‘Guibert of Nogent’s How to Preach a 
Sermon’, Theological Studies vol. 59 (1998) pp. 407-419. 
36
 PL vol. 156, cols 31C – 84B. 
37
 Eligius Buytaert’s dating of the text to 1133 has recently been verified by Cizewski; see E.M. Buytaert, 
‘Abelard’s Expositio in hexameron’, Antonianum 43 (1968) pp. 163-194 and Exposition trans. Cizewski, 
p. 11. See also Constant Mews, ‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et 
littéraire du moyen âge 52 (1985) pp. 73-134. 
38
 After the interpretation of the hexaemeron there is a ‘continuatio’ which carries on as far as Genesis 
2.25 in the most complete of the four extant manuscripts, and Cizewski suggests, given that the 
continuation breaks off abruptly in all four of the extant copies, that Abelard may have intended the 
commentary to continue at least as far as the expulsion from paradise; see Exposition ed. Cizewski, p. 16-
18.  
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his Genesis commentary has remained surprisingly neglected.
39
 Like Guibert, Abelard 
places the figure of Eve at the ethical crux of his text. However, it is clear that Abelard 
conceived the exegesis of the creation and fall as a theological enterprise that was 
significantly different from Guibert’s Moralia. Abelard’s text is largely preoccupied 
with literal interpretation of the opening chapters of Genesis; partly as a development of 
the work of Augustine, but mostly as an attempt to comprehend the mysteries of 
creation by examining the created things themselves. His representation of Eve reflects 
a shift from Guibert’s focus on the individual soul to a focus on mankind as a whole, 
and the position mankind occupied within the carefully calibrated order of the created 
universe. As has already been mentioned briefly, Abelard’s treatment of Eve occurs in 
the context of a broader debate about the nature of sin and the ethical processes which 
afflict the tempted soul; thus Eve emerges as a crucial part of a wider philosophical 
examination which evidently sits more appropriately alongside his work on ethics than 
it does alongside his views on women. Although the description of Eve as being dearer 
to God than many thousands of sinless men is clearly gendered, the issues which her 
actions raise are not. Eve’s dilemma is re-enacted in every human soul which 
experiences temptation and confronts the choice between the act of sin and the act of 
virtue; virtue being, for Abelard, a conscious, deliberate and active mental and spiritual 
operation. 
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 In addition to Cizewski’s translation of the text and Buytaert op. cit., there is Eileen Kearney, ‘Peter 
Abelard as Biblical Commentator: A Study of the Expositio in hexameron’ in Petrus Abaelardus (1079-
1142): Person, Werk und Wirkung, ed. Rudolph Thomas, Trierer Theologische Studien 38 (Trier: 
Paulinus, 1980) pp. 199-210. None of these focus on the representation of Eve. The text is also discussed 
briefly elsewhere in the context of Abelard’s work more generally - Marenbon cites the Expositio in 
hexameron alongside the Problemata Heloissae as being indicative of the apparent level of theological 
sophistication which characterised teaching at the Paraclete, and questions Peter Dronke’s suggestion that 
these texts are largely personal communications composed on the pretext of academic enquiry. He also 
convincingly suggests that the Expositio comprises a summary of what Abelard taught in the schools on 
the hexaemeron, refuting Eligius Buytaert's suggestion that the Expositio represents a simplification of 
this teaching in order to suit a ‘wider’ (i.e. less educated) audience. See Marenbon The Philosophy of 
Peter Abelard, pp. 77-79; Dronke, Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval Europe (Rome: Edizioni di Storia 
e Letteratura, 1992) pp. 308-9; Buytaert, ‘Abelard’s Expositio in hexameron’, p. 182. 
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Around the same time as that the Expositio was written, Hugh of St Victor 
constructed his monumental summa, De sacramentis Christianae fidei.40 Long regarded 
as one of the most influential theological texts of the middle ages, several recent studies 
have emphasised the significance of the creation and fall narratives in this text and 
throughout Hugh’s work more broadly. 41  De sacramentis discusses the hexaemeral 
narrative, and that of the fall and expulsion, as part of a wider theological enterprise 
concerned with providing a systematic analysis of the sacraments and their 
corresponding doctrine. Like Abelard, Hugh treats Eve’s creation and sin as 
fundamentally instructive, although his approach differs in numerous significant ways. 
Hugh’s account of Eve’s creation places considerable emphasis on the notion of the 
Eve’s prelapsarian parity with Adam. Like Abelard, he is an early proponent of the view 
that Eve’s creation from the rib, rather than the head or feet, of Adam indicated that they 
were, in spite of their different levels of strength, essentially equal in the eyes of God.42 
Hugh’s interpretation of the fall is preoccupied with the notion that Eve relinquished a 
privileged state of knowledge and awareness rather than with defining sin, or virtue, 
itself. However, when compared with Guibert’s Moralia, the representations of Eve 
constructed by both Abelard and Hugh demonstrate an identifiable shift in intellectual 
priorities - Hugh and Abelard seek not only to interpret Eve’s creation and sin, but to 
ask and explain why and how these processes occurred.  
Similar in scope if not execution to De sacramentis is Hildegard of Bingen’s 
Scivias, which Hildegard worked on for the best part of a decade between the years 
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 For dating and manuscript tradition, see Berndt’s introduction to his edition, op. cit. pp. 16-19.    
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 Boyd Taylor Coolman, The Theology of Hugh of St Victor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) pp. 31-78; Paul Rorem, Hugh of St Victor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 38-52, 69-
72, and 75-79; Coolman and Dale M. Coulter eds, Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, 
Richard and Adam of St Victor, Victorine Texts in Translation (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011). 
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 De sacramentis, 1.6, 35. 
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c.1141 and c.1151.43 Scivias is difficult to attach to any particular genre, but can best be 
described as a very early theological summa executed in the form of a series of visions 
beginning with the creation and fall, in which the author claims to have been a conduit 
of the word of God. However, Scivias is generally approached as uniquely visionary text 
composed by a marginalised female mystic who supposedly provides ‘a rare feminine 
voice soaring above the patriarchal choirs’.44 Hildegard’s representation of Eve as a 
wing-shaped cloud in Scivias has attracted some scholarly attention, which has largely 
served to isolate the text even further by failing to contextualise Hildegard’s 
interpretation alongside comparable contemporary commentary on the creation and fall 
narratives. 45  Disproportionate emphasis on Hildegard’s gender and her supposed 
originality has obscured her exegetical work, overshadowing the extent to which her 
interpretation of the creation and fall both reflects and engages with the principal 
concerns of other twelfth-century commentaries on Genesis. The representation of Eve 
as a wing-shaped cloud is unusual, but the theological concerns which precipitated it are 
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 Newman has commented on the similarity between these two works, stating in her Introduction to the 
Bishop and Hart translation that ‘Read as a visionary work, Scivias is unique; read as a compendium of 
Christian doctrine, it takes its place alongside many similar works of the period. The closest parallel is 
provided by Hugh if St Victor’s summa, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith… As an early 
scholastic who was also noted teacher of contemplation, Hugh bridged the gap between the older 
monastic theology represented by Hildegard and the newer, more systematic mentality of the schools’, 
Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 23. The concrete distinction between ‘monastic theology’ and 
‘scholastic theology’ is dubious, and it is chronologically impossible for Hugh to bridge any gap between 
Hildegard’s ‘older monastic’ theology and that of the schools, since De sacramentis was completed 
almost a decade before Scivias was even begun. Nonetheless Newman is right to locate Scivias in the 
context of twelfth-century theology rather than treating it as an isolated and atypical text. However, as can 
be seen in the note below, Newman, unfortunately, does not do so consistently.  
44
 Newman, Introduction to Scivias ed. Bishop and Hart, p. 10. She also makes the questionable claim that 
‘If Hildegard had been a male theologian, her Scivias would undoubtedly have been considered one of the 
most important early medieval summas’. Caroline Walker Bynum’s preface to the Bishop and Hart 
translation claims that Hildegard presents ‘the wellings up of profound female experience’, ibid., p. 5. See 
also Newman, Sister of Wisdom: St Hildegard's Theology of the Feminine (California: University of 
California Press, 1987). Peter Dronke, Charles Burnett, and Constant Mews have produced more nuanced 
studies of Hildegard’s theology and its context - see Dronke and Burnett, Hildegard of Bingen: The 
Context of her Art and Thought (London: Warburg Institute/University of London, 1998) and Mews, 
‘Religious Thinker: “A Frail Human Being” on Fiery Life’ in Newman ed., Voice of the Living Light: 
Hildegard of Bingen and Her World (California: University of California Press, 1998) pp. 52 – 69. 
45
 See Rebecca Garber, ‘Where is the body? Imitability in Hildegard’s Images of Eve and Mary’, 
Feminine Figurae: Representations of Gender in Religious Texts by Medieval German Women Writers 
(London: Routledge, 2003) pp. 33-60. Newman, Sister of Wisdom, pp. 89-132. 
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not. Hildegard is not the only medieval female author whose work has been affected in 
this way, as Fiona Griffiths has perceptively observed: 
In the past, it was common for women to be excluded from studies of 
medieval writing (as they were from studies of medieval society more 
generally). Since the 1970s attempts have been made to remedy this 
exclusion. However, since they have focused primarily on the addition of 
women as ancillaries to a traditionally male canon… these attempts have 
tended simply to perpetuate women’s exclusion - both by defining 
women in opposition to the mainstream and by arguing for their 
involvement in a separate and even subversive discourse.46 
 
Consequently, Hildegard is examined here as another commentator on the hexaemeral 
and fall narratives rather than as ‘a medieval female writer’. The differences between 
the Scvias and the other texts discussed here are principally disparities of execution 
rather than content, and Hildegard’s major concerns regarding Eve’s creation and sin 
have much in common structurally and thematically with other major treatments of the 
figure of Eve composed during this period. 
Lombard’s Sententiae (c.1150-5) represents, alongside Hugh’s De sacramentis, 
the ‘mainstream’ of twelfth-century intellectual and theological writing, and their 
representations of Eve, whilst they have not attracted a great deal of attention in modern 
scholarship, would nonetheless have been easily accessible and widely read during the 
twelfth century and the later middle ages. Lombard shares Abelard’s and Hildegard’s 
interest in the idea that Eve’s sin ‘improved’ mankind’s standing in the eyes of God.47 
Lombard’s earlier clarification of this idea also reveals that even Abelard’s apparently 
unprecedented assertion that Eve’s sin made her dearer to God than many thousands of 
sinless men, actually has its roots in Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram.48 The hugely 
influential Sententiae, composed during the early to mid-1150s, are Lombard’s magnum 
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 Fiona J. Griffiths, The Garden of Delights: Reform and Renaissance for Women in the Twelfth Century 
(Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 8. 
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 Lombard, Sententiae, 2. 24, 1.  
48
 See Chapter III, section I below. 
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opus, representing high medieval theology at its most systematic and enquiring. 49 
Lombard not only addresses the questions Hugh and Abelard sought to ask; he presents 
a series of authoritative answers. Giulio Silano has written that Lombard’s Sententiae is 
best viewed as a medieval casebook whose function was to present an ‘anthology’ of 
authoritative potential responses to difficult or frequently raised theological questions.50  
The text thus reflects which sections of the creation and fall narratives were considered 
particularly significant during this period, and the amount of attention Lombard devotes 
to the formation and fall of Eve is indicative of her significance. In particular, Eve is a 
vital component in Lombard’s exposition of the way in which the human soul is 
constructed. According to the Sententiae, every soul has an ‘Adam’ element and an 
‘Eve’ element, and whilst the figure of Eve functions within this discussion as an 
allegorised representation of the soul’s will rather than its reason, it is nonetheless clear 
that this composition of different spiritual forces is present in every human soul 
regardless of the gender of the body in which it resides.51  
Lombard also repeats verbatim Hugh’s assertion that Eve was created to be 
neither slave nor mistress to Adam but his equivalent.52 An Anglo-Norman redaction of 
this idea of parity in creation appears in the Mystère d’Adam, in which the voice of God 
declares to Adam that Eve is ‘your wife and your peer’.53 The mid to late twelfth-
century Mystère d’Adam, also known as the Jeu d’Adam or the Ordo representacionis 
Ade, comprises nine-hundred and forty-four lines of vernacular exegesis, most of which 
(lines 1-588) is devoted to the creation of Adam and Eve, the first sin, and the expulsion 
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 According to Giulio Silano, the earliest known manuscript is dated 1158 by its scribe; see Lombard, 
trans. Silano, The Sentences Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 2007) p. xiii. Studies of Lombard include Joseph de Ghellinck, Le mouvement 
théologique du XIIe siècle : sa préparation lointaine avant et autour de Pierre Lombard, ses rapports 
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and Marcia Colish’s Peter Lombard, 3 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
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 Ibid., pp. xix-xxvi.   
51
 Lombard declares ‘in nobis est mulier et vir et serpens’, Sententiae, 2.24,7. 
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 Ibid., 2.18, 2. 
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 ‘Co est ta femme e tun pareil’, Mystère ed. Sletsjöe, line 10. 
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from paradise.54 The remainder of the text deals with the story of Cain and Abel, and the 
last section comprises a procession of the prophets. Despite the existence of only one 
extant manuscript witness, the text has received considerable scholarly attention across 
several disciplines. There has even been some specific study of the representation of 
Eve in the play: Maureen Fries has rightly emphasised the complexity of the character, 
and Kathleen Blumreich-Moore has explored the notion of sin as treason in the play.55 
All the authors mentioned above employ their discussions of Eve’s creation and 
fall within the context of universally applicable arguments concerning ethics, 
knowledge, human nature and the mechanics of temptation and abstention. In order to 
pursue the objectives outlined above, this thesis examines these arguments by arranging 
its corpus of texts thematically, addressing the main roles with which the figure of Eve 
was endowed in both her biblical incarnation and within twelfth-century thought. The 
thesis is structured as follows. The main three chapters are preceded by a survey of 
relevant secondary literature, in order to situate thesis historiographically, and discuss in 
detail the lacunae which exist in extant scholarship which employs and discusses the 
medieval figure of Eve. Chapter I then discusses representations of Eve as the first 
woman. This chapter demonstrates both the extent to which Eve was conceived as 
Adam’s peer and equivalent rather than his subordinate, and that exegesis of Eve’s 
creation provided a means by which to examine the origins of mankind and the 
composition of the universe in which they operated. Chapter II discusses representations 
of Eve as the first wife and mother. This chapter demonstrates the figure of Eve to be a 
significant component of discourse concerning marriage in the twelfth century, and also 
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 The text is preserved in a single manuscript (Bibliothèque municipale de Tours 927) which is 
reproduced in full by Sletsjöe. ‘Ordo representacionis Ade’ is the title given in the manuscript, f. 20.  
55
 Maureen Fries, ‘The Evolution of Eve in Medieval French and English Religious Drama’, Studies in 
Philology vol. 99, no 1 (2002) pp. 1-16. See pp. 1-5 for her discussion of Eve in the Mystère d’Adam’. 
Kathleen Blumreich-Moore, ‘Original Sin as Treason in Act I of the Mystère d’Adam’, Philological 
Quarterly no 72:2 (1993) pp. 125-141. 
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discusses the ambiguity of Eve’s designation as mother of all the living. Chapter III 
discusses representations of Eve as the first sinner. This chapter demonstrates that Eve, 
rather than being vilified as a model of female iniquity, was employed in order to 
elucidate the mechanics of sin and temptation within the human soul, and that there 
existed a consistent level of emphasis on the advantages of the first sin.
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THE MEDIEVAL FIGURE OF EVE: 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In terms of the extant scholarship relating to the twelfth century, and indeed to the 
middle ages more broadly, navigating contemporary work on medieval representations 
of Eve is a surprisingly difficult task for several reasons. Firstly and most importantly, 
there is remarkably little in the way of a historiographical tradition of writing 
exclusively or at length on the figure of Eve. In addition, there is virtually no 
historiographical tradition of writing on the medieval hexaemeral tradition. There also 
exists the contradictory problem that whilst there has been very little work on the 
medieval figure of Eve specifically, references to Eve are frequently encountered 
throughout scholarship on medieval conceptions of gender. If Eve is rarely examined in 
modern scholarship, she is nonetheless frequently invoked and alluded to: the figure of 
Eve has become a sort of shorthand for medieval attitudes towards gender. As will be 
demonstrated below, it is considered so apparently self-evident that Eve lies at the heart 
of these attitudes, that it has apparently become unnecessary to explore or even to 
substantiate this assumption. Given the significance with which the idea of Eve is tacitly 
endowed in these brief but frequent allusions, it is surprising that so little work has been 
devoted exclusively to it.  
 In order to situate this thesis and to demonstrate the historiographical 
contribution that might be made by studying the medieval figure of Eve, this section 
provides a survey of the extant modern scholarship which deals with medieval 
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commentary on Genesis, and with the figure of Eve herself. It first discusses the 
medieval hexaemeral tradition; an area which has traditionally been overlooked. It then 
discusses scholarship relating to the figure of Eve directly, beginning with the small 
amount of work devoted exclusively to Eve in the middle ages, followed by the wide 
and varied body of work which employs Eve as an emblem of ‘the feminine’ in the 
middle ages. 
 
EXTANT STUDIES OF MEDIEVAL COMMENTARY ON GENESIS 
As was mentioned above, the only monograph to have attempted to provide a full 
survey of hexaemeral commentary is Robbins’ The Hexaemeral Literature: A Study of 
the Greek and Latin Commentaries on Genesis.1 Published in 1912, only the last twenty 
pages of this study are devoted to hexaemeral writing ‘from Eriugena to the 
Renaissance’.2 There has also been some work completed on Genesis commentary as 
used by Milton in Paradise Lost, but this does not, and is not intended to, offer a great 
deal of insight into the context and significance of the medieval tradition.3 In addition, 
early vernacular and apocryphal treatments of the hexaemeron and expulsion narratives 
have received some attention thanks to the work of Brian Murdoch, but this work does 
not address the Latin canon, and nor does it take into consideration the significance of 
the hexaemeral tradition as a whole.4 Thus in spite of some interest in Patristic Genesis 
commentary, the medieval tradition as a whole has been neglected. 
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 See above, p. 12, note 23. 
2
 Robbins, The Hexaemeral Literature, pp. 73-93.  
3
 For example, Mary Irma Corcoran, Milton’s Paradise Lost with Reference to the Hexameral 
Background (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1945); J.M. Evans, Paradise Lost and 
the Genesis Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 
4
 Brian Murdoch, The Fall of Man in the Early Middle High German Biblical Epic: The Wiener Genesis, 
the Vorauer Genesis and the Anegenge (A. Kümmerle, 1972); The Recapitulated Fall: A Comparative 
Study in Mediaeval Literature (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1974); Adam’s Grace: Fall and Redemption in 
Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2000). There is also one chapter devoted to 
apocrypha concerning Adam and Eve in The Medieval Popular Bible: Expansions of Genesis in the 
Middle Ages (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2003) pp. 42-69. 
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This historiographical lacuna was identified as long ago as the early 1980s, in 
unpublished PhD theses by Gunar Freibergs and Wanda Zemler Cizewski.5 Cizewski 
has continued to complete further work on some specific hexaemeral commentaries, 
which has shed much light on their ability to illuminate the wider intellectual concerns 
of the twelfth century.6 In addition, Cizewski’s translation of Abelard’s Expositio forms 
part of the renewed interest in these texts which has recently begun to emerge. The 
medieval tradition of commentary on Genesis appears to be burgeoning area of 
scholarly interest, with several significant studies having emerged in the past few years. 
As was mentioned above, Conrad Rudolph has drawn attention to the volume of extant 
twelfth-century material concerned with the creation and fall. 7  Giles Gasper has 
discussed the creation of light in hexaemeral commentaries from Basil to Lombard, and 
is preparing, with Greti Dinkova-Bruun, a new survey of the medieval hexaemeral 
tradition.8 Emmanuel Bain has discussed the categories of male and female in twelfth-
century hexaemeral commentaries in an article which offers an impressively nuanced 
account of gender in medieval responses to the creation narrative.9 In addition, several 
individual medieval commentaries on Genesis have also been recently studied and/or 
edited.10 Yet, whilst the medieval hexaemeral tradition appears to be emerging as an 
                                                          
5  Gunar Freibergs, ‘The Medieval Latin Hexameron from Bede to Grosseteste’, PhD dissertation, 
University of Southern California, 1981; Wanda Zemler Cizewski, ‘The Doctrine of Creation in the First 
Half of the Twelfth Century: Selected Authors [Rupert of Deutz, Honorius Augustodunensis, Peter 
Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor]’, PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, Centre for Medieval Studies, 
1983. 
6
 See for example ‘Beauty and the Beasts: Allegorical Zoology in the Twelfth Century Hexaemeral 
Literature,’ in Haijo Westra ed., From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought, Studies 
in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau (Leiden: Bill, 1992), pp. 289-300; ‘Interpreting the Hexaemeron: 
Honorius Augustodunensis De neocosmo,’ Florilegium vol. 7 (1985) pp.  84-108. 
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 Rudolph, ‘In the Beginning’, passim but particularly p. 20. 
8
 Giles Gasper, ‘ “Oil upon the waters”: On the Creation of Light from Basil to Peter Lombard’, Archa 
Verbi vol. 8 (2011) pp. 9-31. The forthcoming collaboration with Dinkova-Bruun will comprise a survey 
of the medieval hexaemeron c. 1070 – 1270. 
9
 Emmanuel Bain, op. cit. 
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 Bede, trans. Calvin B. Kendall, On Genesis, Translated Texts for Historians (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1999); Michael Gorman, ‘The Commentary on Genesis of Angelomus of Luxueil and 
Biblical Studies under Lothar’, Studi Medievali vol. 40 (1999) pp. 559-632; idem. and Martine Dulaey 
eds, Isidorus Episcopus Hispalensis: Expositio in Vetus Testamentum: Genesis (Freiburg: Herder, 2009); 
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area of burgeoning interest within medieval cultural and intellectual history, the figure 
of Eve remains largely absent from this field. 
EXTANT STUDIES OF THE MEDIEVAL FIGURE OF EVE: DUBY AND FLOOD 
An examination of the modern studies devoted specifically to the figure of Eve in the 
Middle Ages is necessarily brief as far as historiographical surveys go, since there are 
only two of them: Duby’s Eve and the Church, and John Flood’s Representations of Eve 
in Antiquity and the English Middle Ages. Both these studies have their strong points 
and shortcomings, but the essential issue with both is that they do not offer a sustained 
analysis of the position which the figure of Eve occupied in medieval thought, choosing 
instead to focus exclusively on gender. These studies principally provide short surveys, 
which devote little attention to commentary on Genesis specifically, or to the wider 
intellectual and theological contexts in which the medieval figure of Eve was 
constructed.11 On account of their neglect of texts which devote full attention to the 
complex theological and philosophical issues raised by Eve and her role within the 
narratives of creation and fall, Duby and Flood present a distorted or incomplete 
assessment of the place of Eve in medieval thought.  
Duby’s Eve and the Church represents a missed historiographical opportunity; 
namely, the chance to have had one of the greatest medievalists of the twentieth century 
writing about some of the most compelling texts of the twelfth century. However, the 
text is problematic in several ways. It does not actually analyse twelfth-century 
representations of Eve at all, and if it had done so, it would have been enormously 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Kevin Hughes, ‘St Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron: Fractured Sermons and Protreptic 
Discourse’, Franciscan Studies vol. 63 (2005), pp. 108-129. 
11
 Duby’s study comprises approximately 130 pages and Flood’s not much more. Unlike his ‘predecessor’, 
Flood acknowledges the parameters of the study, declaring right from the beginning that despite the 
book’s chronological range, its title ‘should be hedged about with caveats and qualifications’, op. cit., p. 1. 
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valuable. The following quotation, from Jo Ann McNamara’s review of the trilogy, 
offers some indication of the issues which affect Duby’s study: 
More in anger than in sorrow, I confront the responsibility of reviewing 
this posthumous work from one of the most celebrated and productive 
medievalists of our time. Anger first because a serious university press 
with an excellent list in the history of women in the Middle Ages would 
surely never have considered publishing this work had any lesser name 
appeared on the cover. Moreover, the profit the name can still be 
expected to engender has been maximised by spreading a modest group 
of articles over the pretentious spaces of a trilogy entitled Women of the 
Twelfth Century. A share of anger, however, must also be reserved for the 
author who served up this bit of fluff as the last statement of a great 
career…[Duby] does not pretend to say anything at all about women 
living in the twelfth century, and, indeed, makes very little pretence of 
saying anything about women.12 
 
McNamara’s claims sound at first to be excessively scathing; however, she is, 
unfortunately, entirely accurate in her assessment. Reading Eve and the Church, one 
would be forgiven for concluding that the Fall was thought to have occurred merely as a 
convenient scriptural justification for antifeminist vitriol, and that twelfth-century 
writing presents sin and corporeality as exclusively female afflictions which demanded 
ruthless eradication. 
Duby insists that Eve, and thus all women, were considered merely ‘a 
receptacle, a womb primed for the germination of the male seed, and that she had no 
other function than to be impregnated’.13 The Genesis narrative was, according to Duby, 
relevant to twelfth-century scholars only insofar as it answered three questions – why 
humanity is sexual, why humanity is guilty, and why humanity is unhappy. Predictably, 
the answer according to Duby lies in the faults of Eve, and the faults of all her female 
descendants.14 He writes that as far as twelfth-century scholars were concerned, ‘the 
Fall, no doubt, was provoked by the appetite for pleasure’, and that ‘the men of the 
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 Jo Ann McNamara, ‘Review: Women of the Twelfth Century by Georges Duby’, Speculum vol. 74, no. 
3 (1999) pp. 732-33; p. 732. 
13 Duby, Eve and the Church, pp. 36. 
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 Ibid. p. 28. 
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Church were afraid of women’.15 He maintains that ‘in the last analysis, the priests used 
the words of Eve, her actions and the sentence that condemned her as an excuse to load 
the burden of sin onto women in order to disburden men’, since Eve had ‘doubly sinned’ 
and was ‘therefore doubly punished, not only, like Adam, by physical pain, but by her 
subjection to male power’.16 At certain points in the text it is difficult to tell whether 
Duby is criticising, repeating, or even defending, the misogyny he finds to be so 
apparently ubiquitous; for example, in his claim that Eve ‘deserved to be the mother of 
the dead’.17 All the statements quoted above are presented as being completely and 
axiomatically accurate: ‘this then’, he declares, ‘was how the most learned priests of the 
twelfth century responded in the face of Eve and her troubles’.18 Despite having failed 
to devote any substantial attention to twelfth-century commentaries on Genesis, or 
indeed to any text which offers a sustained, systematic treatment of the theological 
position occupied by women more broadly, Eve and the Church presents a portrait of a 
high medieval Church fuelled by misogynistic contempt, intent on corrupting and 
distorting the image of the female who is the object of frustrated desire and loathing in 
equal measure.  
The crucial question of where the evidence for all of this is to be found is one 
about which the text remains silent, since it contains no critical apparatus at all. Even 
the direct quotations are completely unreferenced: there are no footnotes or citations of 
any kind. There is not even a bibliography. McNamara is perhaps unnecessarily caustic 
in describing the trilogy as ‘a series of short articles, without notes or bibliography of 
                                                          
15 Ibid. pp. 39 and 78. 
16 Ibid., pp. 46 and 38. 
17 Ibid., pp. 41. I do not wish to labour a point here, but see also p. 36, ‘[Eve was] only a wife and above 
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the female ‘duty’ to accept being reduced to ‘a receptacle, a womb’. 
18 Ibid., p. 42. 
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any sort, suitable for airplane magazines’, but her criticism is not unjustified.19 The 
text’s main purpose appears to be the repetition of tedious platitudes relating to 
medieval clerics and their supposed hatred of all women who happened not to be the 
mother of Christ. As McNamara says, the trilogy in general says very little about 
twelfth-century women, as was supposedly its aim, but Eve and the Church, in addition 
to this, says very little about the figure of Eve. It hardly seems worth lamenting that the 
text entirely neglects to contextualise its questionable selection of fragments which 
mention Eve, or that it goes so far as to admit that the Genesis narrative, or at least the 
hexaemeron component thereof, ‘contained the seeds of a spiritual promotion of 
women’ and then subsequently ignores this line of enquiry. In spite of its title, the text 
evidently never aimed to provide a full and measured analysis of representations of Eve, 
or to readdress the common conception of Eve in the Middle Ages by taking into 
account the texts which challenge the idea of endemic clerical misogyny. This 
represents a most unfortunately wasted opportunity - even at one hundred and thirty 
pages, had Duby actually discussed Eve and the Church, it would no doubt have proved 
enormously enlightening. Instead, the text stands in contradiction to everything that the 
last few decades’ worth of scholarship (including his own) on high medieval gender, 
identity, and mentality sought to do, and succeeded in achieving. 
Until very recently, Eve and the Church was the only full length study 
(ostensibly) focusing on the figure of Eve explicitly. This has recently been rectified by 
the publication of John Flood’s Representations of Eve in Antiquity and the English 
Middle Ages. This succinct text traces the traditions of writing about Eve from the major 
Patristic authors, with an understandable focus on the work of Augustine, to the time of 
Chaucer and Dante, including a chapter discussing the much neglected genre of 
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defences of Eve. 20  With the exceptions of Peter Lombard and Peter Comestor, the 
writings of the twelfth century are generally overlooked. Given the study’s intended 
emphasis on medieval texts in English, it skips chronologically from a chapter on ‘The 
Anglo-Saxon Eve’ to one on ‘Later Medieval Theology’. 21  However, this is an 
enormously useful study insofar as it establishes firstly the utility of studying the figure 
of Eve, and secondly in identifying the textual and methodological issues involved in 
doing so. Flood identifies and critiques the inconsistency in modern scholarship which 
employs the figure of Eve as a form of unthinkingly inaccurate shorthand, or an 
insufficiently researched allusion:  
[Eve] appears as a backdrop where she is taken for granted but left 
unexamined. When, as is common, scholarly books or articles make a 
passing reference to Eve to explain some aspect of gender differences, 
they should specify to which Eve they are referring. Yes, it is true that the 
majority of accounts of her were negative, but they were negative in 
significantly different ways. At the same time, the positive depictions of 
Eve should not be forgotten. Eve is useful neither as shorthand for 
women nor for the oppression of women; her history is too rich and 
varied.22 
 
Flood also points out that any reader seeking to find feminist ideals within a medieval 
text will inevitably find themselves disappointed, even by the more positive 
representations of Eve:  
From the outset… it should be stated that medieval ‘profeminism’ is 
always deficient when examined by a modern reader; for example, there 
are several interpretations of the Genesis story that are positively 
disposed towards Eve, but they stop short of gender equality: they are 
inherently patriarchal.23 
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Nonetheless, to disregard such texts as revealing nothing but arrant misogyny is neither 
just nor useful: ‘fortunate in living in a time when equality of the sexes is at least the 
stated aim of society, it is too easy to look back and score easy points with 
straightforward literary-critical analysis of ancient and medieval works’.24  
However, Flood’s study is predicated on the notion that representations of Eve 
can elucidate nothing more than perceptions of women and of gender, and that the 
Genesis narrative has been variously manipulated in order to construct them. The 
narrow and reductive nature of this approach does a disservice to the fascinating 
diversity of material that Flood assembles, and undermines his convincing assertion that 
Eve is too significant a figure to be used merely as ‘shorthand for women or the for the 
oppression of women’.25  ‘Because the centre of this book is the first woman’, the 
introduction states, ‘it is silent about many of the great themes to be found in Genesis 
(such as the nature of evil and divine providence)’.26 It is the main contention of this 
thesis that this argument can, and indeed should, be completely reversed – that, on the 
contrary, representations of Eve actively demand and develop discourse concerning the 
major themes of Genesis, rather than silencing them. Certainly in the case of the 
twelfth-century texts which provide the basis of the present study, it is precisely because 
the figure of Eve is under discussion that major themes such as the nature of evil arise.  
Flood inadvertently highlights this in his brief description of Peter Lombard’s 
representation of Eve in the Sententiae: 
Following the precedent of earlier twelfth-century sentence collection, 
Lombard constructed a systematically organised body of theology drawn 
mostly from the writings of the Church Fathers. These included 
Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory, Bede, Chrysostom, Origen and 
Isidore of Seville. For the history of the representation of Eve, Lombard 
is a hinge figure. He ensures the influence of particular Patristic passages 
while inspiring his commentators to further elaboration of the themes he 
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chose. ...In distinction twelve, he begins an account of the six days, 
commenting on the formation of man in distinction sixteen and the 
production of woman in distinction eighteen before he goes on to 
consider the Fall. In the process he discusses various topics related to 
issues in Genesis including causation, providence and free will, but the 
focus here will be exclusively on matters related to gender.27 
 
Here, the figure of Eve clearly belongs at the centre of both twelfth-century scholastic 
methodology and of the twelfth century’s intellectual and theological priorities. It is 
evident from this passage that constructing representations of Eve was, at least for 
Lombard and  other twelfth-century commentators, a fundamental part of the onerous 
theological enterprise of Genesis commentary, and the numerous problematic issues that 
the Genesis narrative provoked. Flood is entirely correct to emphasise the fact that 
examining Eve and her role in the creation and fall inevitably raises wider ethical 
questions relating to free will, action, grace and temptation.28 It thus seems something 
of a wasted opportunity to gloss over these other issues in favour of focussing explicitly 
on the topic of gender. This becomes particularly apparent alongside his insightful 
survey of the reasons why the figure of Eve is too significant and why ‘her history is too 
rich and varied’ to remain a mere shorthand for women or the ways in which they have 
been oppressed.29 
By divorcing representations of Eve, and the texts which construct them, from 
their context of wider medieval discussion of the major themes of the Genesis narrative, 
Flood risks distorting or marginalising them. Representations of Eve are a component of 
responses to the narratives of the creation and fall, and thus cannot ever really be 
separated from their theological and philosophical setting without reducing their utility 
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and impact. In addition, separating representations of Eve from the context of wider 
Genesis-related debates which are not focused on gender is likely to exacerbate the 
impulse to relegate them to being ‘shorthand for the oppression of women’; a 
problematic approach which Flood rightly and eloquently identifies as being reductive 
and insufficiently rigorous. To say that representations of Eve need to be fully examined 
simply because they are all ‘negative in significantly different ways’ gives insufficient 
credit to the complexity and illuminating qualities of the texts in question. 30 
Furthermore, the assertion that all medieval responses to the figure of Eve were negative 
is itself questionable.  
 
‘THE MYTH OF EVE’: THE USE OF EVE AS AN EMBLEM OF ‘WOMAN’ AND AS THE CAUSE 
OF MISOGYNY  
 
Although Duby and Flood are the only scholars who have discussed the medieval figure 
of Eve exclusively and at length, their emphasis on gender, and their lack of attention to 
many of the wider issues raised by Eve’s role in the Genesis narrative, is representative 
of the way in which Eve is alluded to throughout modern scholarship on medieval 
conceptions of gender and the position of women. Discussions of medieval 
representations of Eve are usually limited to discourse on gender and misogyny, and 
assume Eve to be the cause of and justification for misogyny throughout the Middle 
Ages and beyond. As will be demonstrated below, there remains the assumption that the 
figure of Eve provoked nothing more than misogynistic sentiment from medieval 
writers and their readers. More concerning, however, is the equally prevalent tendency 
to be guided by this assumption without verifying and contextualising the necessary 
sources, or indeed in some cases, without even quoting any of them first hand. As Flood 
rightly points out, Eve has simply come to be synonymous with women and their 
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subjugation.31 
The majority of modern scholarship on the Middle Ages which employs the 
figure of Eve does so as part of a wider argument concerning gender or misogyny in the 
middle ages. The use of Eve in this way has shaped modern perceptions of the medieval 
figure of Eve as a repository of antifeminist ideas, or as a convenient emblem of 
medieval women in general. This perception and use of the medieval figure of Eve is 
rarely based on analysis of medieval texts which systematically examine the creation 
and fall narratives. However, the assumption that medieval representations of Eve will, 
almost by definition, be misogynistic, has rarely been challenged.  
There is a long standing tradition in feminist scholarship of associating the 
figure of Eve with the development of Western misogyny. Simone de Beauvoir 
exemplifies the use of the figure of Eve as an emblem for the oppression of women at 
the hands of patriarchal systems which were considered to have their origins in early 
Christianity and scriptural misogyny. In Le deuxième sexe, Beauvoir asserts that  
The woman seems the most formidable temptation of the Devil. 
Tertullian wrote: ‘Woman, you are the gateway of the Devil. You 
persuaded him whom the Devil dared not attack directly. It is because of 
you that even the son of God had to die; you should always go about in 
mourning clothes and rags’. Saint Ambrose: ‘Adam was driven to sin by 
Eve and not Eve by Adam. It is just that she receive as sovereign the one 
whom she drove to sin’. From [the time of] Gregory VI, when celibacy 
was imposed on priests, the dangerous character of the woman is more 
severely emphasised: all the Fathers of the Church proclaim her 
abjection.
32
 
 
Obviously, Le deuxième sexe was not intended to provide an interpretation of the figure 
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of Eve, or a definitive examination of the role of women in any one specific period or 
genre. Consequently, Beauvoir’s use of the figure of Eve is not underpinned by lengthy 
study of the Patristic texts she cites in her description of Eve. However, Eve has been 
consistently employed in this way throughout texts which do intend to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the theological position occupied by women. Henderson 
et al. convincingly argue that Beauvoir’s discussion of Eve and the way in which she 
relates it to the concept of woman ‘other’ was a directly formative influence particularly 
on Phyllis Trible. 33  From Le deuxième sexe onwards, the figure of Eve became a 
significant element in feminist theory. She became, for feminist theology and feminist 
theory more broadly, both an icon to be ‘reclaimed’ as a model of independent thought 
and curiosity, and an emblem of patriarchal oppression.34 
This problematic approach is discernible throughout numerous subsequent 
responses to the figure of Eve which are concerned with medieval Christianity and its 
attitude toward gender and the position of women. In the preface to 1974 edited volume 
tellingly entitled Religion and Sexism, Rosemary Radford Ruether declared that  
Eve’s fall represents the de-humanization of women under patriarchy and 
patriarchal religion since the beginning of civilization... This is the 
history of the shattered image, because woman, in being made to 
represent the projections of what men are not, his fears and aspirations, 
became a mirror-being without real selfhood of her own, the amalgam of 
the contradictions of men. Simultaneously the ‘Devil’s Gateway’ and the 
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Virgin Mother, the hated and the adored, woman becomes, in Western 
mythology, a chimera without substance.35 
 
At least as far as the Middle Ages are concerned, this is manifestly not the case, as even 
a cursory reading of some medieval analyses of Eve’s fall would have proved. 
Nevertheless, this view of Eve is often encountered in feminist theology.36 In the same 
volume, Eleanor McLaughlin calls attention to the problems surrounding this type of 
approach. At the beginning of her considerably more nuanced article, McLaughlin 
criticises the persistent tendency for modern scholarship on women and the Church to 
fabricate a gloomy image of ubiquitous medieval misogyny, without having embarked 
upon sufficient investigation of the sources. She writes that ‘those few books on women 
and the Church that include a chapter on the Middle Ages’, of which, incidentally, 
Religion and Sexism is one, ‘paint an undifferentiated and quite unanalytical picture of 
medieval misogyny’. 37  Ruether’s extravagant claims of rampant misogyny and 
calculated dehumanisation provide an excellent example of the ‘undifferentiated and 
quite unanalytical picture’ which McLaughlin identifies. 
There are numerous additional examples of modern treatments of medieval 
gender which correspond to McLaughlin’s assessment insofar as they assume that the 
medieval figure of Eve was axiomatically represented negatively, but do not offer 
evidence to substantiate this assumption. R Howard Bloch, for instance, begins his 
study of medieval misogyny and gender with the perceptive criticism that  
Antifeminism... is a mode of thought often taken for granted; one that, 
when acknowledged, is often analysed superficially... A failure to 
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recognise the topic can itself be a source of misogyny by leaving the way 
open to the kinds of unconscious complicities to which none of us is 
immune.38 
 
Nonetheless, whilst he confidently claims that Eve is ‘the originary moment - the cause 
and justification - of medieval antifeminism’, the remainder of his study disregards 
Genesis commentaries, and indeed any other sustained theological treatments of Eve 
and the Fall that were composed after the time of Augustine.39 A comparable example 
can be found in Barbara Newman’s ‘Flaws in the Golden Bowl’, in which she states that 
‘another recurrent topos [in medieval writing about women] is the denunciation of 
curiosity, with woman as its symbol... and its chief exemplars were Dinah and Eve’. She 
goes on to explain Bernard of Clairvaux’s use of Dinah as an exemplar of curiosity, but 
does not explain anything further about the representation of Eve. According to 
Newman, Eve’s being presented as an archetype of the weak and wayward woman led 
astray by her intellectual and moral deficiencies is so self-evidently universal that there 
is nothing to be gained from investigating it further: 
Examples of [such] casual misogyny could be multiplied, but this 
particular dead horse has already been well beaten. The ‘weak woman’ 
topos may have been such a familiar cliché that some users scarcely 
perceived it as misogynist, any more than some people today would 
perceive it as racist to speak of blackening a person’s character. Even 
writers who generally exalted women, like Abelard and Hildegard of 
Bingen, made use of the topos.40 
 
No references are provided for any of these statements. Likewise, Judith M. Bennett, 
although a medievalist writing eloquently about the role of feminist thought in historical 
practice, employs the reductive dichotomy of the temptress Eve and the Virgin Mary as 
being representative of medieval attitudes towards women: ‘defamed and defended, 
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attacked and praised, caricatured as Eve and venerated as the Virgin, medieval women 
were both fully human and profoundly other’.41 Similarly, Simon Gaunt, in his study of 
gender in medieval French texts, quotes Joan Wallach Scott’s excellent assertion that as 
historians ‘we need a refusal of the fixed and permanent quality of the binary 
opposition, a genuine historicisation and deconstruction of the terms of sexual 
difference’, whilst on the exact same page he declares that medieval attitudes to women 
were shaped by ‘the dominant symbols of Eve and Mary throughout the Middle Ages’.42 
Peggy McCracken, although she titles her text The Curse of Eve, devotes more attention 
to the analysis of Alice Cooper’s lyrics than she does to the examination of the 
unsubstantiated Eve/Mary dichotomy on which much of her thesis relies.43  
Thus, despite some attention having been drawn to the problem, the 
‘undifferentiated and unanalytical picture of medieval misogyny’ identified by 
McLaughlin, combined with neglect of relevant sources, is still a dominant 
characteristic of discussion relating to the medieval figure of Eve. The extent to which 
this remains the case can be seen in the use of the ‘devils’s gateway’ phrase employed 
by Ruether in the passage quoted above. This provides a usefully specific example of 
the way in which the ‘myth of Eve’ prevails, and indeed can do so to the point where its 
apparently unassailable veracity overrides any perceived need to provide context or 
justification. 
Tertullian has become somewhat notorious for his description of Eve as the 
‘gateway of the devil’.44 This, it seems, is largely thanks to Simone de Beauvoir having 
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employed this excerpt in the well-known and often quoted passage on Patristic 
misogyny in Le deuxième sexe, as mentioned above. These lines tend to be presented as 
providing such a self-evidently accurate representation of pre-modern attitudes towards 
Eve, and to women in general, that it is quoted regardless of the seemingly obvious 
problems involved in employing a Patristic sartorial diatribe as useful evidence in the 
context of discourse on medieval theology and/or gender. In addition, it is never 
established, or indeed even raised as a possible question, whether or not the text was 
actually read by the medieval authors who supposedly assimilated its sentiments 
without question.  Again, Bloch is an excellent example of a scholar who makes 
frequent use of these lines, using them as an emblematic representation of medieval 
views of Eve, and of women more generally, without having considered the problems 
raised by so doing, despite his otherwise rigorous approach to his material.45 There are 
many examples of scholarship on gender which uses this quotation in much the same 
way.46  
However, De cultu feminarum is a minor tract on clothing which, unlike 
Tertullian’s more significant works, does not concern itself with the theology of creation 
or that of original sin, nor indeed with any of the complex theological issues these 
topics raise. In fact, De cultu feminarum does not appear in a single extant manuscript 
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between the ninth century and the fifteenth.47 It seems unlikely, therefore, that it was 
widely read throughout the middle ages, or that it had a great deal of impact on forming 
medieval representations of Eve and of women. Tellingly, ‘the devil’s gateway’ line is 
usually quoted in translation or from secondary sources and without any attempt to 
establish its context or its likely medieval readership. The lines are often cited from 
translations of the text, with no attempt to present the line in its original form, or indeed 
reproduced without any references being provided at all, which indicates the extent to 
which it has become uncritically accepted as accurate. 48  Moreover, it is presented 
without any attempt to establish some justification for presuming this obscure and 
anachronistic text to be useful evidence for the exploration of medieval attitudes toward 
Eve. It seems to be considered sufficient simply to quote the passage, without offering 
any appreciable sense of how widely known this short polemic was even amid Patristic 
scholarship, let alone how widely it was read by the medieval commentators who are 
apparently thought to have unthinkingly accepted its claims. 
CHALLENGING REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE: TRIBLE, HIGGINS AND BLAMIRES 
Trible’s ‘Depatriarchalizing in Biblical Interpretation’ represents the first academic 
                                                          
47
 De cultu feminarum appears in the ninth-century Agobardinus collection (Paris, Bibilothèque Nationale, 
lat. 1622) and does not appear again until the Editio M. Mesnartii in 1545; see the manuscript survey and 
also Tabula II in Dekkers’ CCCM edition of Tertullian’s works: Tertullian, Opera ed. E Dekkers, CCCM 
1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954) pp. 6-9. See also Marie Turcan, ‘La tradition manuscrite de Tertullien à 
propos du De cultu feminarum’, Revue des Études Latines vol. 44 (1966) pp. 363-372. 
48
  Of the examples given in the note above, Beattie, who describes the text as being ‘widely quoted in 
feminist critiques of Patristic theology’ but gives no examples of this, quotes from a translation without 
giving a page number, op. cit. p. 96 and p. 111 for the citation; Robinson references the lines as being 
quoted by Marina Warner, op. cit. p. 204; Warner herself refers to a translation with no page reference, 
see Alone of All Her Sex (New York: Vintage, 1983) note 18 to p. 58, on p. 371;  Jantzen gives a 
reference to Barbara MacHaffie’s revealingly titled Readings in Her Story: Women in Christian Tradition 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1992) which references a translation with adequate apparatus, but 
which presents the text as a crucial representative of medieval attitudes, see p. 27; Baldwin gives no 
reference at all but maintains that the passage typifies medieval views of Eve and of women; Haskins 
quotes from a translation but does give page numbers, op.cit. p. 416; Gregg also takes the passage from 
Warner’s Alone of All Her Sex, op. cit. p 246; Voaden quotes a translation, op. cit. p.24; McCash provides 
no reference at all and does not even acknowledge the lines to be a quotation, but again presents them as 
exemplifying medieval views of Eve and of women. 
43 
 
refutation of the idea that representations of Eve and exegesis of the creation and fall 
were inevitably written from a misogynistic perspective. 49  Trible argues that the 
hexaemeron, and the creation of Eve in particular, has been appropriated by modern 
writers who have employed it to serve religious or ideological agendas, at the expense 
of analysis and a rigorous approach to the actual texts alluded to.50 Feminist interpreters 
are equally guilty of this, according to Trible, and she singles out both Kate Millett and 
Mary Daly for criticism.51 
Crucially, Trible writes that ‘interpretation is often circular. Believing that the 
text affirms male dominance and female subordination, commentators find evidence for 
this view’.52 This may seem reasonably obvious, however, this statement identifies a 
persistent problem with modern interpretations of the figure of Eve and the way she was 
perceived in the past; namely, that they are a map of the reader’s own mentality rather 
than the result of close consultation of primary sources. This is to some extent an 
inevitable aspect of any form of exegetical criticism, but Trible’s thesis remains 
pertinent.  
Consequently, despite the fact that Trible focuses on direct scriptural 
interpretation rather than Patristic or medieval commentary, the approach she outlines in 
this seminal text is germane to the examination of the figure of Eve in any period. 
Trible’s ‘Depatriarchalizing’ is significant in its identification of a problem that persists 
in modern scholarship which employs the figure of Eve in arguments about medieval 
conceptions of gender, namely the extent to which it is characterised by the 
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unacknowledged but prevalent presumption that the figure of Eve and the spectre of 
misogyny are both ubiquitous and inevitable in medieval thought, but that analysing and 
interrogating them is entirely unnecessary. Trible attributes this problem to ‘the dangers 
of eisegesis’; that is, the tendency to examine a text and see only conformation of one’s 
extant beliefs and opinions.53  
Following Trible, Jean Higgins drew further attention to the problems 
surrounding the assumption of misogyny and the figure of Eve. In an article entitled 
‘The Myth of Eve: The Temptress’, Higgins identified and challenged ‘the myth of the 
temptress’ and the ways in which it has distorted approaches to the representation of 
Eve.54 The main premise of the article is that approaches to the figure of Eve have been 
informed by preconceived ideas and assumptions about lust and misogyny, and that 
there is simply no scriptural basis for depicting Eve as a temptress and seductress since 
the account in Genesis states merely that Eve ‘took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and 
gave to her husband, who did eat’. 55  Representations of Eve as an enticing and 
destructive femme fatale, Higgins asserts, ‘cannot be explained except in terms of each 
commentator’s own presuppositions and cultural expectations’, since there is so little in 
the biblical text to support such interpretation.56 
However, Higgins’ approach is somewhat problematic. There does not appear to 
be any particular rationale behind her choice of evidence, and she assumes (or at least, 
she provides no evidence to the challenge the idea) that every post-Biblical depiction of 
Eve, from Tertullian to Gerhard von Rad, is motivated by an anti-feminine 
                                                          
53
 Trible,‘Depatriachalizing in Biblical Interpretation’, p. 31. 
54 See note 11 above. 
55 ‘[Eva] tulit de fructu illius et comedit deditque viro suo qui comedit’, Genesis 3.6. 
56 Higgins, ‘Myth of Eve’, p. 647. 
 
 
 
45 
 
preoccupation with temptation and lust. The article attempts neither to explain why this 
might be the case, or what it might reveal about the authors of these depictions, beyond 
their desire to flesh out the narrative of the fall. This compromises the validity and 
significance of her overall argument, firstly because some evidence of more affirmative 
representations of Eve would have further emphasised the potentially revealing 
divergences and inaccuracies of the representations she does cite, and secondly because 
hardly any of the extensive evidence employed is taken from sustained analyses of the 
creation and fall. She overlooks the complex and measured representations of Eve 
which can be found in favour of selecting fragments which support her overall thesis. 
This undermines her criticism of those whose use of Eve privileges their own agendas 
over analysis of primary sources. 
Higgins’ pre-modern sources range from the writings of Tertullian to the Malleus 
maleficarum, via Heloise, Geoffrey de la Tour Landry, Bernard of Clairvaux, and 
Jacques de Vitry, inter alia, all examined through dislocated excerpts and brief or 
truncated quotations. Whilst this range is usefully varied, what the article gains in 
diversity it loses in consistency as a result: Higgins is right to draw attention to the 
dominant trend in modern scholarship of vilifying Eve without sufficient textual 
evidence, but it is precisely this disorganised and poorly-chosen corpus of platitudes and 
decontextualised fragments that she herself employs in order to lay the blame for this 
tradition on early scriptural commentators. These excerpts can hardly be said to 
represent the full extent of Patristic and medieval engagement with the creation and fall 
narratives and the complex theological issues they involve, and thus it is unfair to 
criticise them as ‘expressions of imagination, drawn mainly from each commentator’s 
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own presuppositions’.57 It is illogical to confine a corpus to diatribes, conduct texts and 
personal correspondence, and then to opine that the representation of significant 
theological figures found throughout this corpus is weak and unsubstantiated.  
  An additional exception the general tendencies encountered in approaches to the 
medieval figure of Eve can be found in the work of Alcuin Blamires. His study entitled 
The Case for Women in Medieval Culture seeks to redress the balance and assemble 
evidence for a medieval tradition of writing favourably about women, and part of this 
endeavour includes a chapter entitled ‘Eve and the Privileges of Women’.58 This chapter 
offers a brief but crucial survey of texts which are rarely discussed – those which offer 
generous analyses, or even outright defences, of Eve. The chapter employs a wide range 
of examples from Augustine to Christine de Pisan, including some references to Peter 
Lombard and Hugh of St Victor, but as with Higgins’s study, the evidence is generally 
rather fragmented. 
This is essentially the problem, as well as the strength, of the chapter: it runs the 
risk of imposing an alluring consistency and sense of logical progression on a selection 
of excerpts which are not quite so widespread or unified as they initially seem. For 
example, the main tenets of the chapter – the ‘privileges of women’ to which the title 
refers – are based on a list of items which describe the ways in which the creation of 
Eve means that women are in fact superior to men. The list runs as follows. Firstly, Eve 
is created from bone, a far more refined substance than the limo terrae from Adam was 
moulded. Secondly, whilst Adam was only placed in the garden of Eden after he had 
been fully formed, Eve was created within paradise. Thirdly, Eve is ‘the mother of all 
the living’. In addition, women are superior to men in their association with the mother 
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of Christ.59  
Blamires describes this list as being ‘one of those conventions which seem to 
appear from nowhere and quickly assume categorical, almost proverbial status’. 60 
However, the problem with this impressive roster of privileges is precisely the one 
Blamires inadvertently highlights with the phrase ‘appear to come from nowhere’. They 
are enormously difficult to trace, and simply do not appear with anything like the 
frequency required for something to be deemed cateogical or proverbial. Blamires cites 
only two sources in which they all appear together as a list: an unidentified Cambridge 
manuscript found by Paul Meyer in 1886, and one of Jacques de Vitry’s sermons.61  
Blamires also establishes the ‘defence’ texts in opposition to, or divorced from, 
the apparently ‘traditional’ misogynistic accounts. As Blamires is obliged to 
acknowledge, the theological ‘defences’ are often ambiguous or ambivalent: 
Of course the ‘privileges’ were not conjured, fully shaped, from 
nowhere. From the available evidence (albeit fragmentary) I think it most 
credible to suggest that they were the result of incremental growth, as 
writers opportunistically picked up cues... they often are, in reductive 
form, unsophisticated clichés of the medieval case for women.62 
 
In placing so much emphasis on gender, the chapter overlooks the broader theological 
and ethical contexts of the quotations from Abelard, Peter Lombard, Hugh of St Victor. 
Hence it inevitably becomes clear that they do not entirely fit beside Christine de Pisan 
and Dives and Pauper, because they are taken from texts in which Eve more often 
represented an allegorised element of the human soul, regardless of gender. That is not 
to say that Latin theology should be entirely divorced from lay and/or vernacular 
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writing. The Mystère d’Adam, for example, has considerably more in common with the 
Latin commentaries on Genesis than it does with any of the other Anglo-Norman texts 
alongside which it is usually placed simply because they happen to be written in the 
same language. Nevertheless, there is a difference in purpose and approach which must 
be acknowledged. Commentaries on Genesis did not set out to defend Eve or to vilify 
her, but to explain and comment upon the scriptural account of her actions, and they 
should be understood by, and informative to, the reader. Hence, whilst they might have 
informed, say, Christine de Pisan’s defence of Eve, they are nonetheless part of a very 
distinct theological enterprise, for which the figure of Eve represents a crucial element 
of human nature, rather than being an emblem of women and femininity. Nonetheless, 
Blamires remains the only scholar who has devoted any attention to positive 
representations of the medieval figure of Eve, and thus his chapter on Eve and the 
privileges of women is significant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Extant research which employs the medieval figure of Eve is principally concerned with 
gender. The texts discussed above use Eve either as an emblem of perceived ‘female 
nature’ in general, or as a means of explaining misogynistic and patriarchal mentalities. 
As Flood’s Representations of Eve has demonstrated, it is possible to do this with great 
success, and it is clear that examining representations of Eve can reveal much about 
conceptions of gender, and attitudes toward the supposed nature of ‘woman’. However, 
gender is ultimately only one of the many areas which can be illuminated by examining 
medieval representations of Eve, and extant research which discusses Eve places a 
disproportionate amount of emphasis on this subject. 
Moreover, Flood’s careful analysis of his medieval sources is, unfortunately, 
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something of an exception. As Flood himself points out, it is far more common to 
employ the figure of Eve as a form of unsubstantiated shorthand for the idea of 
‘woman’, or ‘femininity’, and to assume that medieval authors did the same. 63  As 
demonstrated by the frequent inaccurate use of the ‘devil’s gateway’ quotation, many of 
the texts which employ the medieval figure of Eve in this way demonstrate a concerning 
tendency to overlook what is actually in the primary source material, particularly those 
of the twelfth century.64 Careful analysis of these sources is too frequently eschewed in 
favour of recycled and unverified references from other secondary texts. Georges Duby 
remains the only scholar to have devoted any substantial attention to twelfth-century 
representations of Eve specifically, and unfortunately, Eve and the Church is predicated 
on a cliché - the image of the medieval male cleric so consumed by alternate horror and 
desire, that he invariably maligns and marginalises the figure of Eve as an emblem of 
disorderly ‘femininity’. Evidence which challenges the verisimilitude of this caricature 
is dismissed as a mere aberration. 65  Even the scholarship which acknowledges the 
tradition of defences of Eve does surprisingly little to redress the unjust assumption that 
medieval representations of Eve reveal only ubiquitous misogyny. Whilst it is 
enormously valuable to have this ‘defence tradition’ acknowledged, Blamires and Flood 
inadvertently privilege the questionable ubiquity of ‘clerical antifeminism’, by 
presenting the defences of Eve as atypical exceptions to the misogynistic rule.66  
In short, thanks to the expectation of misogyny, and exclusive focus on the idea 
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of gender, little has been done to acknowledge or assess the significance of the figure of 
Eve in medieval thought more widely. Hence we are left with an impression of the 
medieval figure of Eve that is inaccurate since, at least as far as the twelfth century is 
concerned, the widespread image of the misogynistic male cleric is simply not borne out 
by the major treatments of the creation and fall. Consequently, examining twelfth-
century representations of Eve involves confronting a problematic disparity between the 
historical and the historiographical. In order to address this disparity, it is necessary to 
examine the texts which seek to interpret the hexaemeron and the fall, rather than those 
which mention Eve only briefly, or refer to Eve with the specific intention of making a 
rhetorical point about gender. As the central figure in the narrative of mankind’s fall and 
expulsion, Eve was an exceptionally significant component of twelfth-century thought 
not merely to debates about gender but about human nature itself. She was an emblem 
not simply of the ‘fallen woman’, but of fallen mankind. The figure of Eve lay at the 
heart of the most crucial issues - creation and composition, free will and virtue, sin and 
temptation, punishment and compunction - raised by these narratives.
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CHAPTER I 
REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE AS THE 
FIRST WOMAN 
  
INTRODUCTION 
The texts with which this thesis is concerned reveal the creation of Eve to be a crucial 
component of the twelfth century’s flourishing corpus of writing on the hexaemeron. 
These texts demonstrate a consistent level of emphasis on, and consensus about, the 
equivalence and parity with which Eve was created, as well as a developing sense of 
engagement with the wider philosophical implications of the hexaemeral narrative. 
They generally present Eve not as an inferior or threatening creation, but as an equal 
participant both in the union she shared with Adam, and in the qualities which 
distinguished mankind as the apex of terrestrial creation. At the same time, these texts 
employ the scriptural account of Eve’s creation as a means by which to elucidate the 
mechanics of the creative processes which comprise the hexaemeron. They construct 
complex and searching representations of Eve as the first woman which succeed in 
negotiating the challenges presented by both literal and symbolic interpretations of the 
opening chapters of Genesis, and which demonstrate the theological significance 
attributed to the first woman and the creative processes by which she was formed. 
Whilst Marie-Dominique Chenu identified the creation of Eve as a significant 
site of theological debate in this period amid an increased concern with the hexaemeral 
narrative more widely, the subject remains neglected.1 The purpose of this chapter is 
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thus to demonstrate the dissemination of two hitherto overlooked aspects of twelfth-
century commentary; namely, the convention of presenting Eve as an equal partner to 
Adam, and the emergence of the narrative of Eve’s creation as a locus of discourse on 
the disposition and purpose of mankind within the order of creation.  
There are two passages in Genesis pertaining to the creation of Eve. The first is 
Genesis 1.26 – 27, which refers to the creation of humanity in general, making no 
distinction between Eve and Adam: 
And God said, ‘let us make mankind to our image and likeness, and let 
him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, 
and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that 
moves upon the earth’. And God created mankind to his own image, to 
the image of God he created [mankind], male and female he created 
them.2 
 
The second occurs in Genesis 2.21 – 24, which describes the formation of Eve 
specifically: 
Therefore the Lord God sent Adam to sleep and when he was asleep, he 
took one of his ribs and filled up flesh for it, and the Lord God built the 
rib which he took from Adam into a woman and brought her to Adam. 
And Adam said, ‘this is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she 
shall be called woman, because she is taken from man’.3 
 
Having breathed life into the inanimate matter from which Adam was created, God took 
a rib from the sleeping Adam and formed it into the first woman. The purpose for his 
having done so is that Adam was in need of an assistant companion like himself 
(‘adiutorum similem sui’) and, having already created the elemental and the animal 
components of Adam’s dominion, God ‘fleshed out’ the rib into another human being.4 
                                                          
2
 ‘Et ait “faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus 
caeli et bestiis universaeque terrae omnique reptili quod movetur in terra.” Et creavit Deus hominem ad 
imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos’, Genesis 1.26-27. 
3
 ‘Inmisit ergo Dominus Deus soporem in Adam cumque obdormisset tulit unam de costis eius et replevit 
carnem pro ea et aedificavit Dominus Deus costam quam tulerat de Adam in mulierem et adduxit eam ad 
Adam. Dixitque Adam “hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea haec vocabitur virago quoniam 
de viro sumpta est”’, Genesis 2.21-24. 
4
 Genesis 2.18-19. 
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These two accounts of Eve’s creation became subject to extensive disputation 
which, in the texts discussed here, is focused not on conceptions of female inferiority 
but on the origins of mankind as a whole. More specifically, they are concerned with 
elucidating the processes which enabled Eve to be formed from a rib, and with 
mankind’s establishment in the order of creation. An identifiable pattern emerges of 
consensus about the equivalence and parity which Eve was intended to share with 
Adam. To say that Eve is conceived in these texts as being categorically equal to Adam 
would be incorrect, since none of the authors discussed here consistently argue that Eve 
and Adam possessed identical levels of strength and privilege. As was mentioned in the 
introduction, these are not feminist or proto-feminist texts, and nor are they consistently 
pro-feminine. However, all of them emphasise the fact that Eve shared with Adam the 
qualities which made human beings the most sophisticated and significant terrestrial 
inhabitants created in the course of the hexaemeral narrative, and it is widely agreed that 
Eve’s status was that of a peer and equivalent within a balanced and reciprocal 
partnership. Contrary to the expectation of clerical antifeminism, which is discernible 
only in the early, and subsequently abandoned, arguments presented by Guibert of 
Nogent, the most explicit and systematically defended arguments for Eve’s parity 
appear in the scholastic commentaries, with Abelard, Hugh of St Victor and Peter 
Lombard providing the most rigorous assertions of Eve’s status as Adam’s equivalent.  
In addition, exegesis of Genesis 1.26 – 27 demonstrates the existence of a 
twelfth-century conception of the human soul as an entity which comprised both 
masculine and feminine elements regardless of the gender of the body in which the soul 
resided. Bain establishes as one of the principal features of twelfth-century hexaemeral 
commentary a complex conception of the categories ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ in this 
passage, which he says is characterised by the refusal to reduce such categories to 
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simple biological distinctions.
5
 This tendency is certainly identifiable in the texts 
discussed here. 
Also apparent within these texts’ representations of Eve as the first woman is the 
more broadly significant theme of a developing sense of engagement with exegesis of 
Eve’s creation, as well as the hexaemeral narrative more generally, as a means by which 
to expand extant knowledge of the created world and the place of mankind within it. 
With the exception of Guibert of Nogent’s exclusively moral and allegorical account of 
Eve’s creation, originating in the late eleventh century, it is possible to identify 
increasing preoccupation with the literal, physical processes which engendered Eve’s 
formation from the rib. This interest in the naturalistic and mechanistic aspects of Eve’s 
creation reveals a profound concern with what Abelard succinctly terms ‘dispositio 
mundi’; that is, the intelligible, observable composition and organisation of a cosmos in 
which mankind is perceived to be a vital participant.6  It seems that discussing the 
creation of Eve provided, or perhaps demanded, the opportunity to discuss the 
fundamental composition of mankind and of the universe in which they existed. 
Discussion of the creation of Eve in this context also reveals that the figure of Eve 
provided an opportunity to approach the disparities between the events of scriptural 
narrative and observable natural phenomena. 
 
I. ‘AD IMAGINEM DEI CREAVIT ILLUM, MASCULUM ET FEMINAM CREAVIT EOS’: 
REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE IN EXEGESIS OF GENESIS 1.26 – 27 
 
Genesis 1.26 - 27 presents numerous difficulties both in terms of the way in was 
interpreted by medieval scholars, and the way in which it is employed in modern 
                                                          
5
 Bain, ‘Homme et femme il les créa’, passim but particularly p. 236. 
6
 Expositio, 9, 72. 
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scholarship relating to gender in the middle ages. Some modern scholarship concerned 
with gender in the middle ages forges the impression of an anthropological and 
theological debate during this period about whether women were created in the image of 
God, or whether bearing the image of God was an exclusively male privilege indicative 
of the superior status according to which men were created.
7
 However, the texts 
discussed here reveal exegesis of this passage not as a locus of discord regarding the 
status of women, but as the site of discussion concerning the composition of the soul as 
an entity containing both masculine and feminine components, regardless of the gender 
of the body in which it resided. 
It is true that Abelard’s Expositio claims that Eve bore only the likeness of God; 
however, this argument paradoxically forms part of his subsequent rehabilitation of Eve. 
He is the only author discussed here who applies Genesis 1.26 – 27 to men and women 
specifically rather than human beings in general, and again, this is connected to his 
defence of Eve rather than an indication of misogyny. Also, the first book of Guibert of 
Nogent’s Moralia presents Eve as bearing only the likeness, and not the image, of God; 
an argument which is subsequently abandoned in the text. However, this initial 
argument is made because the early part of the texts aligns Eve with the body; that is, 
the aspect of the human being which is deemed incapable of bearing the image of God. 
It is the first book of the Moralia which deals with Genesis 1.26 – 27, and thus his 
exegesis of this passage bears the hallmarks of an immature scholar yet to benefit from 
the experience of substantial exegetical output, and from the formative wisdom of 
                                                          
7
   For example, Kari E. Børresen, ‘Imago Dei, privilège masculin? Interprétation augustinienne et 
pseudo-augustinienne de Gen. 1. 27 et 1 Cor. 11. 7’, Augustinianum vol. 25 (1985) pp. 213-234; 
Maryanne Cline Horowitz, ‘The Image of God: Is Woman  Included?’, Harvard Theological Review vol. 
72, no. 3, pp. 175-206. More specifically relevant to the treatment of this subject in twelfth century texts 
is Bain’s discussion of the image/likeness issue in ‘Homme et femmes il les créa’, pp. 239 – 245. 
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Anselm of Canterbury.
8
 Neither Abelard nor Guibert employs the image/likeness 
argument in order to claim that women were created to be inferior to men, or to argue 
that the hexaemeral narrative demonstrates men to occupy a more privileged and 
authoritative position in the order of creation. Thus, whilst the arguments constructed by 
these two authors necessitate examination, they are considered here as two individual 
interpretations rather than as adherents to an opposing view within a consistent and 
widespread debate about Eve as imago Dei. 
THE IMAGO DEI DEBATE: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY  
Despite the modern attention devoted to the issue of whether women were created in the 
both the image and likeness of God, it is difficult to find evidence of a sustained, 
widespread debate surrounding this subject in the twelfth century. The texts discussed 
here do not even mention the subject of Eve, or women in general, as imago Dei. 
Nonetheless, the subject has attracted sufficient attention that the phrase ‘image of God’ 
has come to be something of a rhetorical expedient in studies which concern themselves 
with constructing ‘the history of women’.9 Maryanne Cline Horowitz  has criticised the 
use of the phrase in this way, singling out the work of Julia O’Faolain and Lauro 
Martines as examples of the way in which using the phrase as a title ‘overstates the 
misogyny in the Western religious and humanist traditions’ which these texts discuss.10 
Bain has also commented on the way in which the use of this title has come to provide a 
                                                          
8
    See note 34, p. 16 above. 
9
   Particularly when employed as the title for a publication - see for example see Børresen, op. cit.; 
Horowitz, op.cit.; Julia O'Faolain and Lauro Martines eds, Not in God’s Image: Women in History from 
the Greeks to the Victorians (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). A more recent example is Julia Bolton 
Holloway, Constance S. Wright eds, Equally in God’s Image: Women in the Middle Ages (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1990). 
10
  Horowitz, ‘The Image of God: Is Woman Included?’, p. 205. It could of course be argued that 
Horowitz’s own use of the phrase in the title of this article does much the same. 
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kind of shorthand for the authors’ opinion about the status of women in the middle 
ages.
11
 
The rhetorical currency of this phrase appears to be both a function of, and 
partial explanation for, the fact that it is possible to identify several instances in modern 
scholarship dealing with twelfth-century conceptions of gender where a perhaps 
disproportionate level of significance and cogence is attributed to the image/likeness 
issue. For example, Barbara Newman claims, in her discussion of Hildegard of Bingen’s 
work on the creation narrative, that the subject is ‘a question central to medieval 
anthropology’, but the only evidence she provides of Hildegard’s participation in this 
supposedly prevalent debate is a single line in Liber divinorum operum; a line which 
does not in fact mention the notion of Eve as imago Dei.
12
 Horowitz, though she 
examines a range of Christian and Jewish writing dating from St Paul to Agrippa von 
Nettesheim, actually admits, inadvertently, that it is ‘rare’ to encounter ‘direct 
confrontation with the question “Is woman in God’s image?” ’.13 Bain claims that the 
notion of Eve’s bearing only the likeness of God is fundamental to the unequal 
theological status of women in the twelfth century, which contradicts his valuable 
observation that commentaries on Genesis from this period are remarkable for the lack 
of emphasis they place on the differences between women and men.
14
 The question of 
whether Eve bore the likeness of God also provides one of the few instances in which 
Abelard’s Expositio has been discussed in modern scholarship in a broader theological 
context, since the text describes Eve as bearing only the likeness of God. However, 
within this context, the Expositio has been unfairly misprepresented, and Abelard has 
                                                          
11
 Bain, ‘Homme et femmes il les créa’, p. 238, note 46. Like Horowitz, he gives O’Faolain and Martines 
as examples. 
12
 Newman, Sister of Wisdom: St Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine (California: University of 
California Press, 1997) p. 91. The line she quotes (in English only) here is ‘man signifies the divinity and 
woman the humanity of the Son of God’. 
13
 ‘The Image of God’, p. 195.  
14
 Bain, ‘Homme et femme il les créa’, pp. 229 and 238. 
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received criticism for his supposedly misogynistic interpretation of Genesis 1.26 by 
scholars who neglect to mention that the Expositio formulates one of the most positive 
representations of Eve produced by any medieval author.
15
 Likewise, Guibert of 
Nogent’s interpretation of this passage has been misconstrued, and inaccurately 
represented as being indicative of both the text as a whole, and of supposedly 
widespread tendencies in twelfth-century writing on the hexaemeron. 
However, in the texts with which this thesis is concerned, exegesis of Genesis 
1.26 - 27 is not connected with the attempt to provide a scriptural justification for 
perceived masculine superiority.
16
 In most of the texts discussed here, Genesis 1.26 – 27 
is principally considered to be an account of the creation of the soul. At no point do 
Hugh of St Victor, Hildegard of Bingen, Peter Lombard or the Adam poet enter into any 
debate about whether or not Eve bore the image of God. Nor do they refer to such a 
debate, or give any other kind of indication that such a debate existed. Indeed in 
Hildegard’s account of the soul’s creation it is Eve rather than Adam who is aligned 
with the soul. Moreover, whilst Abelard and Guibert both argue that Eve bore only the 
likeness of God, the Expositio and the Moralia both present strong cases in favour of 
the idea that the divisions imposed on mankind by the biological categories of male and 
female are less significant than the shared qualities which distinguish human beings in 
general as the apex of the creative processes recounted in the hexaemeral narrative.  
Rather than provoking disputation about male and female capabilities, Genesis 
1.26 – 27 had, since the time of Origen, been discussed as an account of the creation of 
                                                          
15
 For example Newman, Sister of Wisdom, p. 91; Horowitz, ‘The Image of God’, pp. 179-80. 
16
 Robert Javelet’s Image et resemblance au douzième siècle de saint Anselme à Alain de Lille, 2 vols 
(Strasbourg: Letouzey and Ane, 1967) provides some revealing contextualisation for the Eve as imago 
Dei issue and the attention it received in the twelfth century. The text comprises a sustained and lengthy 
examination of the concept of the image of God in a wider context beyond the subject of gender; however, 
over the space of two volumes, only nine pages are devoted to this supposedly widespread debate; see vol. 
1, pp. 236-45. 
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the soul, with the ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ elements referred to in the passage being 
considered different aspects of the soul which were universally apparent, regardless of 
the gender of the body in which the soul resided.
17
 A similar approach was taken by 
Augustine, whose De Genesi ad litteram argues that Genesis 1:27 refers only to the 
creation of the soul or mind:  
And so, although this external diversity of sex in the bodies of two 
human beings symbolises what is to be understood internally in the one 
mind of a single human being, still the female too, because it is simply in 
the body that she is female, is also being renewed in the spirit of her 
mind in the recognition of God according to the image of him who 
created that in which there is no male or female. Now just as women are 
not cut off from this grace of the renewal and reshaping of the image of 
God, although their bodily sex has a different signification, according to 
which the man alone is called ‘the image and glory of God’; by the same 
token too in that original creation of man in terms of which ‘man’ 
included woman as well [‘homo’], the woman of course also had her 
mind, a mind endowed with reason, with respect to which she too was 
made to the image of God.
18
 
Thus whilst men and women are biologically different, all human beings share the 
rational interior which distinguishes them as the only terrestrial creations bearing the 
image of God. It is this line of reasoning that is most evident in the twelfth-century 
exegesis of this passage discussed here. Hugh of St Victor writes that Genesis 1.26 
                                                          
17
 ‘Hunc sane hominem, quem dicit “ad imaginem Dei” factum, non intelligimus corporalem. Non enim 
corporis figmentum Dei imaginem continet, neque factus esse corporalis homo dicitur, sed plasmatus, 
sicut in consequentibus scriptum est. Ait enim, “et plasmavit Deus hominem”, id est finxit “de terrae 
limo”…Interior homo noster ex spiritu et anima constat. Masculus spiritus dicitur, femina potest 
nuncupari. Haec si concordiam inter se habeant et consensum, convivientia inter se ipsa crescunt et 
multiplicantur generantque filios sensus bonos et intellectus vel cogitationes utiles, per quae repleant 
terram et dominentur in ea’, Origenes Werk - Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins I: Die Homilien zu 
Genesis, Exodus und Leviticus, ed. W.A. Baehrens, Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der 
Ersten Drei Jahrhunderte vol. 29 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchandlung, 1920) pp. 15 and 19. 
18
 On Genesis trans. Hill, p. 237. ‘Itaque quamvis hoc in duobus hominibus diversi sexus exterius 
secundum corpus figuratum sit, quod etiam in una hominis interius mente intelligitur; tamen et femina 
quae est corpore femina, renovatur etiam ipsa in spiritu mentis suae in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem 
ejus qui creavit, ubi non est masculus et femina. Sicut autem ab hac gratia renovationis, et reformatione 
imaginis Dei, non separantur feminae, quamvis in sexu corporis earum aliud figuratum sit, propter quod 
vir solus dicitur esse imago et gloria Dei; sic et in ipsa prima conditione hominis, secundum id quod et 
femina homo erat, habebat utique mentem suam eamdemque rationalem, secundum quam ipsa quoque 
facta est ad imaginem Dei’, De Genesi ad litteram, 3.22.  
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refers to the creation of the soul only, since it is not actually possible for mankind’s 
physical form to bear the image or the likeness of God: 
Mankind was made in the image and likeness of God, because the soul 
was the better part of man. Actually, this better part was itself mankind 
made in the image and likeness of God: image according to reason, 
likeness according to love… Only in the soul was mankind made thus, 
because it is not possible for corporeal nature to take the likeness of the 
divine.
19
 
Peter Lombard also argues that it was the soul of mankind that was made in the image 
and likeness of God, but also offers the opinion that this passage might refer to the body 
as well: 
Man was made in the image and likeness of God in respect to his mind, 
by which he excels irrational creatures; in his image, however, according 
to memory, intelligence and love; in his likeness according to innocence 
and justice… But also ‘in the body he has some property which indicates 
this [i.e. his creation in God’s likeness], because his stature is erect, so 
that the body suits the rational soul because it is erect toward heaven.
20
   
The fact that Lombard’s Sentences do not enter or even refer to any debate about 
whether Eve bore the image of God is particularly telling, since this text provides an 
excellent barometer of scriptural passages which were deemed especially difficult or 
disputable.21  
Like Hugh and Lombard, Hildegard of Bingen maintains that Genesis 1.26 - 27 
refers to mankind universally. She does not deem this to be a particularly significant 
                                                          
19
 ‘Factus est homo ad imaginem et similitudino dei. Quia in anima potior pars erat hominis. Vel potius 
ipse homo erat fuit imago et similtudino dei. Imago secundum rationem. Similitudino secundum 
dilectionem... Hec autem in anima sola factum est quia corporea natura similitudinem divinitatis capere 
non potuit’, De sacramentis, 1.6, 2. 
20
 Lombard, Sentences Book II trans. Silano, pp. 70-71. ‘Factus est ergo homo ad imaginem dei et 
similitudinem secundum mentem, qua irrationabilibus antecellit; sed ad imaginem secundum memoriam, 
intelligentiam et dilectionem; ad similitudinem secundum innocentiam et iustitiam…Sed et in corpore 
quandam proprietatem habet quae hoc indicat, quia est erecta statura, secundum quam corpus animae 
rationali congruit, quia in caelum erectum est’, Sententiae 1.16, 3 and 4.  
21
   As Silano comments in the introduction to his translation of the Sentences, their influence and utility, 
for both modern and medieval scholars, lies in their ability to ‘provide balanced syntheses of theological 
debates… which everyone had come to regard as crucial in the development of doctrine. The Sentences 
also presented a very comprehensive collection of the questions which school masters raised, discussed, 
and settled or failed to settle’, Sentences Book I trans. Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 2007) pp. xxvii – xxviii. 
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area of debate, but in her discussion of why mankind was able to sin, her rendering of 
the voice of God refers to human beings in general as ‘you who have been made in the 
image and likeness of God’, and asks ‘O foolish humans, how can that which was made 
in the image and likeness of God exist without testing?’.22 Thus it is possible to infer 
that she does not consider Eve and Adam to have been differentiated in terms of image 
and likeness of God. 
However, Hildegard’s depiction of Eve as a cloud offers an intriguing addition 
to these responses to Genesis 1.26 – 27 because, when read in conjunction with her 
literal interpretation of the soul’s creation in Causae et curae, there arises the 
implication that the figure of Eve represents the soul, and Adam the body. Thus, far 
from being excluded from the privilege of having been created in the image of God, it is 
in fact Eve rather than Adam who is visually and symbolically aligned with the aspect 
of the human being that is singularly able to bear the image of God. 
Scivias represents Eve as a shining white wing-shaped cloud, filled with stars 
which represent the unborn descendants to whom she will give birth.
23
 The Eve-cloud 
emerges from Adam’s rib as he is lying above the fires of Hell, his attentive listening to 
which signifies his own temptation and culpability for the Fall. The black column to the 
left of the image represents the evil emanating from Hell. The eighth off-shoot from this 
column represents Satan in the form of a serpent, blowing the column’s black matter 
onto the form of Eve. Hildegard summarises the Fall and expulsion from Paradise thus: 
A pit of great breadth and depth appeared, with a mouth like the mouth 
of a well, emitting fiery smoke with great stench, from which a 
loathsome cloud spread out and touched a deceitful, vein-shaped form 
[the devil]. And, in a region of brightness, it blew upon a white cloud 
                                                          
22
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, pp. 86-7. ‘Qui ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei facti estis’; ‘Ergo, o 
stulti homines, hoc quod ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factum est, quomodo sine probatione posset 
subsistere?’, Scivias, 1.2, 683 and 689. 
23
 Scivias, 1.2, 234. See illustration, p. 1 above. 
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[Eve] that had come forth from a beautiful human form [Adam] and 
contained within itself many and many stars, and so doing, cast out both 
the cloud and the human form from that region.
24
 
Adam is represented in human form, lying on the ground, whilst Eve hovers above him 
in her wing-shaped manifestation as a cloud. This representation of Eve as a cloud and 
Adam in human form offers a visual parallel to her description of the soul and body in 
Causa et curae. She writes that when God created the soul 
Which was winged and could fly everywhere, he also had in his plan to 
give spiritual life – which is the breath of life – a corporeal mass, that is, 
an erect form brought forth from the clay of the earth. And this would not 
be able to fly, nor to float, not to lift itself on its own. Therefore it should 
be bound [to the earth] so that it would look more intensely at God.25 
 
Aside from the notable similarity between this passage and Hugh of St Victor’s 
assertion that God gave the soul a physical carapace in order to deepen human 
appreciation of divine works, what is intriguing here is the implication that Eve 
represents the soul, and Adam the body, in the Scivias image of the creation.26 The soul 
is winged and airborne, like the Scivias image of Eve, whilst the body is tied to the earth 
beneath it, like the Scivias image of Adam. 
To summarise, Genesis 1.26 – 27 is not employed in any of the texts with which 
this thesis is concerned as a means by which to justify the supposed inferiorities of 
women. They do not even refer to any debate about whether or not Eve bore the image 
of God; it is simply assumed that as a human being, Genesis 1.26 – 27 includes Eve, 
                                                          
24
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 73. ‘Et ecce lacus multae latitudinis et profunditatis apparuit, os velut 
os putei habens et igneum fumum cum multo fetore evomens de quo etiam teterrima nebula exhalans ad 
finem usque quasi visu imperceptibilem attigit, et in quadam clara regione candidam nubem quae de 
pulchra hominis forma plurimas stellas in se continens exierat, afflavit, et illam ac eamdem hominis 
formam ex illa regione ejecit’, Scivias, 1.2, 55-64. 
25 Margaret Berger ed and trans., Hildegard of Bingen on Natural Philosophy and Medecine: Selections 
from Causae et curae, Library of Medieval Women (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1999) p.24. Italics mine. 
‘Quae volatilis erat et quae ubique volare potuit, in eodem consilio suo habuit, quod spiritali vitae, quae 
spiraculum vitae est, molem corporalem, id est elatam formam de limo terrae daret, quae nec volaret nec 
flaret et quae prae impossibilitate sua se levare non posset, et ut ideo sic ligata esset, quatinus ad deum 
acutius aspiceret’, Causa et curae ed. Paul Kaiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903) 1, 27 - 33.  
26 See illustration, p. 1 above. De sacramentis, 1.6, 1.  
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and her female descendants. Nonetheless, the principal features that these interpretations 
of the passage share in common are revealing insofar as they present gender as an 
exclusively corporeal phenomenon, and the soul as the only aspect of the human being 
which is capable of bearing both the image and likeness of God. The soul is deemed 
capable of bearing the image and likeness of God regardless of the gender of the body to 
which it belongs. Moreover, the soul is presented as an entity which comprises both 
masculine and feminine components, irrespective of whether it resides in a body that is 
biologically male or female. Hence exegesis of this passage reveals a more complex 
formulation of the categories of masculine and feminine than has been acknowledged in 
modern scholarship concerning the medieval reception of this passage, which tends to 
be focused on constructing a twelfth-century debate about the nature of women at the 
expense of examining the twelfth-century conception of the construction of the soul. 
EVE AS SIMILTUDINO DEI IN GUIBERT OF NOGENT’S MORALIA  
Guibert of Nogent had rather different reasons for arguing that Eve bore only the 
likeness of God. The first book of the Moralia conceives the creation of Eve in relation 
to the fundamental dichotomy which according to Guibert characterises and drives 
humanity after the fall; that between spirit and flesh, and virtue and vice. He depicts Eve 
as a symbolic representative of the body, and the first section of the text is dominated by 
a straightforwardly conceived antagonism between the spirit and the flesh, signified by 
Adam and Eve respectively. Adam and the spirit are aligned with the image of God; Eve 
and the flesh are denied this privilege and are aligned only with the likeness of God. 
Thus like Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard, Guibert does not consider the human 
body to be capable of bearing the image of God. However, it is important to bear in 
mind that Guibert approaches the hexaemeron with a singularly tropological objective, 
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and his representation of Eve should be read accordingly. It is Eve in her allegorical 
guise as the body who does not bear the image of God, rather than Eve as a 
representative of women in general.  
Guibert begins his commentary by establishing that the creation of heaven and 
earth is analogous to the creation of the body and the soul. In a virtuous person, Guibert 
explains, the body (the earth) and soul (heaven) can never coexist peacefully: the soul 
must fight the reign of the body’s lustful disobedience and its invitations to 
indiscretion.
27
 The antipathy between spirit and flesh can never be resolved, Guibert 
says, it can only be controlled through devotion and piety. This process must begin with 
the fear which propels the soul towards conversion, represented by the emergence of 
light.
28
 The firmament represents the path that the soul must negotiate between the 
conflicting demands of the corporeal and the cerebral, the earthly and the divine.
29
 The 
allegorical functions of earth and heaven are then transferred to the figures of Eve and 
Adam respectively in the interpretation of Genesis 1.27. Adam represents the spirit or 
the soul, because the spirit is ‘masculine’ (‘spiritus, quod est masculus’), and it is the 
soul, not the body, which bears the image of God (‘imaginem Dei Adam habuit in 
anima’).30  The body, by contrast, is ‘feminine’, and thus represented by Eve. It is 
represented by Eve because it is inferior and disorderly: 
Eve, however - rebellious and untamed animal - never acquiesces to the 
will of the spirit voluntarily, but always resists the stern zeal of virtue. 
But Eve is our flesh, who – the devil supplying – flaunts before reason 
and bends [it] to consent to an unchaste desire. For Adam, as the Apostle 
                                                          
27
 ‘ “In principio creavit Deus coelum et terram”: in principio conversionis nostrae intra nosmetipsos in 
duo quaedam sibi valde contraria dividimur, quae in nullo bene vivente pacem vel momentaneam inter se, 
ut puto reperiri, possunt habere. Sunt autem caro, et spiritus... Ex tunc ergo in nobis concupiscentialis 
inobedientia regnat, quae etiam nolentes ad motus nos indecoros invitat’, Moralia, PL vol. 156, cols 32 B 
- 33 B. 
28
 Ibid., cols 37 D – 41 B. 
29
 Ibid., cols 41 B – 44 B. 
30
 Ibid., cols 55 C and 57 A. 
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says, was not seduced [by the devil] but Eve was seduced, and then she 
seduced the man as well.
31
  
Guibert’s representation of Eve is thus a crucial element in his formulation of a 
dichotomous and conflicting relationship between the body and soul, and the formative 
influence this relationship has on human conduct. 
Nonetheless, Guibert’s representation of Eve here is crude and misogynistic, and 
could easily be used to demonstrate the prevalence of clerical antifeminism. Within a 
simplistic division between spirit and flesh, Eve/the flesh is a pandering go-between, 
enticing Adam/the spirit to capitulate to the blandishments of sin. The allegorical figure 
of Eve represents base corporeality and unchaste appetites. Lust and corporeality are 
both aligned with, and owe their existence to, the creation of the ‘feminine’. In contrast, 
Adam and the masculine represent the spirit and the intellect, valiantly resisting the 
corrupting influence of Eve. However, it is important to bear in mind that the symbolic 
roles assigned to Eve and Adam here are not intended to be mapped onto literal women 
and men. Since every human being comprises both a body and a soul, this conflict 
between the corporeal ‘Eve’ component and the spiritual ‘Adam’ component occurs in 
every human being, regardless of the biological gender of the body in which the soul 
resides.  
As with Abelard’s Expositio, Guibert’s representation of Eve as bearing only the 
likeness of God has been misrepresented in modern scholarship. Bain portrays the first 
section of the Moralia as being not only representative of the text as a whole, but as 
being representative of a ‘clear and universally accepted’ twelfth-century tradition of 
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 ‘Eva tamen, rebelle et indomitum animal, nunquam voluntati spiritus voluntarie acquiescit, sed semper 
virtutis studio dura resistit. Eva autem est caro nostra, quae suggerente diabolo lenocinatur rationi, et 
inflectit ad consensum appetitus inhonesti. Adam enim, ut ait Apostolus, seductus non est, sed Eva, unde 
et virum seduxit’, ibid., col. 57 B. 
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employing Eve as a representation of the body.
32
 However, none of the major treatments 
of Eve discussed here employ her in this way; nor do they refer to any tradition of doing 
so. Tellingly, the only concrete evidence that Bain provides to demonstrate the ‘clear 
and universal’ acceptance of this formulation in the twelfth century is Guibert himself.33 
He also cites Gregory the Great’s apparent assertion that Eve was as the flesh and Adam 
the spirit; however, Gregory the Great is obviously not a twelfth-century author.
34
 The 
use of this interpretation by only two authors, one of whom precedes the period in 
question by approximately six centuries, is not proof of ‘universal’ or even widespread 
acceptance of the idea during the central middle ages. 
Guibert’s interpretation of Genesis 1.28 (‘fill the earth and subdue it’) suggests 
that Augustine’s early work on Genesis might also be a potential source for the 
representation of Eve as the flesh bearing only the likeness of God. Guibert describes 
Eve as a handmaiden or slave (‘ancilla’) who must be subdued and forced to obey her 
mistress (‘domina’): ‘we subdue the earth when we force Eve to comply with our rule, 
so that the handmaiden - that is, flesh - does not precede reason, her mistress’.35 Here, 
Eve and the earth symbolise the body, which must be ruled and restrained in order to 
prevent it from destabilising the hierarchy of reason and appetite on which virtue 
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 ‘Clair et universellement accepté’, ‘Homme et femme il les créa’, p. 234. 
33
 Ibid., p. 234. 
34
 ‘Une citation de Grégoire commentant la faute affirme qu’Ève est quasi caro et Adam velut spiritus’, 
ibid., p. 234. There is no reference provided for this statement; however, it is found in the work of Bede, 
not Gregory. In the Historia ecclesiastica, the account Bede gives of the letters between Augustine of 
Canterbury and Gregory attributes this representation of Eve to Gregory: ‘Eva velut caro delectata est, 
Adam vero velut spiritus consensit’, Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum ed. Michael Lapidge 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2005) p. 238. Gregory himself did not in fact state this quite so simplistically: ‘Nam 
serpens suasit, Eva delectata est, Adam consensit; qui etiam requisitus, confiteri culpam per audaciam 
noluit... Eva delectata est; quia carnalis sensus, ad verba serpentis mox se delectationi substernit. 
Assensum vero Adam mulieri praepositus praebuit; quia dum caro in delectationem rapitur, etiam a sua 
rectitudine spiritus infirmatus inclinatur. Et requisitus Adam confiteri noluit culpam, quia videlicet 
spiritus, quo peccando a veritate disjungitur, eo in ruinae suae audacia nequius obduratur’, Moralia in Job 
ed. Marcus Adriaen, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2003) vol. 2, p. 58. However, it seems 
likely that this was the source of Guibert’s early representation of Eve, and Rubenstein has commented on 
the Gregorian influences in Guibert’s Moralia; see Guibert of Nogent pp. 32-33 and p. 36. 
35
 ‘Replete terram et subicite eam’, Genesis 1.28. ‘Subjicimus terram, cum nostrae ditioni obtemperare 
compellimus Evam, ut non ordine praepostero ancilla, id est, caro rationem praecedat dominam’, Moralia 
col. 57 C. 
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depends. This idea appears to be a somewhat muddled borrowing from Augustine’s De 
Genesi contra Manichaeos, in which Augustine’s allegorical interpretation of Genesis 
2.18 (‘it is not good for the man to be alone’) compares the relationship between Adam 
and Eve to the ‘masculine’ reason governing the body.36  
Augustine takes care to establish that this does not relate to biological gender:  
every human soul has a ‘masculine’ and a ‘feminine’ component.37 Although he does 
not demonstrate much sophistication in his alignment of Eve with the body, it is 
nonetheless important to bear in mind that even Guibert does not automatically intend 
for the terms ‘masculine’ and feminine’ to signify literal, human men and women. For 
example, it is notable that unlike Augustine, Guibert conceives both components of this 
hierarchy as female here – the governing force of reason is represented not by Adam but 
by a superior female ‘domina’. Like Hugh of St Victor, Peter Lombard and Hildegard of 
Bingen, Guibert makes no comment on the gender of the individual human being in 
which the conflict between flesh and spirit occurs. Every human being, male or female, 
experiences this same conflict, because everyone has both an ‘Adam’ component (that 
is, a soul) and an ‘Eve’ component (a body). His conception of Eve as a signifier of base 
corporeality is thus misogynistic insofar as it depends on a gendered hierarchy in which 
‘the feminine’ is inherently inferior to ‘the masculine’. However, this hierarchy exists in 
every body and soul regardless of whether the body itself is biologically male or female. 
Thus whilst Bain is inaccurate in presenting Guibert as representative of a widespread 
                                                          
36
 ‘ “Non est bonum solum hominem esse”. Adhuc enim erat, quod fieret, ut non solum anima corpori 
dominaretur, quia corpus servilem locum obtinet, sed etiam virilis ratio subjugaret sibi animalem partem 
suam, per quod adjutorium imperaret corpori. Ad hujus rei exemplum femina facta est, quam rerum ordo 
subjugat viro... ut appetitum animae, per quem de membris corporis operamur, habeat mens interior 
tanquam virilis ratio subjugatum, et justa lege modum imponat adjutorio suo, sicut vir debet feminam 
regere, nec eam permittere dominari in virum; quod ubi contingit, perversa et misera domus est’, De 
Genesi contra Manichaeos, ed. Dorothea Weber, CSEL 91 (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1998) book 2, col. 204. 
37
  ‘…Ut quod in duobus hominibus evidentius apparet, id est in masculo et femina, etiam in uno homine 
considerari possit’, ibid., col. 204. 
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twelfth-century tradition of depicting Eve as the body, he is right in arguing that the 
categories of masculine and feminine cannot be straightforwardly mapped onto the 
biological categories of male and female.
38
  
This is another area in which Guibert’s representation of Eve has been 
misrepresented in modern scholarship, and one which highlights the significance of the 
caveat highlighted by Bain. According to Rubenstein, the passage representing Eve as a 
subdued handmaiden  
Leads Guibert to one of his more startling novelties. Just as there would 
have been no distinction between Reason and Flesh had the fall not 
occurred, so there would have been no division between the sexes: “Thus 
God created man… Rightly it is said that man was created singularly, 
and afterwards masculine and feminine. Before their transgression, man 
was the same in himself and never was diverse”.39 
The passage that Rubenstein quotes here clearly does not mean that God refrained from 
dividing the first human beings into the biological categories of male and female, man 
and woman. Guibert is not attempting to deny that Eve and Adam were biologically 
female and male. The passage simply means that before sin, mankind did not experience 
a conflicting disparity between the ‘masculine’ component (that is, the soul) and the 
‘feminine’ component (that is, the body) which comprised the human being regardless 
of biological gender. Guibert’s conception of gender here is less novel and more 
sophisticated than Rubenstein allows, and it demonstrates the validity of Bain’s 
assertion that the categories of masculine and feminine are paired with each other, but 
not with the ostensibly corresponding physical categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’. 
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 ‘Homme et femme il les créa’, p. 236 – 38. 
39
 Rubenstein, Guibert of Nogent, p. 33. The passage Rubenstein translates here runs as follows: ‘creavit 
ergo Deus hominem... Recte primo dicitur homo singulariter creatus, postmodum masculus et femina 
creati, quia ante praevaricationem idem in se, et nusquam diversus homo erat’, Moralia, col. 57 A. 
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EVE AS SIMILITUDINO DEI IN ABELARD’S EXPOSITIO IN HEXAMERON 
As was mentioned above, Abelard’s Expositio has been misprepresented in the context 
of the historiographical debate about medieval women as imago Dei. Newman for 
example, employing some problematically anachronistic terminology, deplores 
Abelard’s supposed reputation ‘as a twelfth-century feminist’ because he writes that 
only men bore the image of God, when ‘most theologians, however, held to the equality 
of the sexes in this regard’.40 Horowitz also cites Abelard’s Expositio as a misogynistic 
aberration among ‘the bulk of theologians from Anselm of Canterbury to Alain de Lille 
[who] considered both man and woman as beings created in the image of God’.41 In 
addition to inaccurately presenting the Expositio as an opposing participant in a cogent 
debate, as will be discussed below, the text is not given any credit for its remarkable 
defence of Eve, and the way in which Abelard’s claim that Eve bore only God’s 
likeness forms part of this defence. Similarly, Duby states that Abelard ‘went much 
further than the others [i.e. other exegetes working on Genesis]’ in his supposed 
misogyny by declaring women to be inferior because Eve was created merely in the 
likeness of God, whereas Adam was created in the image of God, and thus men are by 
definition the superior entity.
42
 
In addition to these examples, a more complex use of the Expositio in this way is 
given by Bain, whose neglect of Abelard’s defence of Eve is baffling. Bain concedes 
that Abelard’s argument is ‘more subtle and more nuanced’ than most accounts of male 
and female difference.
43
 However, he nonetheless presents the Expositio as a text which 
formulates ‘a vision of the woman as categorically inferior to the man, because she is 
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 Newman, Sister of Wisdom, p. 91. 
41
 Horowitz, ‘The Image of God’, pp. 179-80. 
42
 Duby, Eve and the Church, p. 38. 
43
 ‘Plus subtil et plus nuancé’, ‘Homme et femme il les créa’, p. 241. 
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less close to God’.44 He even states that this contradicts the claims made elsewhere by 
Abelard that ‘through their weakness, women effectively had the opportunity to be 
closer to God’.45 However, this ostensible contradiction abates when Abelard’s defence 
of Eve is considered, because Eve is crucial to the ethical framework which allows 
Abelard to argue that women were further removed from the divine in the order of 
creation, whist asserting simultaneously that women were able to become closer and 
dearer to God not despite, but because, of their inherent weakness and their 
concomitantly superior capacity for virtue. 
In order to clarify this, and to demonstrate that Horowitz, Newman and Bain are 
wrong to cite the Expositio as a misogynistic aberration, it is necessary to examine 
Abelard’s exegesis of Genesis 1.26 and 3.6 in more detail. To begin with Genesis 1.26 
directly, Abelard does indeed claim that Eve was created to bear only the likeness of 
God, and that creation in the image of God was a privilege enjoyed by Adam, and men, 
alone: 
Since human being is the shared name of both the man and the woman, 
since both are a rational and mortal animal, hence also in what follows 
where it says ‘God created the human being’ at once there is added ‘male 
and female he created them’; we understand that the man was created in 
the image of God, but the woman was created in the likeness. Indeed, the 
Apostle says concerning the man; ‘truly he ought not to veil his head, 
because he is the image and glory of God’, that is, his more glorious and 
precious likeness. For there is a difference between image and likeness 
because likeness to something can be said to exist because there is a kind 
of conformity with it, whence something can be said to be similar to it. 
But an image refers only to an express likeness like the statues of men 
that more perfectly represent them limb by limb. And so because the man 
is more worthy than the woman and consequently more like God, he is 
called his image, but the woman is his likeness.
46
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 ‘Une vision de la femme certes inférieure à l’homme, puisqu’elle est moins proche de Dieu’, ibid., p. 
243.  
45
 ‘Par leur faiblesse, les femmes ont effectivement la possibilité d’être plus proches de Dieu’, ibid., 245. 
46
 Abelard, Exposition trans. Cizewski, pp. 77. ‘Cum autem homo commune nomen sit tam uiri quam 
femine, cum sit utrumque animal rationale mortale, unde et in sequentibus cum dicitur quia “creavit deus 
hominem”, statim subinfertur: “masculum et feminam creavit eos”; intelligimus uirum ad imaginem dei 
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Thus women possess reason, because all human beings possess reason, but they bear 
only the likeness of God. 
Abelard adds that Adam received more divine wisdom than Eve and was created 
in the image of God. Eve, having received less divine wisdom and having been created 
without the benefit of all the components of the Trinity, was formed only in the likeness 
of God.
47
 Abelard invokes here an argument from 1 Corinthians 11, which presents an 
additional complication to the interpretation of Genesis 1.26 – 27.48  As Augustine 
observed, despite the use of ‘homo’ (‘mankind’), rather than ‘vir’ (‘man’ as opposed to 
‘woman’), in the creation narrative, 1 Corinthians states that women are obliged to 
cover their heads because they were not made in the image of God, unlike men: ‘every 
woman praying or prophesying with her head not veiled disgraces her head…[but] the 
man indeed does not have to veil his head because it is the image and glory of God’.49 
There thus arises a possible conflict between the scriptural accounts of Eve’s creation, 
which Abelard employs here: Genesis states that mankind in general (‘homo’) was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
creatum, feminam uero ad similitudinem. De uiro quippe apostolus ait: “Vir quidem non debet uelare 
caput suum, quia imago et gloria dei est”, hoc est gloriosior et preciosior eius similitudo.  Distat autem 
inter imaginem et similitudinem quod similitudo rei potest dici quod conuenientiam aliquam habet cum 
ipsa, unde simile illi dici queat. Imago uero expressa tantum similitudo dicitur, sicut figure hominum que 
per singula membra perfectius eos representant. Quia ergo uir dignior quam femina est et per hoc deo 
similior, imago eius dicitur; femina uero similitudo’,  Expositio, 255 - 258. Abelard repeats this idea in 
the Hymnarius Paraclitensis: ‘hinc Dei dicimus virum imaginem / Ejusque feminam similitudinem’, PL 
vol. 178, col. 1785 D. 
47
 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
48
 ‘Omnis autem mulier orans aut prophetans non velato capite deturpat caput... vir quidem non debet 
velare caput, quoniam imago et gloria est Dei mulier autem gloria viri est’, 1 Corinthians 11. 5 – 7. 
Gratian is another twelfth-century writer who employs this passage to justify his assertion that women 
bore only the likeness of God, stating that women must cover their heads because they were made only in 
the likeness of God and not his image: ‘mulier debet velare caput, quia non est imago Dei’, Decretum 
liber II, causa 33, q. 5; quoted in Horowitz, ‘The Image of God’, p. 177. Horowitz suggests that this 
interpretation is based on a mangled translation of 1 Corinthians which mistakenly excludes women from 
having been created ‘in imago Dei’; see ibid., pp. 177-78. However, Gratian is correct – 1 Corinthians 
11.7 describes only men (‘viri’) as bearing the image of God, whereas woman is merely ‘the glory of man’ 
(‘mulier autem gloria viri est’). 
49
  ‘Omnis autem mulier orans aut prophetans non velato capite deturpat caput suum…vir quidem non 
debet velare caput quoniam imago et gloria est Dei’, 1 Corinthians 11:5-7. For Augustine’s response to 
this, see note 18 above. 
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created in the image of God, whereas 1 Corinthians provides justification for his 
argument that Eve bore only the likeness of God. 
It seems difficult initially to reconcile these statements of Abelard’s with his 
assertion that Eve, in her transgression, became dearer to God than many thousands of 
men who were without sin. The process by which she was created was inferior to that 
by which Adam was formed, and thus women must bear the burden of Eve’s lesser 
place in the order of creation by being condemned to be considered less worthy than 
their male counterparts. Abelard constructs a hierarchy in which Eve, and women in 
general, occupy a less exalted position than Adam, and men, within the carefully 
calibrated order of creation. However, the notion of Eve’s having been created to be 
weaker than Adam is in fact crucial to Abelard’s subsequent rehabilitation of Eve later 
in the text, because weakness and susceptibility to temptation are crucial to Abelard’s 
definition of virtue. Eve’s weakness and susceptibility paradoxically become the very 
qualities which make virtuous women more valuable than virtuous men in the eyes of 
God.
50
 The relative weakness of the female soul is a necessary component of Abelard’s 
conception of the relationship between weakness and virtue, which, as will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter III below, revolves around the ethics of intention and Christ’s 
ostensibly contradictory assertion in 2 Corinthians that strength is perfected in 
weakness.
51
  
In short, according to Abelard, an act can only be defined as virtuous if the 
person who performs it experiences a genuine struggle with temptation. The greater the 
struggle with temptation, the more commendable the act of virtue, since, Abelard asks, 
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 Expositio, p. 113. This is discussed in further detail in the chapter below on representations of Eve as 
the first sinner. 
51
 ‘Dominum rogavi… et dixit mihi “sufficit tibi gratia mea nam virtus in infirmitate perficitur” ’, 2 
Corinthians 12.8 - 9.  
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where is the sense of victory in a battle which is easily won?
52
 Merely refraining from 
wrongdoing in the absence of temptation may ensure that sin is avoided, but remaining 
sinless is not the same as being actively virtuous. The comparative weakness of Eve and 
her female descendants means that it is harder for them to overcome temptation, since 
they are less resilient and bear only the likeness of God.
53
 However, if virtue is defined 
by the ferocity of the struggle with temptation, and women have to work harder than 
men to overcome temptation, any virtuous act performed by a woman is more worthy 
and more commendable, because it was more difficult to achieve. This is clarified in the 
seventh letter to Heloise, which states that:  
Because the female gender is the weaker, their strength is more pleasing 
to God and is more perfect according to the word of God himself by 
which he encouraged the weakness of the apostle to the crown of victory, 
saying: “My grace is enough for you, for my strength is at its best in 
weakness”.54 
Thus, Abelard directly aligns female weakness with the weakness which defines and 
perfects the strength of Christ in 2 Corinthians 12.9. Bearing only the likeness of God is 
thus a function of the means by which both Eve’s sin, and subsequent acts of female 
virtue, achieve their value in the eyes of God; a value which outstrips the worth of any 
evidence of virtue demonstrated by men. Hence it is misleading to present Abelard’s 
image/likeness argument as a misogynistic dismissal of women as inferior creations. 
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 Expositio, p. 102. 
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 I.e. Because they bear only the likeness of God they are thus less ‘like’ him, and less strong than men, 
who, by contrast, possess the image of God. Since the male is more worthy, Abelard writes, he can be 
said to be more like God – thus the man can be said to bear the image of God, whereas women can be 
said to possess only his likeness (‘vir dignior quam femina est et per hoc deo similior, imago eius dicitur; 
femina uero similitudo’), Expositio, 258. 
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 ‘Letter 7 to Heloise: The History of Women’s Roles in Christianity’, ed. and trans. Vera Morton and 
Jocelyn Wogan Browne in Guidance for Women in Twelfth-Century Convents, Library of Medieval 
Women (Cambridge: Brewer, 2003) pp. 52-95; see p.76. ‘Quippe quo infirmior est feminarum sexus, 
gratior est Deo atque perfectior earum virtus, juxta ipsius quoque Domini testimonium, quo infirmitatem 
Apostoli ad certaminis coronam exhortans, ait: “Sufficit tibi gratia mea. Nam virtus in infirmitate 
perficitur” ’, ‘The Letter of Heloise on Religious Life and Abelard’s First Reply’, ed. J.T. Muckle, 
Mediaeval Studies vol. 17 (1955) pp. 240 - 281; p. 269.  
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In addition to the way in which Abelard’s argument about Eve bearing only the 
likeness of God is related to his assertion that she was dearer to God than many 
thousands of sinless men, it is necessary to draw attention to the emphasis he places on 
female capacity for reason and wisdom. Abelard takes great care to point out that as the 
first human beings, both Adam and Eve represent the peak of God’s creative force, 
since human beings were the most important and worthy component of the created 
universe, on account of whom all other things were made.
55
 He also points out that 
corporeal gender has no impact on the capacities of the soul, and that all souls are 
equally equipped with the capability for reason and wisdom: 
The human soul… is created immortal and free of defect. It alone, 
moreover, is capable of reason and wisdom and partakes of divine love. 
For what cannot recognise God through reason cannot love him. And 
these three are common to the woman as well as to the man.
56
  
The principle difference between the souls of men and women, he continues, is that men 
are capable of more wisdom and reason, which was demonstrated by the fact that Eve 
was capable of being seduced by the serpent and Adam was not.
57
 The difference 
between Adam and Eve at the moment of their creation was thus not a qualitative one - 
Eve possessed all the qualities which made human beings the apex of God’s creative 
force, but she possessed them in a smaller quantity.  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, exegesis of Genesis 1.26 – 27 is usually focused on the soul, and 
emphasises the qualities which distinguish humanity as a whole in a way that renders 
the categories of masculine and feminine entirely distinct from the biological categories 
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 Abelard, Expositio,p. 58.  
56
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 78. ‘Anima humana… immortalis et defectus ignara est condita. Sola 
quoque capax est rationis et sapientie et diuini amoris particeps. Que enim deum recognoscere per 
rationem nequeunt nequaquam eum diligere possunt. Et hec quidem tria tam uiro quam femine communia 
sunt’, Expositio pp. 60-61. 
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 ‘Per sapientiam quoque siue rationem uirum femine preeminuisse supra docuimus, et in hoc eum 
sapientiorem constare quod a serpente seduci non potuit’, Expositio, p. 61. 
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of male and female. The emphasis discernible in modern scholarship on the question of 
whether Eve bore the image of God attributes a disproportionate level of significance to 
a subject which did not play a prominent role in several of the major twelfth-century 
treatments of the figure of Eve. Abelard is atypical, not only for arguing that Eve was 
not created in the image of God, but for the fact that he addresses this issue directly. The 
texts with which this thesis is concerned do not suggest that there was any consistent 
debate during the twelfth century about whether or not Eve bore both the image and 
likeness of God. It is possible to infer that the notion that Eve was created only in the 
likeness of God was not widely shared. However, it is only possible to infer this because 
they do not directly state otherwise, not because they consciously adhere to a particular 
argument within a persistent, widespread debate. None of these texts make an explicit 
case for Eve as imago Dei, and none of them except Abelard’s Expositio approach 
Genesis 1.26 – 27 as a means by which to address the theological position of women. 
In addition, the arguments presented by Guibert and Abelard regarding Eve as 
imago Dei need to be adequately contextualised. Whilst they cannot be dismissed as 
misogynistic aberrations, equally, they become distorted when viewed as components of 
a debate that is to some extent a construction of historiography. Guibert’s representation 
of Eve as the body is swiftly abandoned within the scope of the Moralia’s hexaemeral 
commentary, and whilst his representation of Eve as an analogue of the body is atypical, 
his assertion that it is the soul alone which bears the image of God is not. In Abelard’s 
Expositio, with its complex and paradoxical interaction between weakness and virtue, 
the idea that Eve did not bear the image of God is in fact a crucial part of the text’s 
defence of her sin. More importantly, both Guibert and Abelard form part of a wider 
tendency to interpret Genesis 1.26 – 27 as a text which recounts the origin of the human 
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soul, and the capacities which distinguish it regardless of the gender of the body in 
which it resides. 
  
II. ‘NEC ANCILLA NEC DOMINA SED SOCIA’: THE FORMATION OF EVE FROM THE RIB 
 
As was discussed above, for Guibert, the creation of both the earth and of Eve/the body 
signified the creation of base corporeality, and physical creation meant only sensual, 
carnal distractions from the pursuit of virtue. On the other hand, for Abelard, Hugh of St 
Victor, Peter Lombard and Hildegard of Bingen, examining the creation of the earth and 
of human beings provided an opportunity to examine the physical composition of the 
universe and its components. With the evident exception of Guibert’s exclusively 
allegorical exegesis, it is possible to detect considerable concern with the mechanics of 
Eve’s formation from Adam’s rib, and literal exegesis of Eve’s creation emerges in the 
texts discussed here as a means by which to access and comprehend the mysteries of the 
creation process.  
It is possible to identify in these texts a consistent level of emphasis on the 
examination of observable phenomena, frequently authorised by the declaration in 
Romans 1.20 that ‘from the creation of the world, the invisible things of him [God] are 
clearly seen, being understood via created things’.58 This line is employed in all the 
texts discussed here as a scriptural justification for attempting to make the divine more 
comprehensible via human intelligence, and it is quoted to explain the hermeneutic and 
exegetical usefulness of examining observable things in order to elucidate divine 
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mysteries.
59
 At no point is it suggested that human intelligence is comparable with the 
divine or capable of fully understanding the ‘mysteries’ of the hexaemeron narrative: 
human knowledge and agency are always subordinate to the divine. Nonetheless, these 
texts demonstrate an identifiable preoccupation with the earth and the body as means by 
which to explore natural law and the physical processes of the creation, rather than 
employing them to signify base physicality. 
In terms of the creation of Eve, this preoccupation manifests itself in the form of 
literal interpretation of her formation from Adam’s rib, and a concern with examining 
how this process supposedly progressed. However, the significance of the allegorical 
and symbolic readings of Eve’s creation cannot be overlooked. As will be discussed 
below, there is an identifiable tendency to provide surprisingly egalitarian metaphorical 
accounts of the reason for Eve’s creation, and for the reason this creative process 
occurred in the way it did. Genesis states simply that Eve was created to provide Adam 
with a ‘helper’ who was ‘like himself’ (‘adiutorium simile sui’). 60  However, the 
commentary on Eve’s creation discussed here endows her with substantially more 
significance. She is frequently represented as an analogue of the Church, emerging from 
the side of Adam as the Church emerged from the side of the crucified Christ. Moreover, 
rather than being only a helper to Adam, there is an identifiable tradition in twelfth-
century writing of interpreting the manner of Eve’s creation as an indication of her 
parity.  
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 The notion of the divine being comprehensible through human intellect was a potentially problematic 
assertion. Cizewski has commented on hexaemeral commentators’ use of Romans 1.20 in this context, 
and discusses its use in Abelard’s Expositio, Rupert of Deutz’s Commentariorum in Genesim and Hugh of 
St Victor’s De tribus diebus; see Doctrine of Creation pp. 387-9. Its use by Abelard is wholly 
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LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CREATION OF EVE FROM THE RIB 
The texts with which this thesis is concerned devote considerable attention to clarifying 
and rationalising the implausible series of the physical processes which enabled Eve to 
be formed from a rib. Here there are two concerns which arise with relative frequency. 
First, there is the question of why Adam needed to be asleep before God took the rib 
from him. It is widely agreed that God submerged Adam not into ordinary human sleep 
but a form of divine anaesthesia, in order to spare him any pain he might have suffered 
as a result of his rib having been removed, and in order to demonstrate the creative force 
of God.
61
 
Second, and of substantially greater interest, was the question of how Eve’s 
body in its entirety could possibly have originated with a single rib, and whether 
anything was added to the rib. It is possible to discern that this process of the rib’s 
having had been ‘built’ (‘aedificavit’) into Eve was, unsurprisingly, an issue which 
provoked some debate.
62
 Both Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard testify to the 
significance of Eve’s creation as a significant locus of discourse during this period, with 
both referring explicitly to people who question how Eve could have been created in 
this way, and even those who might be sceptical about whether it happened at all. Hugh 
writes that he devotes so much time to the exposition of Genesis 2.22 on account of 
those who are inclined to marvel at (‘mirare’), and especially those who doubt 
(‘dubitare’), the plausibility of Eve’s creation.63 Lombard does not use the word ‘doubt’ 
explicitly, but he likewise states that the question of whether something was added to 
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  ‘Et aedificavit Dominus Deus costam…’, Genesis 2.22. 
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the rib frequently arises, and that the correct answer (that is, that nothing was added) is 
one to which some people object.
64
  
Abelard, Lombard, Hugh and Hildegard all devote considerable attention to 
establishing and clarifying that Eve was made from the rib alone, and not from any 
other additional external material. Abelard writes that it is to be understood that the 
flesh of Adam would transfigure or move toward (‘transierit’) becoming the flesh of 
Eve. He too states that it is possible to question whether Eve originated from the rib 
alone or whether some other element added (‘elementis aliquid superadditum sit’) as he 
believes is the case with the growth of children. However, he maintains that the former 
statement is correct and the flesh which adhered to Adam’s rib is the only substance 
from which the body of Eve was derived.
65
  
Whereas Abelard likens the process of Eve’s creation to a quantifiable physical 
phenomenon – that is, procreation – Hugh and Lombard describe it as a miracle. Peter 
Lombard explains that Eve was formed from the rib via the same miraculous process 
which enabled Jesus to multiply the five loaves of bread into enough to feed five 
thousand people. He is equally careful to emphasise that no extra material was added to 
the rib:  
But if God added anything extrinsic in making the body of the woman, 
then the addition would be greater than the rib itself, and so the woman 
should rather be said to have been made from that from which she had 
received the greater part of her substance than from the rib. So it remains 
that the body of the woman be said to have been made by divine power 
from the substance of the rib alone, without any extrinsic addition, by 
that very same miracle by which Jesus would later multiply the five 
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 ‘Solet etiam quaeri utrum de costa illa sine adiectione rei extrinsecae facta sit mulier. Quod quibusdam 
non placuit’, Sententiae, 2.28, 4.  
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loaves of bread with a heavenly blessing and five thousand men were 
filled.
66
 
This explanation, as well as the comparison with the loaves and fishes miracle, is 
clearly borrowed from Hugh’s De sacramentis, which gives a virtually identical 
explanation.
67
 To describe the creation of Eve as miracle is an undeniably positive 
assessment, and to find this statement in the work of two of the most prominent scholars 
of the central middle ages discredits the idea that ‘clerical antifeminism’ was the 
distinguishing characteristic of representations of Eve during this period. However, 
Hugh’s and Lombard’s discussion of the ‘miraculous’ process of Eve’s creation reveals 
something other than a marked lack of misogyny in responses to the first woman. It also 
demonstrates the extent to which representations and discussions of Eve provided the 
impetus and opportunity to examine more fundamental issues; in this case, the fabric of 
the universe and its components.  
For Hugh of St Victor, the creation of Eve necessitated an explanation of the 
fundamental nature of matter. Hugh describes the way in which all matter can be 
reduced to basic atomic level, explaining that an atom is the most basic or ‘simple’ unit 
from which all matter is ultimately comprised: ‘of such a nature are the simple “bodies” 
which are called atoms’, he writes, ‘which are not from matter, because they are simple, 
but rather they become matter, because they are in themselves multiplied’.68  Since 
atoms are the most basic components of all the matter in the universe, the appearance of 
the first atoms was the very beginning of the world’s existence - the point at which 
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 Sentences Book II trans. Silano, p. 78. ‘Ceterum si ad perficiendum corpus mulieris deus extrinsecum 
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something was made out of nothing (‘de nihilo aliquid factum est’). 69  To make 
something from nothing is the ultimate creative act, a process which Hugh describes as 
the first mode or work of operating. There are six such works or modes according to 
which all actions are bought into effect, which correspond to the six days of the 
hexaemeron.
70
 Second in this hierarchy of operating modes is the act of multiplication 
(‘opus multiplicationis’), by which extant matter is expanded and developed into 
something greater in terms of substance and quality (‘de aliquo aliquid facere secundum 
substantiam et qualitatem in maius’).71 The process by which Eve was formed from 
Adam’s rib was thus achieved through this second mode of operating in which things 
are created via the multiplication and development of extant material. The substance of 
the rib was ‘multiplied’ and formed into the physical form of Eve without any external 
addition, because God was able to expand and multiply the extant atoms from Adam’s 
rib. It is thus not right, Hugh concludes, to say that the rib received any additional 
material in order to grow sufficiently to the body of the woman.
72
 Hence, rather than 
being content with the justification that Eve’s creation was a miracle and thus 
axiomatically inexplicable, Hugh goes on to offer a literal, scientific explanation of how 
this miracle operated. It is possible to see here then that the creation of Eve provoked 
discussion of significant theological and philosophical concerns entirely unrelated to 
gender; in this case, the ways in which divine creative processes can be elucidated 
through the examination of how they manifest themselves in observable physical 
phenomena.  
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For Peter Lombard, the principal concern raised by the mechanics of Eve’s 
creation also relates to the fundamental nature of physical phenomena. Having 
borrowed Hugh’s comparison with the loaves and fishes miracle, Lombard elucidates 
the miraculous nature of Eve’s creation with reference to the Augustinian conception of 
natural law. He begins by explaining Augustine’s account of the seminal reasons which 
govern physical processes:  
As Augustine says, God placed seminal reasons in things. By these 
reasons, some things come from others, as such a grain from this seed, 
such a fruit from this tree, and suchlike… And those things which are 
made according to seminal cause are said to be made naturally, because 
the course of nature has become known to men to be such.
73
 
However, Lombard continues, there are certain miraculous exceptions to established 
natural law and the observable ways in which it proceeds. The creation of Eve is one of 
these exceptions: 
Augustine says that these [exceptional] things are the ones which are 
made through grace, or are made miraculously, not naturally… Among 
these, he places the making of woman through the man’s rib, saying as 
follows: ‘That it would be necessary for woman to be made in this way 
was not established in things, but hidden in God. Each and every course 
of nature has its natural laws. Over this course, the creator has at his 
disposal the power over all things to do something other than their 
natural order requires: namely, that a dry staff suddenly flower and bear 
fruit; and that a woman who was sterile in her youth should give birth in 
her old age…’74 
 Eve’s creation clearly does not match the ‘course of nature [which] has become known 
to men’. Lombard identifies and addresses here the disparity between the way in which 
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 Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, pp. 79-80. ‘Ut ait Augustinus, quia inseruit deus seminales rationes 
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Eve was formed, and the observable natural laws and processes which usually govern 
the growth and development of physical phenomena.  
Hildegard’s Scivias also offers a naturalistic literal interpretation of Genesis 2.22. 
Hildegard, like Hugh and Lombard, establishes that Eve and Adam were made from the 
same substance, and that Eve was created entirely from the material comprised in 
Adam’s rib without any extraneous matter having been added. Hildegard demonstrates 
this through the use of an unusual but effective botanical analogy. She writes that Eve 
was ‘grafted’ (‘insito’) from Adam’s rib. The rib received heat and moisture from Adam, 
she says, and was thus it able to produce the figure of Eve.
75
 This botanical analogy 
implies that Eve was ‘grown’ from Adam’s side via the ‘scion’ provided by the rib. This 
signifies the indivisible bond which joined Eve to her husband from the very beginning 
of her existence, and also elucidates the image which accompanies Hildegard’s vision of 
the creation and fall in Scivias, in which the wing-shaped Eve is depicted as having 
‘sprouted’ (exire) from Adam’s side.76 This explanation of Eve’s creation also clarifies 
Hildegard’s apparently inconsistent statements regarding the respective roles of Eve and 
Adam and the ways in which these roles correspond to women and men more generally, 
which argue that Eve is simultaneously esteemed and inferior. Eve and Adam share a 
fundamentally similar composition, and whilst she is certainly weaker than him, they 
are ultimately stronger and more productive when they operate in union. Hence 
Hildegard writes without contradiction that Eve’s creation demonstrates that women 
must remain under the rule of their husbands, but also (referring to 1 Corinthians 11.12) 
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that women and men were created for each other’s mutual benefit – as Eve is of the man, 
so he is of her.
77
 
METAPHORICAL AND ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION OF EVE’S CREATION FROM THE RIB 
Whilst the physical processes of the creation of Eve are generally dealt with by 
providing literal exposition of Genesis 2.22, there are two particularly significant 
allegorical readings of Genesis 2.21-22 which tend to accompany the literal explanation 
of Eve’s creation. These interpretations deal with why Eve was created, and what the 
method of her creation reveals about her purpose and significance, and they make 
particularly illuminating contributions to the study of twelfth-century representations of 
Eve, since they are remarkably positive about her function and status. The first presents 
Eve as a typological representation of the Church’s creation from the side of the 
crucified Christ. The second presents Eve as Adam’s equivalent and partner, stating that 
her creation from the rib was intended to indicate symbolically that she was to be 
neither superior nor subordinate to Adam, but equal to him.  
To begin with the first of these allegorical interpretations, the representation of 
Eve as a typological symbol of the Church has its roots in Ephesians 5.28 – 32. This 
passage compares the union of Adam and Eve to that of Christ and the Church: 
And all men ought to love their wives as their own bodies; he who loves 
his wife loves himself. For no one ever had hatred for his own flesh, but 
nourishes and cares for it, just as Christ does the Church... on account of 
this a man shall leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife, and 
they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament, but I speak in 
terms of Christ and the Church.
78
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This idea appears in Patristic exegesis of Genesis dating back to Tertullian, who relates 
it specifically to Eve’s creation from the rib. Tertullian’s De anima asserts that Adam’s 
being put to sleep to allow Eve to be created prefigured Christ’s ‘sleeping’ on the cross 
so that the Church might be taken from his side like Eve from that of Adam. He 
reinforces the Eve/Church connection by interpreting the phrase ‘mother of all the 
living’, used to describe Eve in Genesis 3.20, as a reference both to Eve and to the 
Church itself: 
For as Adam was a figure of Christ, Adam’s sleep shadowed the death of 
Christ, who was to sleep a mortal slumber, that from the wound inflicted 
on His side might, in like manner (as Eve was formed), be typified the 
Church, the true mother of the living.
79
 
However, this idea was more likely borrowed by twelfth-century commentators from 
the work of Augustine. Augustine’s De Genesi contra Manichaeos refers to the same 
passage in Ephesians, agreeing that Eve’s creation from Adam’s side prefigures the 
creation of the Church:  
So then, what as a matter of history was fulfilled in Adam, as a matter of 
prophecy signifies Christ… He [Christ] too was put to sleep, falling 
asleep in death, in order that his consort the Church might be formed for 
him… So then the Church was formed for him as his consort from his 
side, that is, from faith in his death and baptism, because his side was 
pierced with a lance and poured out blood and water.
80
 
This representation of Eve as the Church prefigured appears to have had some currency 
in twelfth-century commentaries on Genesis.
81
 Abelard refers to it briefly, stating that 
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‘the apostle states that in these words of Adam [“bone of my bone and flesh of my 
flesh”] the great sacrament of Christ and the Church is prefigured’.82 He repeats the idea 
in the Hymnarius Paraclitensis.
83
 Hugh of St Victor devotes a little more attention to 
Eve as a type of the Church, in a passage clearly influenced by Augustine’s rendering of 
the idea:  
As far as [the creation of Eve] pertains to a spiritual understanding 
therefore, the first Adam furnished while sleeping the material whence 
his spouse might be created from his side, since afterwards the second 
Adam [Christ], rendered unconscious by the sleep of death on the cross, 
that his spouse the Church might be formed, ministered sacraments by 
shedding from his blood with water.
84
  
Peter Lombard also describes the creation of Eve as being representative of the 
Church’s emergence. Writing of Eve’s formation he states that  
In this work, the sacrament of Christ and his Church is also prefigured. 
For just as the woman was formed from the side of the sleeping man, so 
the Church was formed from the sacraments which flowed from the side 
of Christ sleeping on the cross, namely blood and water, by which we are 
redeemed from punishment and washed clean of our faults.
85
 
These associations of the creation of Eve with the creation of the Church are both 
significant and affirmative. Had Eve been widely considered worthy only of disdain, to 
compare her with so significant an institution as the Church would have been 
impossible. However, Flood advises caution regarding the positive nature of this 
association: 
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The Eve/church identification is largely based on positive associations 
(in that both Eve and the Church are the mother of the living and 
Eve/church is the spouse of Adam/Christ). It must be observed, however, 
that whether the Eve/church comparison is a wholly positive one 
depends on one’s ecclesiology. Paul certainly had doubts about the 
church in Corinth (2 Corinthians 11.2 - 4), and Matthew’s parable of the 
wheat and the tares (Matthew 13.24 - 30) along with the mixture of clean 
and unclean animals in Noah’s ark (Genesis 7.2 - 3) were taken by early 
Christians as symbols of the mixed nature of a fallible institution with 
human participants.
86
 
Several aspects of this argument are questionable. Flood gives no indication of whom 
these sceptical early Christians might be, offering no evidence to substantiate his 
suggestion that the association between Eve and the Church was read as being negative 
or critical. Also, the misgivings of Matthew and Paul are somewhat tangential here, 
since the scriptural origin of the Eve/Church typology makes it clear that the association 
is meant to be a positive one. Ephesians 5 clearly constructs an image of a loving and 
mutually nurturing relationship between Eve/the Church and Adam/Christ. In addition, 
even if we assume that Paul, Matthew and ‘the early Christians’ had intended to express 
their misgivings about the early Church by connecting it with Eve, it is unlikely that any 
theologian writing as late as the twelfth century would have doubted whether or not the 
existence of the Church was a good thing. In short, it seems rather more likely that the 
comparison between Eve and the Church was, at least as far as its twelfth-century 
redactions were concerned, a positive one.   
The other significant allegorical reading of Eve’s creation relates to the symbolic 
significance of God having specifically selected the rib from which to form the body of 
Eve. Abelard, Hugh and Lombard all argue that God created Eve from Adam’s rib in 
order to indicate the parity and equivalence she was to share with Adam. Had she been 
created from his feet or from his head, it is argued, this would have indicated that she 
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was intended to be subordinate to him, or superior to him. In a simultaneously literal 
and allegorical reading, Abelard explains that  
[God] decided to form the woman from the side of man, not from a 
higher or lower part, so that before sin he saw her as a kind of partner 
and companion, not as a superior or subordinate… And so he decided to 
work in that first man in such a way namely that he did not restore the rib 
but substituted flesh for the rib, so that [Adam] might especially learn 
through this, when he felt the place that he lacked the rib, and felt 
somewhat weakened in strength, so that a woman might be made from 
him, how important to God is the woman also is whom he decided to 
create at some detriment or loss to the strength of his bone structure. 
Hence also the man would love her the more, because he recognised that 
she was not created through herself, but out of him.
87
 
A precedent for this idea may be found in Augustine’s De civitate Dei, which states that 
‘the fact that the woman was made from him from his side signifies clearly enough how 
dear the union between a man and his wife should be’.88 However, Augustine does not 
state specifically that Eve’s creation from the rib indicates any kind of equality. He 
seems simply to emphasise that Eve was made from the same matter as Adam – that she 
was ‘like unto him’ and equivalent in composition rather than in status. Flood suggests 
Jewish exegesis of Genesis as another possible source: 
It is this type of reasoning which gives rise to one of the most lasting 
contributions of the Midrash to the Christian theology of the significance 
of the rib. In the passage Yahweh is speaking: “I will not create her from 
[Adam’s] head, lest she be swelled-headed... nor from the foot, lest she 
be a gadabout; but from the modest part of man”.89 
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illam, sed de ipso creatam agnosceret’, Expositio, p. 107. 
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Again though, there is no suggestion of parity or equivalence here, and nothing to 
indicate that Eve should not be considered inferior to Adam. 
It appears thus appears that Abelard is the originator of this remarkably 
egalitarian representation of Eve as the first woman, although Hugh of St Victor, 
writing only slightly later than Abelard’s Expositio, uses the same idea. Hugh writes 
that 
[Eve] was made from the rib in order that it might be demonstrated that 
she was created for a partnership of love, lest perhaps she would have 
been seen as taking precedence over the man in domination if she had 
been made from the head, while if from the feet, that she was to be 
subjected to him in servitude. Because, then, she was produced as neither 
a slave nor a mistress but a partner to the man, she was made from 
neither his head nor from his feet, but from his side.
90
 
Hugh’s redaction of the idea is thus more elaborate than that of Abelard. He removes 
Abelard’s caveat that Eve was only meant to be considered an equivalent before sin, and 
he clarifies this equality further by adding that any intended superiority or subordination 
would have been indicated by God having chosen to create her either from Adam’s head 
or from his feet. In his subsequent redaction of this idea in his discussion of the 
sacrament of marriage, he makes the parity between Eve and Adam more explicit. 
Whereas he had not previously mentioned equality explicitly, he writes that Eve’s 
creation from the rib indicated that she was created in order to participate in an 
association of equals (‘equalitatem societatis’).91 Peter Lombard repeats the words of 
Hugh of St Victor more or less exactly: 
[Eve] was formed not from just any part of [Adam’s] body, but from his 
side, so that it should be shown that she was created for the partnership 
of love, lest, if perhaps she had been made from his head, she should be 
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perceived as set over the man in domination; or if from his feet, as if 
subject to him in servitude. Therefore, since she was made neither to 
dominate nor to serve the man, but as his partner, she had to be produced 
neither from his head, nor from his feet, but from his side.
92
 
 
This sense of Eve’s parity is not confined to Latin commentary. The Anglo-
Norman Adam poet, whilst he does not use the argument about Eve’s creation from the 
rib, was equally concerned with establishing Eve as Adam’s equivalent rather than his 
inferior. In the opening exchange of the Mystère d’Adam, the voice of God instructs 
Adam with the following lines: ‘I have given you a good companion. / She is your wife; 
her name is Eve. / She is your wife and your peer’.93 However, the rib topos appears to 
have been fairly well known, and is found in vernacular texts as late as Dives and 
Pauper and Chaucer’s Parson’s Tale.94 Whilst it has attracted some scholarly attention, 
it is rarely discussed in detail.
95
 Despite being repeated by several of the most influential 
theologians of the central middle ages, arguments about Eve’s equivalence to Adam are 
not sufficiently well known in modern scholarship to have provided a possible 
challenge to the assumption that medieval representations of Eve are largely 
misogynistic. It must also be admitted that none of the twelfth-century writers who 
employ the argument could be described as feminists, or proto-feminists, even were 
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these not deeply anachronistic appellations. As will be discussed in the next chapter 
concerning representations of Eve as the first wife, use of the rib argument did not 
prevent anyone from arguing that wives ought to be subject to their husbands. 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that there were prominent twelfth-century scholars who 
argued that Eve was created as Adam’s equal.  
 
III. ‘IN PARADISO VOLUPTATIS’: REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE AND PRELAPSARIAN HUMAN 
NATURE 
 
The nature and composition of prelapsarian mankind was an issue that provoked 
questions from many during this period, as Hugh of St Victor asserts.96 Discussions of 
prelapsarian human nature tend to focus on two main concerns in relation to the figure 
of Eve. First, the significance of the placing of Eve in paradise – whereas Adam had 
been created within paradise, Eve was created externally and established in the garden 
of Eden subsequently. Second, there is the question of the role that mankind was 
intended to perform in paradise, and the status of mankind as the most significant 
occupant of the terrestrial sphere of the created universe.  
 
THE PLACING OF EVE IN PARADISE 
Regarding the establishment of the first human beings in paradise, it is generally agreed 
that Adam was created outside it and then placed there afterwards, whereas Eve was 
created within paradise itself. In the Expositio, Abelard writes that Eve was created in a 
better situation than Adam; that is, inside the garden of Eden itself. However, despite 
this privileged creation, she proved weaker and more susceptible to temptation that 
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Adam, who had been made in less exalted circumstances; thus ‘the woman was created 
in a better place [than Adam] but behaved worse when tempted’.97 This idea is taken 
from Ambrose’s Paradiso, although Abelard tones down here the misogyny of 
Ambrose’s original formulation, which uses the location of Eve’s creation as a 
justification for the subordination of ungratefully wayward women to the supposed 
authority and protection of their ‘superior’ male counterparts: 
Note that the man was created outside Paradise, whereas woman was 
made within it. This teaches us that each person acquires grace by reason 
of virtue, not because of locality or of race. Hence, although created 
outside Paradise, that is, in an inferior place, man is found to be superior, 
whereas woman, created in a better place, that is to say, in Paradise, is 
found to be inferior. She was first to be deceived and was responsible for 
deceiving the man...And Paul says: “Adam was not deceived, but the 
woman was deceived and was in sin”... For she who was made for 
assistance needs the protection of a man, because the head of woman is 
man, who, while he believed that he would have the assistance of his 
wife, fell because of her.98 
 
However, Abelard seems to have changed his mind about this issue at some point during 
the 1130s, and the seventh letter to Heloise demonstrates the same idea, taken from 
Ambrose again but reworked into a far more generous representation of Eve:  
Indeed if we trace the benefits of this divine grace and honour shown to 
women from the creation of the world, we at once find that the creation 
of woman excelled by a certain dignity, since it was clearly in paradise. 
Man was created outside paradise.99 
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Hence Abelard takes a misogynistic Patristic representation of Eve and translates it into 
a positive representation, maintaining the impression of Patristic authority whilst 
providing praise of Eve and of women in general. Peter Dronke has established that 
Abelard was the first person to employ this interpretation of Eve’s creation, which 
appears in numerous later texts.
100
 Blamires concurs, pointing out that Abelard repeats 
the idea in a sermon on the Assumption.
101
 The sermon that Blamires refers to here 
discusses Eve’s privileged creation in the context of the redemptive agency of the 
Virgin Mary.
102
 As with the rib topos, it seems once again that Abelard and his 
exegetical creativity lie at the origin of a particularly positive representation of Eve 
which proved influential in later medieval defences of the first woman.
103
 
However, this interpretation of Eve’s ‘privileged’ creation does not seem to have 
been enormously popular among other writers of the twelfth century. Hugh of St Victor 
does emphasise the fact that Adam was created first, and then moved to paradise after 
his creation, since the Genesis text clearly states that he was not created but placed there 
(‘referto positus est homo, non creatus’). 104  However, he does not attribute any 
particular significance to this; nor does he suggest that Eve’s creation within paradise is 
indicative of any particular privilege. Lombard does not consider the location of Eve’s 
creation as an indicator of privilege either, although he does suggest that Adam’s having 
been created outside paradise might have indicated that mankind would not stay there 
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for long: Genesis ‘plainly indicates that man, who was created outside paradise, was 
afterwards placed in paradise. This is said to have been done because he was not going 
to remain in it’.105  
 
THE ROLE OF PRELAPSARIAN MANKIND IN PARADISE 
Regarding the prelapsarian role of mankind, Genesis states that mankind was ordained 
to rule (‘dominare’) and to preside (‘praeesse’) over the living elements which occupied 
the earthly components of the carefully calibrated universal hierarchy: 
And [God] said ‘let us make man in our image and likeness and let him 
have precedence...’ and he blessed them, and said ‘increase and multiply 
and fill the earth and make it [your] subject, and rule over the fish of the 
sea and the flying-things of the sky and all the creatures which move 
upon the earth’.106 
 
This description of the position occupied by Adam and Eve (the statement applies to 
them both equally) places them at the heart of the creation Adam and Eve were to 
govern the earth as God governed the cosmos, and the notion of mankind’s being the 
crowning achievement of the six day work sustains the distinctively anthropic emphasis 
discernible in twelfth-century responses to the creation narrative.  
The purpose of mankind’s existence is usually deemed twofold – human beings 
were created in order to worship God, and also to rule over the rest of his creation. They 
are able to fulfil these functions on account of being the only corporeal being created 
with a soul, and with the capacity for reason. This privileged status also accounts for 
mankind’s having been created after every other physical component of the earth. 
Abelard writes of Genesis 1.26 (‘let us make man’) that 
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All other things having been created, or disposed on account of man, he 
[God] created him lastly, and as in the conclusion of his works 
established him. To whom [mankind], as the end and cause of his 
creation, all other things tended, since on account of him all things were 
made. Whence it was not right for him to be created unless he ought to 
be in charge of these other things.107 
 
As mentioned above, Abelard also writes that the human soul is the strongest of all 
souls (‘validior est’) and is thus fit to rule the rest of the earth, since it is alone in being 
capable of participating in divine wisdom and love.108  He comments that the very words 
used in the Bible to describe the creation of mankind were employed in order to indicate 
the significance of mankind as the most significant occupant of the terrestrial 
component of the world: ‘how excellent this particular creation is’, Abelard writes of 
mankind, ‘and how far superior to the others described above, is in fact expressed in 
these words, [spoken] as if conferring together in some sort of council for the making of 
something great’.109 Peter Lombard was equally convinced of mankind’s superior status 
within the universe: as mankind was made in order to serve God, he writes, so the world 
was created in order to serve mankind.110 Likewise, Hildegard of Bingen writes that the 
world had been created for the service of mankind.111 
The Adam poet is unique in his exegesis of Genesis 1.26-28, and numerous 
scholars have commented on the way in which establishment of Adam and Eve in 
paradise resembles a lord expecting homage from his vassals.112 God instructs Adam 
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that ‘You must never take arms against me’, and to his announcement that ‘I give it [this 
garden, i.e. Paradise] to you, to maintain and preserve...’, Adam dutifully answers that ‘I 
will entirely obey your command’. 113  Even assuming that the poet intended these 
supposed allusions to feudal hierarchy to be apparent, given that the semantic field of 
bondage, duty and servitude would have had distinct scriptural resonances for a twelfth-
century audience, the significance of this apparently secularised rendering of scriptural 
edicts has perhaps been overstated, particularly by Morgan.114 However, Morgan is right 
to dispute the tenability of Erich Auerbach’s argument that the Mystère d’Adam 
‘domesticates’ (i.e. simplifies) its scriptural material in order to render it 
comprehensible to an unenlightened laity. 115  The poet glosses and dramatises this 
passage in a way which communicates its theological import as a defining factor in 
prelapsarian humanity’s purpose within the cosmos, as well as rendering it directly 
relevant to the debt owed by fallen mankind to their creator and redeemer. As Duby 
states, the poet seeks to affirm in the minds of his audience the fact that mankind had 
transgressed despite their establishment ‘in a state of perfection where ratio ruled over 
sensus’.116  
Mankind was thus agreed to have been the most significant being on earth, and 
the apex of the hexaemeral process as far as terrestrial creation was concerned. Given 
this anthropic emphasis, it is unsurprising that commentaries on Genesis have been 
employed in order to support arguments in favour of the existence of humanism in the 
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twelfth century. Two prominent examples of this can be found in the work of Chenu and 
Southern.  In an essay defending the existence of ‘renaissance’ and humanism in 
twelfth-century thought, Chenu claims that the twelfth century marks the point at which 
theologians self-consciously began to confront the physical universe as ‘an external, 
present, intelligible and active reality’, and that ‘they reflected that they themselves 
were caught up within the framework of nature, were themselves also bits of this 
cosmos they were ready to master’.117 These anthropic and naturalistic concerns are, he 
continues, conspicuous in the hexaemeral commentaries of the period.
118
Likewise, 
Southern predicates his definition of medieval humanism on a demonstrable awareness 
of the fundamental worthiness of human nature, and of mankind’s centrality within the 
universal order. Medieval humanism is rooted, Southern states, in ‘a strong sense of the 
dignity of human nature’, from which man ‘understands himself as the main part, the 
keystone of nature’.119 He writes that ‘scholastic humanism’ in particular comprised an 
intellectual habitus in which 
The whole universe appears intelligible and accessible to human reason: 
nature is seen as an orderly system, and… we may expect a humanist to 
assert not only that man is the noblest of God’s creatures, but also that 
his nobility continues even in his fallen state, that it is capable of 
development in this world, that the instruments exist by which it can be 
developed, and that it should be the chief aim of human endeavour to 
perfect these instruments.
120
 
It is indeed possible to find excerpts from twelfth-century hexaemeral writing which 
appear to justify the views of both Chenu and Southern, and it is difficult to deny that 
these definitions are at least superficially persuasive. 
However, what they essentially say is simply that twelfth-century scholars 
considered the earth to be intelligible, and considered mankind to be the most 
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significant of the creatures that occupied it. This does not constitute humanism, 
however laudable or justifiable it might be. It is also necessary to point out the 
frequency with which commentaries on Genesis point out the limitations of human 
knowledge and the inferiority of human capacity to comprehend divine ‘mysteries’. As 
was described above in the section discussing the use of Romans 1.20, commentaries on 
Genesis reflect the feeling that the world was intelligible; not that human intelligence 
was comprehensive, and certainly not that it was inherently beneficial to employ it. 
Examining created things and their physical existence was a means by which to 
approach God, and such examination was thus an earthly means to a spiritual end rather 
than an intellectual end that was considered inherently worthwhile. For example, 
Hildegard’s Scivias has the voice of God declare that there are elements of the creation 
and fall narratives which human beings cannot comprehend and should refrain from 
investigating. 121  Furthermore, she reports that God issues the following warning to 
human beings who wish to know more than is appropriate, particularly regarding 
creation: 
You see clearly only a few things among many which are hidden from 
your eyes… Truly you do not know how you were created. But now, O 
human, you wish to investigate heaven and earth, and to judge of their 
justice in God’s disposition, and to know the highest things though you 
are not able to examine the lowest.122 
 
Even Abelard writes that it is necessary to study the physical components of 
creation precisely because God himself is ultimately inaccessible and invisible, whereas 
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the earth is intelligible.
123
 Hugh of St Victor is equally cautious about what it is 
appropriate for mankind to know. The genius of human intellect is, he writes, best 
judged by its ability to focus prudently on those things which need to be known, rather 
than persisting deliberately in the study of things which are inadvisably difficult.124 
‘Therefore’, he continues, ‘insofar as it is sufficient for sound faith, we seek to discern, 
and we cease to examine those things which curiosity alone persuades us to 
investigate’.125 This passage itself in fact demonstrates the very caution it advises. It is 
no coincidence that this exhortation to prudence appears in the section of De 
sacramentis which is concerned with the origin of the soul and its relationship to that of 
the body, which was, thanks to the legacy of Origen, a matter of long standing 
controversy.
126
 More broadly relevant, however, is its demonstration that a sense of 
intellectual restraint was advisable within a setting which demanded that innovative 
enquiry afford due reverence not only to divine and scriptural authority, but also that of 
the major Church Fathers.
127
 
Human intellect, therefore, was not only considered finite or flawed. These texts 
attest to the existence of things which human beings cannot and, moreover, are not 
allowed to know. To seek knowledge and understanding of such things is deemed 
actively impious and an affront to the superiority of the divine. It is difficult to reconcile 
this notion with Southern’s insistence that the whole universe was considered 
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intelligible and accessible to human reason during this period, or with Chenu’s claim 
that hexaemeral commentary conceived mankind as part of a cosmos that was to be 
intellectually mastered in its entirety. Literal commentary on Genesis may have been 
employed to elucidate the earth and the natural laws which governed it, but certainly not 
the entire universe, which included unknowable components such as heaven, hell and 
the nature of angels. Moreover, at no point do any of the hexaemeral commentaries state 
that it is an inherently good thing, in itself, to examine the fabric of the universe - they 
do not advocate human knowledge for its own sake. The role of mankind within the 
order of creation does receive considerable attention, but at no point is mankind truly 
central in the sense of being its most important component. Humanity and human 
reason are subordinate to the divine, and the supposedly humanist undertaking of 
examining the ‘dispositio mundi’ is conceived as a way of becoming ‘closer’ to God. 
Human knowledge of the created world is thus a means to an end; not an end in itself. It 
is therefore difficult to describe exegesis of the hexaemeron as a genuinely humanist 
endeavour. 
 
CONCLUSION  
It is possible to identify the following broad areas of concern which receive consistent 
attention throughout the major treatments of Eve’s creation: the fundamental 
composition of the human being, the mechanics of the creative processes which enabled 
Eve to be produced from Adam’s rib, Eve’s purpose and status within the order of 
creation, and the knowledge and nature of mankind before the fall. Throughout the texts 
discussed here, there is a consistent level of emphasis on the equivalence with which 
Eve was created, and on the creation of Eve as a means of examining the fabric of the 
created world. The main development that it is possible to trace in examining 
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representations of Eve as the first woman is an identifiable shift in responses to the 
physical nature and status of the human being, and the significance of mankind within 
the order of creation. It is possible to discern an increasingly developed level of 
engagement with the exegesis of Genesis as a potential means by which to understand 
both the physical and spiritual realities of human nature and existence.  
This analysis destabilises the notion that the categories of masculus and femina 
referred to in the passage were simplistically mapped onto the ostensibly equivalent 
biological categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’. Rather, what emerges in the interpretations 
of Genesis 1.26 – 27 discussed here is a consistent sense of the shared qualities which 
distinguish all human beings regardless of physical gender, and a conception of the 
human soul as an entity which contained both masculine and feminine components, 
symbolically represented by Adam and Eve respectively. Twelfth-century accounts of 
Eve’s creation were not used simply to demonstrate female inferiority by asserting that 
Eve was created to be weaker than her husband. Rather, commentary on Eve’s creation 
provided the opportunity to discuss numerous significant theological and philosophical 
issues during this period. It would be a mistake to say that the texts discussed above 
argue that the rights and capacities of women in general are equal to those of men, or 
that they do not express patriarchal attitudes. Tempting though it might be to translate 
words such as ‘socia’ and ‘pareil’ as ‘equal’, this would be somewhat misleading - Eve 
is presented as an equivalent partner, but at no point is she described as having the same 
spiritual or physical capability and status as her husband. Moreover, the notion of Eve’s 
equivalence is not unanimously asserted; for example, it does not appear at all in the 
commentaries by Hildegard of Bingen or Guibert of Nogent.  
It must also be noted, however, that the concern with demonstrating any 
equivalence between Eve and Adam, and related ideas regarding gender, are given 
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considerably less attention than the wider issues surrounding the creation of Eve; 
namely, the origins of mankind generally, and the composition of the world in which 
they were created. It seems that gender and the nature of ‘woman’ was by no means the 
significant aspect of the biblical account of Eve’s creation. Rather, the most significant 
aspect, the area which demanded most in terms of exegetical skill and intellectual 
attention, was the physical process itself. The process by which Eve is said to have been 
formed from the rib was clearly a difficult issue to address, since it is, as Lombard says, 
so clearly contrary to the course of nature as it has become known to mankind. 
Providing commentary on the creation of Eve necessitated confronting the disparity 
between certain scripturally recounted events and observable physical processes and 
phenomena. This disparity was not only acknowledged; there were also attempts to 
elucidate it which went beyond the idea that it was an axiomatically inexplicable 
miracle. It is also noticeable that discussions such as Lombard’s account of seminal 
causes, or Hugh’s explanation of the atomic composition of matter, arise in relation to 
Eve’s creation, not that of Adam. This is also the case with the discussions of what it 
meant to be created in the image and likeness of God - the creation of Adam simply 
does not appear to have provoked such debate.  
There is an increasingly identifiable emphasis throughout these texts on Eve’s 
position as an equivalent created with benevolent intent, rather than on employing the 
creation of Eve as a means of justifying misogynistic theories about female inferiority. 
It is significant that some of the most influential scholars of this period were certain that 
the manner of Eve’s creation was indicative of her worth and equivalence. Eve is 
consistently aligned with the Church, which indicates both the significance of the 
theological function she occupied during this period, and the positive associations with 
which she was endowed. The writers discussed above, even those who do not employ 
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the rib topos or the Eve/Church comparison, emphasise the unity and parity between 
Adam and Eve, and were occasionally even willing to modify Patristic and scriptural 
authority in order to do so. Moreover, the creation of Eve both justified and provoked 
discussion of much broader issues, and offered, or perhaps demanded, the opportunity 
to examine the composition and function of mankind in general, and that of the world in 
which they were created.
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CHAPTER II 
REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE AS THE FIRST 
WIFE AND MOTHER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the hexaemeral material discussed in the previous chapter, representations of 
Eve as the first wife and mother relate to two areas which have been widely studied 
amid modern scholarship dealing with the twelfth century and with the middle ages 
more generally. The first of these areas is the medieval institution of marriage; a subject 
which has fostered a substantial historiographical corpus.
1
 However, whilst the union of 
Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden has been described as a well-established basis for 
exploring medieval responses to marriage, reading matrimonial and misogamous 
discourse in relation to Eve specifically has been overlooked as a means of exploring 
the ways in which marriage was viewed during this period, and exegesis of Genesis 
remains largely neglected in this context.
2
 The second, and less easily definable, area is 
that of the theological and social expectations of medieval women as wives and mothers; 
                                                          
1
 Prominent examples include Georges Duby trans. Elborg Foster, Medieval Marriage: Two Models from 
Twelfth-Century France (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978); idem, trans. Barbara Bray, 
The Knight, the Lady, and the Priest; R. Howard Bloch, Medieval French Literature and Law (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977); idem, Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic 
Love (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society 
in Medieval Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Christopher Brooke, The Medieval 
Idea of Marriage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). More recently, the subject of marriage in a 
literary context has been explored by Neil Cartlidge, whilst Brundage’s situation of matrimonial discourse 
within the creation and enforcement of canon law has been advanced by the work of Anders Winroth, and 
David d’Avray has taken a more broad and sociological approach focusing on matrimonial symbolism; 
see Neil Cartlidge, Medieval Marriage: Literary Approaches 1100-1300 (Cambridge: Boydell and 
Brewer, 1997); Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), see also ‘Marital Consent in Gratian’s Decretum’, in Martin Brett and Kathleen G. Cushing 
ed., Readers, Texts and Compilers in the Earlier Middle Ages: Studies in Medieval Canon Law in Honour 
of Linda Fowler-Magerl (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) pp. 111-2; David d’Avray, Medieval Marriage: 
Symbolism and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2005). 
2
 Cartlidge, Medieval Marriage, p. 38; Bloch, pp. 22-9. 
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more specifically, the substantial body of texts in which the medieval figure of Eve is 
deemed to be representative of the middle ages’ supposedly inflexible and dichotomous 
characterisation of women as either Eve or Mary. Such studies often employ the 
palindromic formulation ‘Eva/Ave’, in which the name ‘Eva’ is reversed in order to 
form the word ‘Ave’, as an indication that the Virgin Mary ‘reversed’ the sin of Eve.3 
The Eve/Mary parallel has been endowed with substantial theological and 
anthropological significance in modern scholarship, and both the ‘Eva/Ave’ palindrome, 
and the idea of Mary as the ‘new’ or ‘second’ Eve, are often described as both a tenet of 
medieval theology and an exemplification of the medieval view of women.
4
 
The twelfth-century figure of Eve has often been misrepresented in the modern 
scholarship relating to both these areas, and twelfth-century writers have been unfairly 
criticised for constructing representations of Eve as the first wife and mother which are 
distinguished principally by their misogynistic hostility toward Eve and toward the 
female corporeality she is thought to have represented during this period. For example, 
‘clerical authors’ and their supposedly universal anti-feminism have received 
condemnation from Sharon Farmer, whose study of twelfth-century conceptions of the 
wife states that  
                                                          
3
 The word ‘Ave’ is the first word spoken by the angel Gabriel in the Annunciation narrative: ‘et 
ingressus angelus, ad eam dixit “ave gratia plena, Dominus tecum, benedicta tu in mulieribus” ’, Luke 
1.28.   
4
 See for example, Henry Kraus, ‘Eve and Mary: Conflicting Images of Medieval Woman’, Feminism and 
Art History: Questioning the Litany ed. Norma Broude and Mary D. Garrard (Colorado: Westview Press, 
1982) pp. 79-100; Gender and Sexuality in the Middle Ages: A Reader ed. Martha A. Broznya (North 
Carolina: McFarland, 2005) p. 235;  Jacques Dalarun, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, ‘The Clerical Gaze’, A 
History of Women in the West: Silences of the Middle Ages ed. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1994) pp. 15-42, see p. 23; Rebecca L. Garber, Feminine Figurae: 
Representations of Gender in Religious Texts by Medieval German Women Writers (London: Routledge, 
2003) p. 34, where the Eva/Ave phrase is described as ‘well known’ but no references are given; Brian 
Murdoch, Adam’s Grace, p. 12; Catherine Sanok, ‘Women and Literature’, in A Concise Handbook to 
Middle English Literature ed. Marilyn Corrie (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009) pp. 54-76, p. 55; Susan Haskins, 
Mary Magdalene: Truth and Myth (London: Harper Collins, 1993) p. 140, Handbook to Life in the 
Medieval World ed. Madeleine Pelner Cosman and Linda Gale Jones (New York: Infobase Publishing, 
2008) vol. 3,  p. 331; Marina Warner, Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary 
(London: Vintage, 1983) p. 60. 
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Clerical authors became increasingly inclined to represent woman as Eve, 
the temptress. She was not a mere pawn, but an active, negative force, a 
source of disorder in society: she enticed men into the material realm of 
sin just as Eve enticed Adam.
5
 
 
Likewise, Duby has much to say about the supposedly ubiquitous antifeminism of this 
period, stating that the ‘only’ extant evidence regarding twelfth-century marriage was 
written by ecclesiastical men who were, apparently, little more than professional 
misogynists: ‘men professionally obligated to express repugnance toward sex and 
particularly toward women’. 6  This endemic misogyny has, according to Duby, so 
blighted twelfth-century responses to marriage and the role of the wife that it is 
impossible to study it except as a phenomenon of social history.
7
 
It has also been assumed that twelfth-century authors deemed the original sin to 
have consisted in sexual activity, with the lust-filled Eve seducing Adam and thereby 
sealing the fate of mankind.
8
 This approach is exemplified by Jacques Le Goff’s 
assertion that  
The original sin was one of intellectual pride, intellectual defiance of 
God, but medieval Christianity transformed this into a sexual sin. The 
height of abomination, the worst of the body and of sexuality, was the 
female body. From Eve... woman’s body was the devil’s stomping 
                                                          
5
 Sharon Farmer, ‘Persuasive Voices: Clerical Images of Medieval Wives’, Speculum, vol. 61, no 3 (1986) 
pp. 517-43; p.519. 
6
 Duby, The Knight, the Lady and the Priest, p. 20. 
7
 ‘So my investigation of marriage during this period is necessarily restricted to what was on the surface 
both of society and of institutions; to facts and events’, ibid., p. 7.  
8
 See for example Brundage, Law, Sex and Christian Society, p. 62; Cartlidge, Medieval Marriage, p. 39; 
Joan Young Gregg, Devils, Women and Jews, p. 92; Sally Vaughn, ‘Saint Anselm and his Students 
Writing about Love: A Theological Foundation for the Rise of Romantic Love in Europe’, Journal of the 
History of Sexuality vol. 19, no 1,pp. 54 – 73; p. 70; Rebecca Garber, ‘Where is the Body? Images of Eve 
and Mary in the Scivias’ in Maud Burnett McInerney ed., Hildegard of Bingen: A Book of Essays, 
Garland Mediaeval Casebooks (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 103 – 132; see pp. 113-14. 
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ground... By the twelfth century this view was accepted by nearly 
everyone... the original sin was simply said to be sexual.9 
 
Related to this misconception is the notion that medieval theologians deemed marriage 
an aberrant concession to the concupiscence of fallen mankind; an approach typified by 
Duby’s statement that twelfth-century marriage was conceived as ‘a policy designed in 
fact to purify the whole of society’.10  
On account of the prevalent conception of widespread hostility toward Eve as 
well as toward procreation and marriage during this period, twelfth-century writers in 
particular have been accused of subjecting women to vilification as wayward 
temptresses, and to veneration as remote and idealised sponsae Christi. For example, 
Newman writes that ‘in the dichotomy of Eve and Mary, demonised femina and 
idealised virgo... medieval writers often remarked that the Virgin’s Ave was but Eva 
inverted’.11 Duby similarly employs the ‘Eva/Ave’ formulation, erroneously attributing 
the creation of the phrase to Anselm of Canterbury.
12
 Robert Swanson argues that 
women were largely excluded from ‘the twelfth-century renaissance’. He echoes 
Newman’s conception of an inflexible dichotomy which presented only Eve and Mary 
as possible exemplars for female conduct, ‘encapsulated’, he asserts, ‘in the reversal of 
the Fall as Eva (Eve) became Ave’.13 
                                                          
9
 Jacques Le Goff trans. Arthur Goldhammer, The Medieval Imagination (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988) p. 83. 
10
 Duby, The Knight, the Lady and the Priest, p. 3. 
11
Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature 
(Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995) p. 6; she gives no examples with which to 
support this claim. 
12
 Duby, Eve and the Church, p. 118. 
13
 R. N. Swanson, The Twelfth-Century Renaissance (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1999) 
p. 204. 
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There are of course exceptions to this conception of twelfth-century responses to 
Eve and women in general in the roles of wife and mother. Despite his insistence that 
twelfth-century responses to marriage were marked principally by the ubiquitous 
presence of misogyny, Duby’s discussion of the Anglo-Norman Eve in fact provides 
valuable demonstration of the way in which the twelfth-century figure of Eve could 
function as a complex, informative didactic model rather than as a straightforward 
vehicle of misogyny. This function of Eve as positive exemplar is only rarely 
acknowledged; however, in addition to Duby another exception can be found in 
Cartlidge’s discussion of the Anglo-Norman Eve.14 In addition, Christopher Brooke has 
briefly highlighted the significance of the biblical representation of Eve in the 
establishment of marriage as a sacrament during the twelfth century: 
In the creation of Eve, one of the authors of Genesis had provided a 
deeply moving image - that man and wife could be ‘one flesh’… [Hence] 
the essence of marriage law and doctrine in twelfth century lay in the 
reaffirmation of positions already established in earlier times…What is 
new is the attempt by the Church with great sophistication and subtlety 
to define and enforce its law of marriage. Marriage is a sacrament - and 
here, in the definition of sacraments, we have something clearly 
original.
15
 
On the whole, however, the myth of the twelfth-century figure of Eve as a 
simplistic vehicle for antifeminist sentiment remains prominent. Modern conceptions of 
the twelfth-century figure of Eve as a wife and mother remain characterised by the three 
misrepresentations outlined above; namely that Eve was a model of destructive uxorial 
conduct, that she was responsible for an act of sexual sin which necessitated the 
establishment of marriage as a concession to lust and procreation, and that her role as 
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 Ibid., pp. 213 – 216; Cartlidge, Medieval Marriage, pp. 38 – 43, particularly p. 43 which argues, as 
Duby does, that Eve becomes both a model of contrition and vehicle for the text’s typological optimism. 
15
 Christopher Brooke, The Medieval Idea of Marriage, p. 57. 
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wife and mother was unfavourably compared to that of the Virgin Mary in such a way 
that reduced female identity to a simplistic dichotomy between temptress and virgin. 
The texts with which this thesis is concerned offer a very different perspective, 
and their representations of Eve as the first wife and mother bear little resemblance to 
the image of the twelfth-century figure of Eve described in the majority of the 
secondary texts referred to above. Since hexaemeral commentary has been neglected 
amid modern scholarship on the middle ages, the dominant conception of twelfth-
century representations of Eve remains partial and incomplete. However, when 
hexaemeral commentary is explored in this context, a more nuanced and markedly less 
misogynistic image emerges of both the twelfth-century figure of Eve, and of the ways 
in which the figure of Eve informed responses to the subjects of marriage and 
procreation. 
As will be discussed in more detail below, Eve is necessarily employed as a 
positive uxorial model, because the scriptural basis for marriage was the union 
established between Adam and Eve in Genesis 2.23 – 24. 16  Also, whilst the 
transmission of original sin after the fall was considered to be something facilitated via 
the act of procreation, the first sin itself was not considered to have consisted in illicit 
sexual activity. All the principal primary sources discussed here describe lust as 
consequence rather than a cause of the fall, and procreation as a basic human necessity 
which, had Eve not sinned, would have occurred innocently and without sin in paradise. 
In addition, there is no evidence in these texts to suggest that the Eve/Mary parallel was 
deemed a significant means by which to examine either the position of women or the 
theology of creation and redemption. It is not a common feature in major twelfth-
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 ‘Dixitque Adam “hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea haec, vocabitur virago quoniam de 
viro sumpta est”. Quam ob rem relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adherebit uxori suae et erunt 
duo in carne una’. 
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century treatments of Eve or of the fall. The only the only author discussed here who 
compares Eve and Mary at all is Hildegard of Bingen, and she does not employ the 
parallel as a simplistic reversal of Eve’s sin by Mary, and nor does she present the roles 
of Eve and Mary as being straightforwardly applicable to women in general.  
   
II.I REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE AS THE FIRST WIFE 
Marriage occupied a singular position within the sacramental theology of the twelfth 
century since it was the only sacrament thought to have been instituted before the fall of 
mankind. The account in Genesis of Adam and Eve’s being joined in one flesh became 
the blueprint for a union that was both socially and theologically significant, and which 
became both the subject of, and to some extent impetus for, the analysis and 
interpretative practices which characterise twelfth-century responses to the hexaemeron 
and the fall of mankind. Consequently, representations of Eve provide useful insights 
into these discussions, and the texts and traditions they comprised.  
The model for Christian matrimony is described in the second chapter of 
Genesis as the joining of Adam and Eve into a single unit, the establishment of which is 
to be privileged above the ties of parental bonds:  
And Adam said, ‘this now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she 
will be called woman for she is made from man.’ On account of this a 
man will leave his father and his mother and will cleave to his wife, and 
they will be two in one flesh.
17
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  ‘Dixitque Adam, “hoc nunc os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea haec vocabitur virago quoniam de 
viro sumpta est”. Quam ob rem relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adherebit uxori suae et erunt 
duo in carne una’, Genesis 2.23 – 24. 
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Despite the image of husband and wife as harmonious components in carne una, the 
‘first’ Christian marriage establishes a markedly abstract and utilitarian union which 
addresses none of the emotional and social aspects of the matrimonial bond as it 
functioned in medieval society. In addition to the extant complications involved in 
exegesis of the hexaemeron, interpretation of this passage presented the additional 
complication applying theological and doctrinal intricacies to an institution that was not 
only subject to the temporality of romantic and political affinities, but which pre-dated 
Christianity itself, and which had long functioned successfully without Christian 
commentary or regulation. In relation to Eve’s role as the ‘first’ wife, there is the 
difficulty of reconciling Eve’s status as an equivalent in the order of creation with the 
social and cultural expectation that a wife be subordinate. Moreover, whilst Adam and 
Eve’s marriage was necessarily deemed the formative exemplar for all subsequent 
matrimonial unions, and also deemed unique among the sacraments as the only one to 
be established before the fall and ratified by God directly, Eve’s subsequent actions fall 
far short of exemplary uxorial conduct.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, several twelfth-century interpretations 
of the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib display a notable concern with establishing the 
parity and equivalence which existed between the first man and woman. However, when 
dealing with Adam and Eve as the archetypal married couple, it was necessary to 
reconcile this parity with the expectation that the wife be obedient and subordinate to 
the authority of the husband. This tension has been usefully identified by Duby, who 
describes the marriage of Adam and Eve in the Mystère d’Adam as a union of ‘two 
parties equal in nature but necessarily unequal in power’.18 Whilst it contradicts his 
earlier insistence on ubiquitous antifeminism, this phrase encapsulates the tenor of the 
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 Duby, The Knight, the Lady and the Priest, p. 214.  
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representation of Eve as a wife not only in the Mystère d’Adam but also in the work of 
Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard. The work of both Hugh of St Victor and Peter 
Lombard forms a significant component of twelfth-century writing on marriage as a 
sacrament, with De sacramentis proving particularly formative in this context.
19
 
Moreover, it is the exegesis of Genesis in these texts which informs and upholds the 
sacramentality of marriage and the nature of the bond that it institutes. 
Quoting Genesis 2.23 – 24, Hugh writes that the manner of Eve’s creation and 
the prospect of procreation ‘demonstrates marriage to be from God and to be good’.20 
He is concerned with establishing the uniquely prelapsarian nature of the sacrament, 
stating that whilst the other sacraments were instituted after the fall as a remedy 
intended to restore mankind, marriage has ‘a singular law just as it has a singular 
institution’.21 The marriage of Adam and Eve, he continues, having been established 
prior to the first sin, was intended not as a remedy but as an office, since in prelapsarian 
mankind ‘there was no illness to be healed’ and ‘humbling was not necessary where 
there was no pride’.22 After sin, however, marriage was intended to act, like the other 
sacraments, as a remedy for the maladies incurred by Eve’s transgression.23 Thus for 
Hugh, marriage is both a burden and a blessing, providing simultaneously a connection 
with the privileged and sinless existence of prelapsarian humanity, and a persistent 
reminder of its loss. Eve was both responsible for the sin which necessitated the 
implementation of the sacraments by God as a remedy for fallen human nature, but she 
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 Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, pp. 269 – 70; John Witte, From 
Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion and Law in Western Tradition (Kentucky: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2012) p. 78-9. 
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 ‘Coniugii auctor deus est. Ipse enim coniugium esse decreuit quando mulierem ad propagationem 
generis humani homini in adiutorium fecit… In quibus omnibus ostenditur coniugium et a deo esse et 
bonum esse’, De sacramentis, 2.11, 1. 
21
 ‘Hoc sacramentum singularem habens legem quemadmodum habet singularem institutionem’, ibid., 1.8, 
12. 
22
 ‘Morbus in homine non fuit qui sanaretur… humilitatio enim sibi necessaria non fuit ubi nulla superbia 
fuit’, ibid., 1.8, 12. 
23
 ‘Post peccatum ad remedium’, ibid., 1.8, 12. 
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nonetheless functions as an original and archetypal representative within the only one of 
them established directly by God prior to the fall. 
This ambivalence toward the function and institution of marriage as a sacrament 
dominates Hugh’s conception of Eve as a model of uxorial conduct. Despite having 
established that Eve was created neither to dominate Adam nor to be his inferior, 
Hugh’s conception of the parity which she initially shared with Adam is diminished in 
relation to her role as his wife. As the first human beings, Eve and Adam may have 
enjoyed equal significance within the order of creation. As the first wife however, Eve 
is subordinate to the superior masculine authority of her husband. Thus, despite what 
Hugh argues in the hexaemeral portion of De sacramentis, he subsequently declares that 
the woman was, even before the fall, weaker than the man.
24
 She is also subject to him, 
and she is to be instructed by his counsel.
25
 In his discussion of Adam and Eve as 
models of the husband and the wife, Hugh writes that  
For [God] himself decreed marriage to be when he made woman the 
assistant to man in the propagation of the human race. Adam, knowing in 
spirit to what end the woman was made said, when she was brought up to 
him, ‘This now is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh…’26 
 
Hugh’s explanation of the origin of marriage thus recasts the creation of Eve. 
Whereas before she was to be a partner ‘in consortium dilectionis’ as well as a mother, 
she is now a biological expedient, created for the purpose of procreation.
27
 However, 
Hugh remains insistent that this does not compromise Eve’s position as Adam’s partner 
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 Hugh writes that devil approached Eve rather than Adam  because he wished to attack human nature in 
the part where it seemed to be weakest, that is, the female: ‘humanam naturam in eam partem ubi 
deliberior [i.e. debilior] videbatur aggressus est’, De sacramentis, 1.7, 3. 
25
 In his claim that Eve also received the commandment not to approach the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil because she received it through Adam, he writes that ‘deinde mediante viro ad mulierem 
quoque que subiecta viro fuit et consilio viri instituenda perveniret’, ibid., 1.7, 5. 
26
 De sacramentis, 2.11, 1. 
27
 Ibid., 1.6, 35. 
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(‘socia’) rather than his servant or master. In the section of the text which deals with the 
fundamental nature of marriage, Hugh repeats his previous assertion that Eve was 
created from Adam’s side in order to demonstrate her equivalence. 28  In fact, he 
develops this idea further, stating explicitly for the first time Eve’s equality with, rather 
than equivalence to, Adam: Eve was created, he says, to be part of an equal 
association.
29
 In a certain way, he continues, Eve can be considered inferior to Adam, 
because she was created from him, and thus she must always look upon him as the 
origin of her existence.
30
 However, this does not, apparently, undermine the unity and 
parity with which Eve was created. Hugh’s representation of Eve as the first wife 
therefore constructs for her an ambivalent function as both Adam’s equal and his 
subordinate. She was created for him as an associate in a union of equals, but created 
from him and thus a weaker derivative. Hugh is thus resolutely patriarchal in his 
conception of Eve’s uxorial role despite his egalitarian view of her creation. However, 
this does not lead Hugh to an axiomatically negative representation of Eve in this 
context. Eve’s position as both an equal and a subordinate is ratified by Hugh’s casting 
her as the ‘bride’ within a series of allegorical representations of the sacrament of 
marriage which are typologically invoked by the prelapsarian union she shared with 
Adam. As the soul is the bride of God (‘sponsa Dei’) and the Church is the bride of 
Christ (‘sponsa Christi’) – a relationship  prefigured by the creation of Eve from 
Adam’s rib - Eve both represents the literal role of the wife, and the rational faculty of 
the soul (‘prudentia… hoc est ratio ad humana’) which is governed by wisdom. 31 
Hugh’s representation of Eve as the first wife is thus patriarchal but not misogynistic. 
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   Ibid., p. 430. 
29
  ‘Quia enim socia data est non ancilla aut domina… Propterea de medio facta est ut ad equalitatem 
societatis facta probaretur’, ibid., 2.11, 4. 
30
 ‘In hoc tamen quodammodo inferior ipso quod facta est de ipso ut ad  ipsum semper quasi ad 
principium suum respiceret’, ibid., 2.11, 4.  
31
  Ibid., 1.8, 13. 
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Eve is consistently categorised as the weaker component within a series of binary 
arrangements, but none of these components are themselves indicative of imperfection 
or iniquity. The soul, the Church and prudentia may be subordinate to their respective 
counterparts, but it is difficult to describe them as images which signify abject 
inferiority or transgression.  
In addition to displaying some uncharacteristic divergence from the views of 
Hugh of St Victor, Peter Lombard’s discussions of the role of the wife within marriage 
demonstrate a remarkably consistent emphasis on the rights of the wife.
32
 Indeed, 
Lombard has a notably positive view of marriage in general.
33
 Unlike Hugh of St Victor, 
however, his preferred model of the conjugal bond is that of Joseph and the Virgin 
Mary rather than Adam and Eve, and thus his discussion of Eve as a model of uxorial 
conduct is somewhat less substantial than his discussion of Adam and Eve’s union as a 
prelapsarian model for the sacrament itself. However, where he does employ Eve as an 
archetypal wife, it is done with the same level of emphasis on reciprocity and 
equivalence that characterises his conception of the marital bond more generally. He 
refers to the manner of Eve’s creation as a means by which to indicate that marriage 
consists not in mere cohabitation or sexual consent, but in reciprocal commitment to a 
conjugal partnership:  
And so let us say that a consent to carnal joining or cohabitation does not 
make a marriage, but consent to a conjugal partnership, expressed by 
words of present tense, as when a man says: I take you as my wife, and 
                                                          
32
 He does say that wives should heed the authority of their husbands; however, he also writes that no one 
has the right to coerce a woman into marriage, that a husband is not allowed to wish for a celibate 
marriage without his wife’s consent, that a woman is permitted to leave a husband who refuses or is 
unable to have intercourse with her and/or give her children, and also that a husband is not permitted to 
leave or mistreat his wife, and vice versa, on account of any aesthetic or physical deficiency; see 
Sententiae 4.32, 1; 4,29, 1; 4.32, 2-3; 4.34, 1; 4.34, 6. 
33
 Colish has noted that this is identifiable throughout his work, particularly in his earlier commentary on 
Corinthians which assembles a consistent refutation of the Pauline conception of marriage as a deplorable 
concession to the inherent concupiscence of fallen mankind; Colish, Peter Lombard vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 
1994) p. 204. 
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neither as one to lord it over me, nor as a slave-girl (‘non dominam, non 
ancillam’).34 
 
He then describes explicitly the way in which Eve’s creation ought to inform the nature 
of the relationship between husband and wife; that is, that it should be a relationship 
characterised by parity and reciprocity: 
If she had been from the highest, as from the head, she might seem 
created for domination; but if from the lowest, as from the feet, she 
might seem to be created for subjection to slavery. But because she is 
taken neither as mistress, nor as slave-girl, she is made from the middle, 
that is, from the side, because she is taken for conjugal partnership. 
When they come together in this manner, so that the man says: I take you 
as my marriage partner, and the woman says: I take you as my husband, 
by these words… consent is expressed, and not to carnal joining or to 
bodily cohabitation, but to conjugal partnership.
35
 
 
Lombard thus demonstrates little of Hugh’s ambivalence regarding the reconciliation of 
Eve’s equivalent status at the moment of her creation with her subsequent role in the fall 
of mankind. Nor does he refer to Eve as a biological expedient. 
The only point at which he describes marriage as a union in which the feminine 
must be dominated by the masculine is in his conception of the allegorical ‘marriage’ 
which exists between the components of the soul; a formulation which also appears in 
                                                          
34
 Sentences Book 4 trans. Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2010), p. 172. 
‘Dicamus igitur quod consensus cohabitationis uel carnalis copulae non facit coniugium, sed consensus 
coniugalis societatis, uerbis secundum praesens tempus expressus, ut cum uir dicit: Ego accipio te in 
meam, non dominam, non ancillam, sed coniugem’, Sententiae 4.28, 3. 
35
 Sentences Book 4 trans. Silano, p. 172. ‘Si de summo fieret, ut de capite, uideretur ad dominationem 
creata; si uero de imo, ut de pedibus, uideretur ad seruitutem subicienda. Sed quia nec in dominam nec in 
ancillam assumitur, facta est de medio, id est de latere, quia ad coniugalem societatem assumitur. Cum 
igitur sic conueniunt, ut dicat uir: Accipio te in meam coniugem, et dicat mulier: Accipio te in meum 
uirum, his uerbis uel aliis idem significantibus, exprimitur consensus: Non copulae carnalis uel 
cohabitationis corporalis, sed coniugalis societatis’, Sententiae, 4.28, 4. 
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the work of Guibert of Nogent.
36
 Lombard writes that Eve represents the lower part of 
reason, which must be subordinate to the higher portion, represented by Adam: 
On the spiritual marriage of the man and woman within us. And between 
this man and this woman there is, as it were, a spiritual marriage and a 
natural contract by which the higher portion of reason, the man, as it 
were, is to go first and dominate; but the lower one, the woman, as it 
were, is to be subject and obey.
37
 
 
Guibert likewise employs the prelapsarian union of Adam and Eve as a symbolic 
representation of the virtuous soul, which is characterised by the harmonious co-
existence of the will (Eve as the wife), ruled by the intellect (Adam as the husband): 
On account of this, [Genesis] says, he who has been separated from 
bestial life will leave his father, the devil, and his mother, concupiscence, 
and will cleave to his wife, that is, to his will, ruled by reason, and they 
shall be two - evidently will and intellect - in one flesh, that is, in one 
disposition of mind.
38
  
 
According to both Guibert and Lombard, the maintenance of this ‘marital’ formulation 
is a prerequisite of virtue, with sin occurring when the ‘Eve’ component overrides the 
‘Adam’ component.39 However, this hierarchical arrangement of the soul’s ‘husband’ 
and ‘wife’ aspects is intended to operate in every soul, regardless of the gender of the 
body in which it resides. 
                                                          
36
 The idea in both cases is, as Lombard acknowledges, rooted in Augustine’s De trinitate, 12.7.  
37
 Sentences Book 2, trans. Silano, p. 111. ‘De spirituali coniugio uiri et mulieris in nobis. Atque inter 
hunc uirum et hanc mulierem est uelut quoddam spirituale coniugium naturalis que contractus, quo 
superior rationis portio quasi uir debet praeesse et dominari; inferior uero quasi mulier debet subesse et 
obedire’, Sententiae, 2.24, 8. 
38 ‘Propter hoc, inquit, relinquet is, qui a bestiali semotus est vita patrem diabolum, matremque 
concupiscentiam, et adhaerebit uxori, id est, voluntati suae rationabiliter regendae, et erunt duo, 
intellectus videlicet ac voluntas, in carne una, id est in affectu uno’, Moralia, col. 70 C. 
39
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter III below. 
118 
 
Overall, Lombard’s view of Eve as a largely positive uxorial model is not 
consistently shared, with other authors demonstrating the ambivalence which 
characterised Hugh of St Victor’s discussion. This is particularly apparent in 
Hildegard’s Scivias and the Mystère d’Adam. Hildegard devotes considerable attention 
to the consideration of Eve as a model of wifely conduct. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, Hildegard’s account of Eve’s creation does not make the explicit 
arguments for the parity that Eve shared with Adam that appear in the work of  Abelard, 
Hugh, Lombard and the Adam poet.  However, her discussion of Eve as the first wife 
places more emphasis on the similarities she shared with Adam, and the similarities that 
women thus share with men more generally. 
Paradoxically, this leads Hildegard to a rather critical representation of Eve and 
the potential agency she possesses within the marital union. It is on account of the 
similarities Eve shared with Adam, and the love he felt for her, that she was uniquely 
able to lead him into disobedience. Despite Eve’s innocent soul (‘innocentem animum’): 
[The devil] saw that Adam burned so vehemently in his holy love for 
Eve that if he, the Devil, conquered Eve, Adam would do whatever she 
said to him… How? By first misleading Eve, so that she might flatter 
and caress Adam and thus win his assent, since she more than any other 
creature could lead Adam to disobedience, having been made from his 
rib. Thus woman very quickly overthrows man, if he does not hate her 
and easily accepts her words.
40
 
 
This uneasy combination of inferiority and latent authority is discernible throughout 
Hildegard’s discussion of Eve as a model of uxorial conduct. ‘A wife is under the power 
                                                          
40
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 77. ‘Videns etiam quod Adam in caritate Euae tam fortiter ardebat ut 
si ipse diabolus Euam uicisset, quidquid illa Adae diceret, Adam idem perficeret… Quomodo? Videlicet 
Euam primum seduxit, ut ipsa Adae blandiretur, quatenus ei assensum praeberet, quia ipsa citius Adam 
quam alia creatura ad inoboedientiam perducere potuit, quoniam de costa illius facta fuerat. Quapropter 
mulier uirum citius deicit, cum ille eam non abhorrens uerba eius facile assumit’, Scivias, 1.2, 237 – 49. 
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of her husband’, Hildegard continues, ‘because the strength of the man is to the 
susceptibility of the woman as the hardness of stone is to the softness of earth’.41 
However, Eve’s formation form Adam’s rib indicates that the marital union was a 
partnership forged in perfect love (‘perfectam caritatem’) in which ‘woman was created 
for the sake of man, and man for the sake of woman. As she is from the man, the man is 
also from her… they should work as one in one work’.42 
For Hildegard then, Eve’s destructive potential originates in her similarity to 
Adam, and it is precisely this similarity which complicates the attempt to argue that she 
ought to be subject to him. As in De sacramentis, Hildegard’s Scivias seeks to reconcile 
the conflicted scriptural representation of Eve as both equal to and weaker than Adam. 
Like him, Eve bears the image and likeness of God, and shares the qualities which 
distinguish mankind as the apex of terrestrial creation. At the same time, she is also 
weaker than him, and intended to function within a union which designates her inferior. 
Ambivalence about Eve and the role of the wife within  marriage is perhaps 
most apparent in the Mystère d’Adam, in which the qualities required for exemplary 
uxorial conduct are delineated, but also subjected to a remarkable degree of criticism. 
The text presents Adam and Eve’s marriage as being simultaneous with Eve’s creation. 
It seems that marriage to Adam is the primary motivation and justification for bringing 
Eve into Paradise; the role of the wife and the role of the first woman are to all intents 
and purposes indistinguishable. The opening stage directions dictate that the figure of 
Eve should be dressed in white (‘vestimento albo’) and standing next to Adam, who is 
                                                          
41
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 77. ‘Unde et mulier sub potestate uiri manet, quoniam ut duritia 
lapidis ad teneritudinem terrae est, ita etiam et fortitudo uiri ad mollitiem mulieris est’, Scivias, 1.2, 259 – 
261. 
42
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 78. ‘Mulier propter uirum creata est, et uir propter mulierem factus 
est; quoniam ut illa de uiro ita et uir de illa… in uno opere unum operantur’, Scivias, 1.2, 302. 
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dressed in red (‘tunica rubea’).43 God explains to Adam how he was formed from the 
earth in the image and likeness of his creator, whom Adam must always obey.
44
 Having 
sworn never to disobey or take arms against God, Adam is then introduced to Eve, with 
the figure of God informing him that: 
I’ve given you a good companion 
She is your wife, Eve by name. 
She is your wife and your equivalent 
You must be faithful to her 
Loving her and she loving you. 
If you will both be good to me 
May she be subject to your command 
As you both be to my will. 
From your rib I formed her, 
She is not a stranger [to you], she was born from you. 
I formed her from your body, 
From you and not from outside [i.e. not from any extraneous material]. 
You govern her by reason, 
Let there not be conflict between you 
But great love, great co-operation 
Such be the law of marriage.
45
 
 
This passage provides a considerable contrast with the instructions that God addresses 
to Eve: 
Mark you this and hold it not in vain: 
If you do my will you will keep goodness within you. 
Love me and honour [me as your] your creator, 
Put all your resolve, all your strength 
And all your sense into serving me. 
Love Adam and hold him dear, 
He is your husband and you his wife. 
Be you inclined to him at all times 
And do not deviate from his discipline. 
Serve and love him through good-heartedness 
                                                          
43
 Mystère ed. Sletsjöe, p. 3. 
44
 Ibid., 1 – 5. 
45
 ‘Je tai dune bon cumpainun / ce est ta femme eva a noun / Ce est ta femme et tun pareil / tu le deuez 
estre ben fiel / Tu aime luj e ele ame tej / si serez ben ambedui de moj / Ele soit a tun comandement / e 
uus ambedeus a mun talent / De ta coste laj formee / nest pas estrange de tej est nee / Jo la plasmai de ton 
cors / de tei eisset non pas de fors / Tu la gouerne par raison / nait entre uus ia tencon / Mais grant amor 
grant conseruage / Tel soit la lei de mariage’, ibid., 8-22. 
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For this is the law of marriage. 
If you make him a good helpmate 
I’ll place you with him in glory.46 
 
When God describes marriage to Adam, it is defined by ‘great love’ and co-operation. 
When he describes it to Eve, it is defined as a contract in which she is obliged to serve. 
Thus whereas Adam is presented with a partnership between peers, God describes to 
Eve only the paragon of the good and humble wife, and the duties that she is 
contractually obliged to undertake. 
These differences in the way in which marriage is described to Adam and Eve 
respectively provide a dramatised representation of the tension mentioned above 
between the two positions occupied by the figure of Eve. On the one hand, Eve is an 
equal participant in the privileged status of prelapsarian humanity, which is reflected in 
the speech to Adam with its emphasis on reciprocity and Eve as Adam’s ‘pareil’. On the 
other hand Eve must, according to the organisation of the matrimonial bond, remain 
Adam’s faithful ‘adiutoire’, subject to his discipline. Her provenance and identity as 
Adam’s equivalent is explained only to Adam, with God’s speech to Eve containing 
comparatively little of the mutual love and co-operation which characterises marriage as 
it is described to her husband.  
The promising incipient parity of the first marriage – ‘your wife and your peer’ – 
is tacitly undermined by God’s speech to Eve. Whilst she is described as being Adam’s 
equivalent, she is simultaneously obliged to acknowledge him as the stronger member 
of the union. He is similar to her in nature yet her superior within the matrimonial 
                                                          
46
 ‘Co garde tu nel tenez en uain / Si uos faire ma uolente / en ton cors garderas bonte / Moi aim e honor 
ton creator / E moi seruir met ton porpens / tute la force e tot tun sens / Adam aime e lui tien chier / Il est 
marid e tu sa mullier / A lui soies tot tens encline / nen issir de sa discipline / lui serf e aim par bon coraje 
/ car co est droiz de mariage / Se tu le fais bon adiutoire / Jo te mettre od lui en gloire’, ibid., 25-39. 
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hierarchy: ‘You I will know as lord’, Eve says to God, ‘and he [Adam] as equivalent 
and stronger [than me]’.47 With only the lexicon of service and discipline at her disposal, 
Eve is essentially defined, and obliged to define herself, in relation to her husband.  
However, it seems that the Adam poet establishes these necessary pre-requisites 
for model wifely conduct not in order to exhort them as worthy female aspirations, or to 
highlight Eve’s faults by comparison. Rather, he seems to lay them open to critique. 
Eve’s actions in the text make apparent the spiritual and intellectual poverty of the role 
offered to her, by exposing the paradox of demanding subservience and immediate 
capitulation to masculine commands. Indeed, it is precisely these qualities which allow 
Eve to be led astray by the Devil. Eve is informed by God that servitude and discipline 
comprise the laws of marital union, and that the most desirable characteristics that she 
can possess as a wife are compliance, faithful credulity and bon corage. This lauded 
ideal of credulous and uncomplaining obedience is nowhere more clearly enacted by 
Eve than in her communications with the Devil. See for example the following 
exchange:  
EVE: 
DEVIL: 
EVE: 
 
DEVIL: 
EVE: 
DEVIL: 
EVE: 
DEVIL: 
 
EVE: 
DEVIL: 
Begin speaking and I will hear it 
You will listen to me? 
Yes indeed 
I will not cross you at all 
You will be discreet about me?  
Yes, by faith 
Will it [i.e. this exchange] be made known? 
Not by me 
Now put me in your trust – I want from you no other pledge 
[than this] 
Really, you can believe what I say 
You have been well schooled.
48
 
                                                          
47
 ‘Toi conustrai a seignor / lui a paraille et forzor’, ibid., 42 - 3. 
48
 ‘E: Ore le commence e jo l’orrai / D: Oirras me tu / E: Si frai bien / Ne te curcerai de rien / D: Celeras 
m’en E: Oil par foi / D: Iert descouert E: Nenil par moi / D : Or me mettrai en ta creance / Ne voil de toi 
altre fiance / E: Bien te pois creire a ma parole / D: Tu as este en bone escole’, ibid., 211-19.  
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It is by enacting this role of the faithfully complicit and trustfully submissive 
adiutoire in response to the Devil’s approach that facilitates Eve’s capitulation to sin. 
Faced with the devil’s combination of flattering persuasion and authoritative instruction, 
Eve yields to authority, doing exactly as she is told, as she has been instructed to do: ‘jol 
ferai’, she avers, ‘I will do it’.49 It is this act of obedience, dictated by the ideal of 
feminine passivity and wifely submission, which seals the fate of mankind. However, 
the Adam poet makes it clear that Eve is a conscious performer here. Unlike Adam, 
whom the Devil attempts unsuccessfully to approach in the previous scene, Eve knows 
exactly with whom she is conversing. She addresses Satan by name as soon as he 
approaches her, and it is made clear that she is fully aware that eating the proffered fruit 
would amount to a conscious act of sin.
50
  
This sense of knowing and conscious performance becomes particularly 
apparent in Satan’s flattery, and Eve’s response. Satan approaches Eve as a seducer 
armed with the platitudes of amatory discourse; Eve responds as a ‘well-schooled’ 
recipient, obedient and only ostensibly unwilling to capitulate. Like a courtly lover, the 
Devil attempts to seduce Eve as the object of his illegitimate, that is, extra-marital, 
affection. He praises her beauty, her delicacy, and her absolute superiority to the 
undeserving husband whom she makes only cursory attempts to defend: 
                                                          
49
 Ibid., line 271, p. 21. 
50
 ‘Di moi, sathan...’, ibid., line 205, p. 17. In the temptation scene with Adam, 112-203, Adam does not 
appear to realise who the Devil is until line 195, ‘tu es sathan / mal conseil dones’, ibid., pp. 11 – 17. Eve 
later explains to Adam that she knows exactly whom, the devil is and that his intentions are sinful; see 
276 – 285, pp. 21 – 22. This exchange is discussed more fully in Chapter III below. 
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DEVIL: 
EVE: 
DEVIL: 
 
EVE: 
DEVIL : 
I have seen Adam but he is too stupid 
He is a little hard 
He will be soft, [even though at present] he is 
more hard than hell is 
He is most noble 
On the contrary, he is most slavish 
He takes no care of himself 
But he might at least take care of you 
You are a delicate and tender thing 
And are more fresh than is the rose 
You are more white than crystal 
Than the snow which falls on the ice of valleys 
A grave fault has the Creator committed 
[Because] you are too tender and he [Adam] is 
too hard.
51
 
 
In both the role of the obedient wife and that of the object of a courtly love, Eve 
behaves exactly as she is supposed to, and still succeeds in obtaining that which she 
desires; namely, the fruit and the knowledge it bestows. Both roles offer her the 
opportunity of accessing the fruit by conceding without having been obliged to make 
clear her desire for it. By yielding without ostensibly having wanted to do so, she has 
succeeded in her aim without appearing to have transgressed the limitations of the 
submissive role dictated to her. Eve allows herself to be seduced, and the portrayal of 
her doing so allows the poet not merely to rehearse the trope of the ideally malleable, 
obedient woman, the ‘fieblette e tendre chose’, but also to undermine it. 
 
 
 
                                                          
51
 ‘D: Jo ui Adam mais trop est fols / E: Un poi est durs D: Il serra mols / Il est plus dors que nest emfers / 
E: Il est mult francs D: Ainz est mult serf / Cure non volt prendre de soi / Car la prenge sevals de toi / Tu 
es fieblette e tendre chose / E es plus fresche que nest rose / Tu es plus blanche que cristal / Que neif que 
chiet sor glace en val / Mal culpe em fist li criator / Tu es trop tendre e il trop dur’, ibid., 220-31, p. 19. 
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II.II ‘MATER CUNCTORUM VIVENTIUM’: EVE’S 
AMBIVALENT FERTILITY 
 
As in the case of Eve’s role as the first wife, in relation to Eve’s role as the ‘first’ 
mother there exists a difficulty in negotiating the prelapsarian and post-expulsion 
aspects of her function. Eve’s maternal potential emerges in the Genesis narrative as 
both a privilege and a burden. Despite the exhortation to ‘increase and multiply and fill 
the earth’, Eve’s fertile potential is not specifically addressed until she and Adam are 
expelled from Eden.
52
 Having been apprised of the punishment that mankind has 
incurred, Adam ‘called his wife the name “Eve”, because she was the mother of all the 
living’.53 Eve is thus literally defined by her maternal capacity - this is the first point in 
the biblical narrative at which Eve is referred to by name. The punishment attributed to 
Eve specifically is directly connected to her potential motherhood: ‘[God] said “I will 
multiply your sorrows and your conceptions, in sorrow shall you bring forth 
children”’.54 
Thus, like her role as the ‘first’ wife, Eve’s status as the ‘first’ mother, and thus the 
mother of all the living, provides both a connection to the privileges of prelapsarian 
existence, and a perpetual signifier of its loss. Hence the figure of Eve as wife and 
mother inevitably draws attention to the disparity between what mankind is and what it 
ought to have been. Studying Eve as wife and mother forces an attempt to acknowledge 
humanity at its nadir and at its apex: she represents a problematic permutation of 
prelapsarian privilege and fallen disgrace, and of physical fertility and moral barrenness. 
                                                          
52
 ‘Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram’, Genesis 1.28. 
53
 ‘Et vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae Eva eo quod mater esset cunctorum viventium’, Genesis 3.20. 
54
 ‘Dixit “multiplicabo aerumnas tuas et conceptus tuos in dolore paries filios” ’, Genesis 3.16. 
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SINLESS SEX: EVE AND PRELAPSARIAN PROCREATION 
As was mentioned above, the notion of procreation in paradise is an area in which it 
becomes particularly apparent that commentary on Genesis provide vital context which, 
when overlooked, can exacerbate the ‘myth of Eve’ and the self-perpetuating 
expectation of misogyny in twelfth-century texts. Although Le Goff et al present an 
image of twelfth-century thought characterised by a hostile and horrified response to 
both the female body and to human sexuality, the commentaries with which this thesis 
is concerned present procreation as a basic and necessary human function that would 
have occurred in paradise even if Eve had not sinned. Lust is condemned as immoderate, 
and extramarital sex deemed a violation of the sacrament of marriage, but the original 
sin is deemed to have been disobedience, involving neither lust nor sexual activity of 
any kind. 
This view is rooted in Augustine’s view, expressed in De Genesi ad litteram, 
that Genesis 1.28 indicates that procreation would necessarily have occurred in paradise 
even if Adam and Eve had not sinned: 
Although, you see, it was when they had been turned out of paradise that 
that they are reported to have come together and brought forth, I still 
cannot see what could have prevented them their also being wedded with 
honour and bedded without spot or wrinkle. In Paradise, God granting 
this right to them if they lived faithfully in justice and served him 
obediently in holiness, so that without any restless fever of lust, without 
any labour or pain in childbirth, offspring would be brought forth.
55
 
 
                                                          
55
 ‘Benedixitque illis Deus et ait “crescite et multiplicamini et replete terramˮ ’, Genesis 1.28. On Genesis 
trans. Hill, pp. 378 – 79. ‘Quamquam enim iam emissi de paradiso conuenisse et genuisse 
commemorantur, tamen non uideo, quid prohibere potuerit, ut essent eis etiam in paradiso honorabiles 
nuptiae et torus inmaculatus hoc deo praestante fideliter iuste que uiuentibus ei que oboedienter sancte 
que seruientibus, ut sine ullo inquieto ardore libidinis, sine ullo labore ac dolore pariendi fetus ex eorum 
semine gigneretur’, De Genesi ad litteram, 9.3. All the texts discussed likewise state that the first sin was 
disobedience, not lust; see Chapter III, section I below. 
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Hence, procreation could have taken place in paradise before the fall, and would have 
done so without the corrupting influence of lust. Eve’s sin did not involve illicit sexual 
activity, because until the first sin occurred, such activity was impossible on account of 
mankind’s prelapsarian inability to experience lust. Augustine does say that the 
transmission of original sin was necessarily facilitated in fallen humanity via 
procreation, but at no point does he suggest that the first sin itself was anything to do 
with lust.
56
  
This opinion is widely shared. Abelard writes that it was not until ‘after the 
eating of this tree [that] they at once felt the promptings of lust’.57 Likewise, Hugh of St 
Victor writes that since the union of Adam and Eve was instituted before the first act of 
sin with the benediction ‘increase and multiply’, undoubtedly, ‘the mingling of flesh in 
the generation of offspring’ would have occurred in paradise ‘without disgrace and 
concupiscence’.58 However, after the corruption incurred by the first sin, it became 
impossible for mankind to procreate without experiencing lust.
59
 This is on account of 
the fact, Hugh continues, that prelapsarian mankind had complete control over all the 
members of the body because they were subject to the control of the soul, which was 
aligned with the will of God.
60
 
When mankind disobeyed, part of the subsequent punishment consisted in 
mankind’s losing the ability to control, or remain exempt from, sexual desire and its 
physical expression: 
                                                          
56
 Ibid., 10. 11. 
57
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 104 (italics mine). ‘Quod post esum huius ligni statim senserunt 
incentiua libidinis’, Expositio, 402. 
58
 ‘Quia ergo coniugium inter masculum et feminam ante peccatum a deo est institutum eisque ut 
crescerent et multiplicarentur dono benedictionis concessum atque coniunctum legimus commixtionem 
carnis in prolis generatione sine turpitudine et concupiscentia futuram nullatenus dubitare debemus’, De 
sacramentis, 1.6, 23. 
59
 Ibid., 1.8, 13. 
60
 Ibid., 1.8, 13. 
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Therefore, so that disobedience might be made manifest in the human 
body, [God] removed from the power of the soul the member through 
which posterity was to be engendered in the flesh… In this member 
through which human propagation had to proceed a sign of disobedience 
was placed, hence it was shown to all who came [to be] via this member 
that they were generated with the sin of disobedience.
61
 
 
As prelapsarian mankind disobeyed the command of God, the fallen body disobeys the 
commandment of the soul. Lust is both a punishment for, and a corporeal manifestation 
of, the disobedience of which the first sin consisted. However, neither lust nor sexual 
activity were themselves part of this first sin, since the former was essentially a 
consequence thereof, and the latter would have occurred even if mankind had remained 
sinless.  
Hildegard’s Scivias similarly states that prior to sin, procreation would have 
been an innocent act, and that it became tainted with lust only after the first sin of 
disobedience. Hildegard recounts the voice of God telling her that 
After falling thus from disobedience into death, when they knew they 
could sin, they discovered sin’s sweetness. And in this way, turning My 
rightful institution [i.e. marriage] into sinful lust, although they should 
have known that the commotion in their veins was not for the sweetness 
of sin but for the love of children, by the Devil’s suggestion they 
changed it to lechery; and, losing the innocence of the act of begetting, 
they yielded it to sin.
62
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 ‘Ut igitur inobedientia manifesta firet unde in corpore humano membrum potestati anime subtraxit per 
quod posteritas in carne seminanda fuit… In hoc membro per quod humana propagatio transire debuit 
signum inobedientie positum est cunctis per illud transuentibus manifeste ostenditur quoniam cum culpa 
inobedientie generatur’, ibid., 1.8, 13.   
62
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 80. ‘Et ita de inoboedientia sua in mortem cadentes dulcedinem 
peccati conceperunt, cum se posse peccare cognouerunt.Sed ipsi hoc modo rectam constitutionem meam 
in libidinem peccati uertentes, cum commotionem uenarum suarum non in dulcedine peccati sed in amore 
filiorum scire deberent, eam diabolica suggestione in libidinem dederunt; quia innocentiam geniturae suae 
perdentes illam in peccatum miserunt’, Scivias, 1.2, 407 – 413. 
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Thus Adam and Eve were created with the capacity for reproduction prior to sin, and it 
was only via the first sin of disobedience that, in their fallen state, procreation 
necessarily came to involve the sin of lust. Even Hildegard, a consecrated virgin, 
considers the begetting of children to be an inherently good thing; an act of love which 
does not incite horror or hostility, even whilst she acknowledges that for fallen human 
beings it necessarily involves experiencing the vice of lust. 
Whilst neither Hugh nor Hildegard present Eve as a seducer, nor the first sin as a 
sexual act, they do nonetheless present sexual activity, even between spouses for the 
purpose of procreation, as less preferable than virginity. On the other hand Peter 
Lombard, whilst he also follows the Augustinian line of reasoning that Adam and Eve 
were intended to procreate without lust in paradise, presents a rather less austere view of 
sex within marriage. Of prelapsarian procreation, he writes that 
Some hold that the first humans in paradise would not have been able to 
join sexually for the procreation of children, since they say that sexual 
intercourse cannot occur without corruption or stain. But there could be 
neither corruption nor stain in humankind before sin, because these 
things were the consequence of sin… If the first humans had not sinned, 
they would have come together in carnal coupling in paradise without 
any sin or stain, and there would have been a marriage bed without stain 
there, and a commingling without concupiscence.
63
 
 
He also agrees that fallen mankind’s ‘disobedient’ sexual organs represent a 
manifestation of the disobedience that humankind showed to God: had it not been for 
Eve’s sin of disobedience, ‘they would exercise the same control over their genitals as 
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 Sentences Book 2, trans. Silano, p. 86. ‘Quidam putant ad gignendos filios primos homines in paradiso 
misceri non potuisse nisi post peccatum, dicentes concubitum sine corruptione uel macula non posse fieri. 
Sed ante peccatum nec corruptio nec macula in homine esse poterat, quoniam ex peccato haec consecuta 
sunt…si non peccassent primi homines, sine omni peccato et macula in paradiso carnali copula 
conuenissent, et esset ibi thorus immaculatus et commixtio sine concupiscentia’, Sententiae, II.20, 1. 
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over their other members, so that they would feel no unlawful motion there’.64 However, 
Lombard also asserts that sex within marriage is not sinful: 
For when, preserving the faith of the marriage-bed, partners come 
together for the sake of offspring, coitus is excused so that it has no fault; 
but when they come together by reason of incontinence, without the 
good of offspring yet preserving the faith, it is not excused so that it has 
no fault, but only a venial one.
65
 
 
It is therefore possible to see that Eve’s sin was widely considered to be 
disobedience rather than lust, and sexual activity was generally deemed to have been not 
merely permissible, but sanctioned as a necessity, in paradise. Mankind was created 
with both the ability and the imperative to procreate, and thus this would have occurred 
in paradise even had Eve not sinned. Whilst lust is condemned as immoderate, and sex 
even within marriage largely presented as something of a necessary evil, it is clear that 
major twelfth-century treatments of the hexaemeron and fall narratives do not deem the 
original sin to have consisted in lust. Le Goff’s image of Eve’s body as ‘the devil’s 
stomping ground’ is thus difficult to justify, as is the persistent conception of Eve as a 
seducer. 
 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EVE/MARY PARALLEL 
Despite the tradition of arguing that procreation would have occurred in paradise even 
had mankind not sinned, the biblical creation and fall narratives discuss Eve as the first 
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 Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, pp. 86 – 7. ‘Atque genitalibus membris sicut ceteris imperarent, ut ibi 
nullum motum illicitum sentirent’, Sententiae, II.20, 1. 
65
 Sentences Book 4 trans. Silano, p. 182. ‘Quando enim, seruata fide thori, causa prolis coniuges 
conueniunt, sic excusatur coitus ut culpam non habeat; quando uero, deficiente bono prolis, fide tamen 
seruata, conueniunt causa incontinentiae, non sic excusatur ut non habeat culpam, sed uenialem, 
Sententiae, IV. 31, 1. He also writes that whilst lust is sinful, physical pleasure per se is not sinful so long 
as it is not immoderate, ibid., IV. 31, 8.  
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mother only in relation to her punishment and expulsion. The sinless and unproblematic 
nature of prelapsarian procreation is necessarily only ever a hypothetical theological 
problem, whereas fallen human procreation and childbirth were identifiable realities.  
However, within Eve’s punishment there is necessarily the prospect of 
redemption, since it is her sin which necessitates the coming of Christ. On account of 
this, much attention has been devoted in modern scholarship to the relationship between 
Eve and the Virgin Mary.
66
 Several aspects of this view are problematic. The Eve/Mary 
parallel represents only the surface of twelfth-century representations of both Eve and 
Mary, and it is difficult to find a substantial quantity of evidence which demonstrates 
that medieval texts employed the parallel as a simplistic classification of women in 
general. In addition, whilst there exists a typological affinity between Eve and Mary, the 
‘Eva’/Ave’ palindrome and the ‘Second Eve’ idea are no more than a convenient means 
by which to identify and indicate this affinity. The theology of the creation, fall and 
redemption is too complex to be reduced to a convenient apothegm. The redemption is 
not a straightforward reversal or erasure of the fall, and the Virgin Mary’s bearing of 
Christ does not erase, invert or reverse the sin of Eve. However, like the ‘devil’s 
gateway’ phrase discussed in the historiographical survey above, the Eve/Mary parallel 
has come to function as a form of shorthand for perceived misogyny in the middle ages, 
and is now often deemed so self-evidently accurate a description of medieval 
conceptions of women that it is cited with very little representative evidence, or indeed 
without any substantiation at all.
67
 
The secondary texts cited above tend to conflate two related but essentially 
different traditions; namely, that of Mary as the ‘Second Eve’, and that of the ‘Eva/Ave’ 
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 See note 4 above. 
67
 This is certainly the case for all the examples cited in note 4 above. 
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palindrome. The ‘Eva/Ave’ palindrome and its employment in medieval texts, despite 
its obvious connection, is a tradition quite distinct from the conception of Mary as a 
second Eve. It has been variously attributed, but this palindromic construction 
developed independently from, and much later than, the tradition of the Second Eve. 
Rather, it is taken from the Vespers hymn, ‘Ave maris stella’ (‘Hail, Star of the Sea’), 
the earliest extant copy of which dates from the ninth century.
68
 Most importantly, 
however, neither the ‘Ave/Eva’ palindrome nor the ‘New Eve’ idea are employed by 
medieval authors with anything like the frequency described by Newman, Duby, 
Swanson et al. The ‘Eva/Ave’ formulation has appeared more times in the scholarship 
of the last three decades than it does in the entirety of the Patrologia Latina.
69
 The 
phrase is best viewed as a principally literary or linguistic device rather than an 
exegetical tool, or a site of sustained theological enquiry.
70
 Rather, it appears, like the 
figure of Eve herself, to have become a form of shorthand for the supposed theological 
conception of women during the middle ages, as can be seen from the texts cited 
above.
71
 The ‘New Eve’ idea does appear to have had some currency, although 
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 St Gallen, Codex Sangallensis 95, f. 2. ‘Ave maris stella / Dei mater alma / atque semper virgo / Felix 
coeli porta / Sumens illud “Ave” / Gabrielis ore / funda nos in pace / mutans Evae nomen’, 1 – 8. The 
catalogue attributes it to Venantius Fortunatus (c. 530-c. 609); see Gustav Scherrer, Verzeichniss der 
Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek von St. Gallen (Halle: 1875) pp. 37-38. In PL, Migne also groups it 
among the works of Venantius Fortunatus; see PL vol. 88, cols 265 C- 266 C. However, this attribution 
has widely been called into question – Graef, for example, posits the late eighth century as a more likely 
date for its composition, as does Andrew Breeze; see Graef, Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1985) p. 174, and Breeze, ‘Two Bardic Themes: the Virgin and Child, and 
“Ave-Eva” ’, Medium Aevum vol. 63 (1994) pp. 17-33, p. 24.  
69
 It appears eight times over the two hundred and seventeen volumes, in three sermons, two poems and 
the work of three minor twelfth-century authors. See the sermon dubiously attributed to Fulbert of 
Chartres, PL vol. 141, col. 336 D; Innocent III, PL vol. 217, cols 581 D and 506 B; the ‘Ave maris stella’, 
PL vol. 88, col. 265 C; Peter Damian, PL vol. 145, cols 937 C – 939 B; Helinand of Froidmont (c. 1160 – 
1237), PL vol. 212, col. 745 C; Joannes Belethus (fl. 1135 – 1182), PL vol. 202, col. 77 B; Henry of 
Marcy (c. 1136 – 1189), PL vol. 204, col. 343 B. 
70
 Tony Hunt, ‘Wordplay Before the Rhetoriquers’, De Sens Rassis: Essays in Honour of Rupert T. 
Pickens ed. Keith Busby, Bernard Guidot and Logan E. Whalen (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2005) pp. 
283-296; see pp. 283-286; and Breeze, ‘Two Bardic Themes’, pp. 23-30 of which give a useful survey of 
the occurrences of the ‘Eva/Ave’ phrase in vernacular poetry after the twelfth century, and suggests that it 
was more frequently employed in the later middle ages than it was in the twelfth century. 
71
 The comparative absence of the phrase within sustained theological analysis in the middle ages is 
reflected in the fact that the major modern works the role of the Virgin Mary in medieval devotion and 
theology make little use of it. It does not, for example appear in the studies of Rachel Fulton or Hilda 
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principally in very early Christian thought rather than the middle ages.
72
 Supposedly, 
the Virgin Mary erases or reverses Eve’s sin: conjugal subjugation is reformed as the 
role of ancilla domini, the pains of childbirth are vindicated by the Virgin Mary’s giving 
birth to Christ, and it is the propagation of sin which itself necessitates Christ’s birth. 
However, like the ‘Ave/Eva’ formulation, the ‘New Eve’ idea appears to have 
been a convenient shorthand rather than a locus of sustained theological analysis and 
exegesis - Kevin McNamara has suggested that despite its attractive neatness, the 
parallel cannot be said to have contributed a great deal either to Mariology or to the 
theology of the creation, fall and redemption: 
It may indeed be said that the principle enunciated by him [i.e. St 
Irenaeus] never quite fulfils its promise... Its attraction...was often the 
attraction of a literary theme lending itself to numerous variations, rather 
than that of a theological locus providing sure guidance concerning 
revealed truth. An understandable consequence of this has been a 
wariness and even suspicion of the New Eve idea; a theme which seems 
to imply in so facile a manner so many major Marian 
doctrines...naturally seems to many to have little place in serious 
theological discussion.
73
 
 
As McNamara suggests, the ‘New Eve’ idea is perhaps too flippant a way to describe 
and analyse the theological complexity of the Virgin Mary’s redemptive capacities, or 
Eve’s role in the fall of mankind. The same can be said of the ‘Ave/Eva’ formulation.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Graef; Miri Rubin and Jaroslav Pelikan mention it once in passing but certainly do not base their overall 
theses on it. See Miri Rubin, Mother of God: A History of the Virgin Mary (Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 2009) p. 312; Jaroslav Pelikan refers to it as a mere linguistic coincidence, Mary through the 
Centuries: Her Place in the History of Culture (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1996) p. 52; Rachel 
Fulton, From Judgement to Passion: Devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary, 800 – 1200 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002); Hilda Graef, Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion (London: 
Steed and Ward, 1985). 
72
 St Irenaeus of Lyons has been deemed the originator of the ‘Second Eve’ idea; see ibid., pp. 39 – 54; 
Rubin, Mother of God, pp. 36 -7; Graef, Mary: A History, pp. 39 – 55.  
73
 Kevin McNamara, review of La Nouvelle Ève II-III, Bulletin de la Société Française d’Études Mariales, 
1959 in The Furrow, vol. 10, no 4 (1959) pp. 268-69; see p. 268. 
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The assumption that medieval authors conceived women in general, and the 
theology of creation and redemption, in terms of a simplistic dichotomy is both 
misleading and reductive. Given that none of the texts with which the present study is 
concerned use this phrase or, with the exception of Hildegard, mention a parallel 
between Eve and Mary, examples of its use must be found elsewhere. There are two 
lengthier poetic redactions of the ‘Eva/Ave’ idea which originate in the twelfth century, 
namely those of Wace and Adam of St Victor. Both provide excellent examples of how 
the phrase was employed and why it is misleading to assume that phrase bore any 
substantial theological significance, or that it was employed as a conception of women 
in general. Adam of St Victor’s version reads as follows: 
Gabriel was sent from Heaven 
Faithful messenger of the words 
For the sacred utterances he discussed  
With the blessed Virgin. 
The good and sweet Word  
He set out within her chamber 
And from ‘Eva’ formed ‘Ave’ 
The name of Eve reversed... 
The dry rod without dew 
In a new rite, by a new manner 
Bought forth fruit with flower, 
And so a virgin gave birth. 
Blessed be such a fruit 
Fruit of joy, not strife. 
Adam would not have been seduced 
If he had tasted it.
74
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 ‘Missus Gabriel de coelis / Verbi bajulus fidelis / Sacris disserit loquelis / Cum beata virgine / Verbum 
bonum et suave / Pandit intus in conclave / Et ex Eva format Ave / Evae verso nomine... / Virga sicca sine 
rore / Novo ritu, novo more / Fructum protulit cum flore / Sic et virgo peperit / Benedictus talis fructus / 
Fructus gaudii, non luctus / Non erit Adam seductus / Si de hoc gustaverit’, Adam of St Victor, 
‘Annunciatio beatae Mariae virginis’, The Liturgical Poetry of Adam of St Victor from the Text of Gautier, 
vol. II, ed. Digby S. Wrangham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1881) 1-8 and 33-40. 
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Eve’s name is contrasted with the ‘Ave’ that heralds the Annunciation, and the fructis 
ventris of Mary’s sinless fertility is contrasted with the fructus ventitus which Eve took. 
It is difficult to see any intended misogyny in this, and it is also clear that sustained 
exegesis is not the purpose of the text. The ‘Ave/Eva’ palindrome receives a similar, if 
slightly more developed, treatment in Wace’s La vie de la Vierge: 
St Mary returned to us 
The good that Eve took away 
This is signified to us in the greeting bought 
By the angels who first said ‘Ave’ 
Which is the name [of Eva] having been turned around 
Each letter exchanging its place with the others 
The spelling turned backwards. 
Leave ‘E’ then ‘v’ and ‘a’:  
Thus you will find it is the name of Eva. 
For this is given to us [to emphasise]  
Whence Eva made us fall 
That we might go back 
Whence Eva forced us to be ejected 
To return to paradise.
75
 
 
Wace’s text is distinguished by its development, rather than mere repetition, of the 
phrase, by his explicit presentation of the linguistic reversal as an analogue of 
redemptive re-Creation.
76
 However, in both these texts, the phrase is not pursued for its 
theological significance but for its lexical felicity – its exposition is clearly motivated 
more by the opportunity it affords for wordplay than it is by desire to provide a 
commentary on the role of the Virgin Mary or the theological complexities of the fall 
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 ‘Saint Marie nos rendi / Le bien que Eve nos toli / Li salus nos segnefia / Que li angles li aporta / Qui 
premierement dist Ave / Qui cest nom aureit trestorné / De letre en autre remué / Ariere en espelant torné 
/ Desist E, puis v et a / Si troverait cest nom Eva / Por ce nos a doné / Là dunt Eva nos fist descendre / 
Tenz est venus d’ariere aler / Là dunt Eva nos fist geter / De retorner en paradis’, La vie de la Vierge de 
Maître Wace ed. Victor Luzarche (Tours: J. Bouserez, 1859) pp. 55-6. 
76
 In the thirteenth century, Gautier de Coinci develops this even further in his ‘Li salus de nostre dame’; 
see Gautier de Coinci, Les Miracles de Nostre Dame ed. V.F. Koenig (Geneva: Droz, 1955) pp. 545-6, 
17-56.  
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and the redemption.
77
 Theological commentary per se is not, and was not intended to be, 
the distinguishing feature of these treatments of the ‘Ave/Eva’ palindrome since they 
are merely restating an opposition between Eve and Mary. These are essentially 
narratives of the Annunciation, which rely heavily on the aforementioned ‘Ave maris 
stella’. 
 
CONCEIVING THE WORD OF GOD: HILDEGARD, EVE AND THE VIRGIN MARY 
As was mentioned above, Hildegard of Bingen’s Scivias is the only text discussed in 
this thesis whose representation of Eve makes any use of a comparison between Eve 
and the Virgin Mary. Uniquely among the hexaemeral commentaries discussed hitherto, 
Hildegard includes the Virgin Mary as a component of her discussion of the fall and its 
consequences, and Mary functions as an emblem of the spiritual and physical integrity 
which the rest of mankind, male as well as female, are denied as part of the punishment 
incurred for the sin of Eve. Hildegard is not concerned with Mary as a remote and 
gender-specific paragon of inaccessibly faultless purity. Rather, Mary functions as a 
connection to, and representation of, the integrity and innocuous fertility which 
distinguished mankind’s prelapsarian existence. It is in fact Eve who provides a model 
of inaccessible perfection, in the sinless fertility of her prelapsarian existence which 
Hildegard depicts by representing Eve as a cloud filled with stars. 
Hildegard’s juxtaposition of Eve and Mary does not correspond with the 
‘Ave/Eva’ dichotomy that has so often been described by modern scholars as a 
widespread medieval formulation of the qualities and theological position of women. 
Rather, the juxtaposition of the two comprises a significant element of Hildegard’s 
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 Tony Hunt, op. cit. pp. 286-93; idem, Miraculous Rhymes: The Writing of Gautier de Coinci 
(Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2007) pp. 169-174. 
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conception of Eve’s punishment and fertility; subjects with which Hildegard displays 
considerable concern. This concern is most prominently expressed in the following 
passages, in which the text establishes the times at which both women and men are 
forbidden from entering a church. The first states that: 
During the wife’s menses… the woman is in pain and in prison, suffering 
a small portion of the pain of childbirth. I do not remit this time of pain 
for women, because I gave it to Eve when she conceived sin in the taste 
of the fruit, but therefore the woman should be cherished in this time 
with a great and healing tenderness. Let her contain herself in hidden 
knowledge; she should not, however, restrain herself from going into My 
Temple, but faith allows her to enter in the service of humility for her 
salvation. But because the Bride of My Son is always whole, a man [‘vir’] 
who has open wounds because the wholeness of his members has been 
divided by the impact of a blow shall not enter My Temple… lest it be 
violated, as the intact members of Abel, who was a temple of God, were 
cruelly broken by his brother Cain.
78
  
 
Hildegard presents the fallen human body as an entity that is characterised by painful 
fracture and disorder. It is susceptible to violation, to wounds, to fragmentation and 
even dismemberment. 
The choice of Cain and Abel as exemplars of this fallen physical state is 
significant. As the first descendants of Eve, they are the first human beings born within 
the remits of Eve’s punishment, and they represent both the consequences of this 
punishment and the way in which fallen humanity is subsequently condemned to 
perpetuate it. In the case of Eve and Cain, the ‘harvest’ of sin is death; in Mary and 
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 ‘Sed nolo ut idem opus fiat in diuisione mulieris, cum iam fluxum sanguinis sui patitur... Ubi se mulier 
in dolore et in carcere positam uidet, portionem scilicet doloris partus sui tangens. Sed hoc tempus doloris 
in muliere non abicio, quoniam illud Euae dedi quando in gustu pomi peccatum concepit, unde et mulier 
in hoc eodem tempore in magna medicina misericordiae habenda est; ipsa etiam se continente in absconso 
disciplinae, non autem ita ut ab incessu templi mei se contineat, sed fideli permissione ipsum in officio 
humilitatis pro salute sua ingrediatur. Quia autem sponsa Filii mei semper integra est, uir apertis 
uulneribus si integritas membrorum ipsius in tactu percussionis diuisa est templum meum nisi cum timore 
magnae necessitatis non intrabit ne uioletur, sicut integra membra Abel, qui templum Dei fuit, Cain frater 
suus crudeliter fregit’, Scivias, 1.2, 506 – 523. 
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Christ, the ‘harvest’ of virtue is redemption. The connection between sin and wounding 
or dismemberment presented here is also significant, and appears on numerous 
occasions in Hildegard’s writing. For example, Causae et curae states that the fall 
resulted in the flesh of mankind becoming ulcerated (‘ulcerata’) and perforated 
(‘perforata’), whereas prelapsarian mankind had been characterised by impenetrable 
physical intactness.
79
 This sense of fragmentation is echoed in Hildegard’s description 
of the devil as scattered and divided, in contrast to God whose divinity is whole and 
complete like a wheel.
80
 Similarly, the antiphon ‘O virga ac diadema’ refers to Eve’s sin 
as originating in ‘the wounds of ignorance’ (‘vulneribus ignorantiae’), on account of 
which Eve plucked and reaped (‘decerpsit’) pain for both herself and for all her 
descendants.
81
  
However, for Hildegard, the prelapsarian figure of Eve is a paragon of perpetual 
physical integrity and uncompromised fertility, and the permeable and fragmented 
corporeal state of fallen mankind is starkly and unfavourably contrasted with her 
inviolate wholeness. It is the prelapsarian Eve, not Mary, who provides a model of 
unattainable perfection and wholeness.  Moreover, the passage quoted above is not 
aimed specifically at women. Both male and female bodies are referred to since it is 
mankind in as a whole, regardless of gender, that Hildegard deems subject to the 
fragmentation and permeability which marks human physicality after the fall. 
                                                          
79
 ‘Nam de gustu mali versus est sanguis filiorum Adae in venenum seminis, de quo filii hominum 
procreantur. Et ideo caro eorum ulcerata et perforata est. Quae ulcera et foramina quandam tempestatem 
et humectatem fumi in hominibus faciunt’, Causae et curae ed. Paul Kaiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903), 2, 
21. 
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 ‘Deus autem integer ut rota permansit... Sic paternitas est quomodo circulus rotae, paternitas est 
plenitudo rotae. Deitas est in ipsa... Lucifer autem integer non est, sed in dispersione divisus est’, ibid., 1, 
8 – 9, 23. 
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 ‘Nam ipsa mulier / quam Deus matrem omnium posuit / viscera sua / cum vulneribus ignorantie 
decerpsit / et plenum dolorem / generi suo protulit’, Barbara Newman ed., Symphonia: A Critical Edition 
of ‘Symphonia armonie celestium,’ (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998) 5 b. 
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These same concerns emerge in the second passage relating to the times at which 
people are allowed to enter a church. This passage forbids women from entering after 
childbirth or the loss of their virginity, but also points out that the ‘injuries’ of both 
women and men (‘viri ac mulieris’) are liable to violate the sanctity of the church: 
So a woman, too, when she bears offspring, may not enter My Temple 
except in accordance with the law I give her, because her hidden 
members have been broken, that the holy sacraments of My Temple may 
be unviolated by any masculine or feminine pain or pollution; because 
the most pure Virgin bore My Son, and she was whole without any 
wound of sin. For the place that is consecrated in honour of my Only-
Begotten knew in himself the integrity of the Virgin Birth. Therefore, let 
a woman who breaks the wholeness of her virginity with a man also 
refrain from entering My Temple while injured by the bruise of her 
corruption, until the injury of that wound is healed.
82
 
 
Both Eve and Mary provide the Scivias with potent symbols of female fertility here, and 
the description of perforated flesh and the fracture of corporeal boundaries echoes 
Hildegard’s repeated remarks concerning wholeness and physical integrity. This 
concern with the polluting influence of injury and fracture leads Hildegard to assemble 
an indictment against new mother entering a church that is markedly more severe than 
the canon law which addresses this situation. Gratian states that there is nothing to 
prevent women from entering a church after they have given birth, because prohibiting 
them from so doing would amount to an unjust and theologically inconsistent 
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 ‘Sed et mulier cum prolem pepererit fractis occultis membris suis templum meum nonnisi secundum 
legem per me sibi datam ingrediatur, quatenus sancta sacramenta eiusdem templi mei ab omni pollutione 
et dolore uiri ac mulieris inuiolabilia sint; quia Filium meum purissima Virgo genuit, quae integra absque 
ullo uulnere peccati fuit. Locus enim, qui in honorem eiusdem Unigeniti mei consecratus est, integer ab 
omni corruptione liuoris ac uulneris esse debet; quoniam idem Unigenitus meus integritatem uirginei 
partus in se nouit. Unde et mulier quae integritatem uirginitatis suae cum uiro corrumpit, in liuore plagae 
suae qua corrupta est ab ingressu templi mei se contineat, usque dum plaga uulneris ipsius sanetur’, 
Scivias, 1.2, 525 – 37. 
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punishment for having endured the pain of childbirth, which is not sinful.
83
 
Nevertheless, for Hildegard, the fragmentation that accompanies human fertility after 
the fall is sufficiently damaging that it ought to prevent entry into a church. Eve’s sin 
disordered the elements, which should be harmonious and which, before the fall, ‘had 
existed in great calm, were turned [after the Fall] to the greatest agitation’. 84  This 
elemental disorder parallels the fragmentation of the fallen human body itself. 
After the fall, Eve retains her status as mother of all the living, although as a 
consequence of her disobedience, childbirth becomes something that Hildegard 
considers both physically and spiritually damaging. Fertility is something about which 
Hildegard is ambivalent: procreation may be beneficial, but virginity is infinitely 
preferable. Female fertility is both a blessing and a curse; it is a problematic signifier 
both of the miracles of creation and of mankind’s ability to damage them.  
Augustine Thompson, in his assessment of Hildegard’s views on the priesthood 
and women preaching, points out her failure to elaborate on her initial assertion that 
women were ‘appointed to bear children’.85 She is unable to pursue this point because, 
he says, Hildegard was writing for an exclusively monastic audience which would, 
understandably, have been unresponsive to this claim. Similarly, Rebecca Garber claims 
that ‘by offering Eve redemption through Mary, Hildegard offers a means to redeem the 
female body: Eve’s potential yet spoiled fecundity is fulfilled by Mary’s corporeal yet 
                                                          
83
 ‘Si mulier eadem hora, qua genuerit, actura gratias intrat ecclesiam, nullo pondere peccati grauatur; 
uoluptas etenim carnis, non dolor in culpa est. In carnis autem commixtione uoluptas est, in partu uero 
prolis gemitus. Unde ipsi primae mulieri dicitur: “In doloribus paries.” Si itaque enixam mulierem 
prohibemus intrare ecclesiam, ipsam ei penam in culpam uertimus’, Emil Friedberg ed., Decretum 
Magistri Gratiani, Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. 1 (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959) 1.5, 
2. 
84
 Scivias, trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 73. ‘Et ita omnia elementa mundi, quae prius in magna quiete 
constiterant, in maximam inquietudinem’, Scivias, 1.2. 
85
 Augustine Thompson, ‘Hildegard of Bingen on Gender and the Priesthood’, Church History 63.3 
(1994), pp.349-364; see p. 351. 
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non-carnal fertility’.86 Whilst Thompson and Garber are right to identify a concern with 
the potential conflict between virginity and fertility, Hildegard’s juxtaposition of Eve 
and Mary goes further than merely identifying this conflict as a straightforward 
dichotomy. Hildegard does not ‘fail to elaborate’ on account of the ostensible 
contradiction of a consecrated virgin declaring childbearing to have been the ultimate 
purpose for the creation of women. She in fact pursues and solves this conflict, on an 
individual and personal level at least, by employing the Virgin Mary not as an 
inaccessible paragon, but as an active and immediate symbol of how a workable 
semblance of Eve’s impossible prelapsarian sinless fertility might be possible to achieve 
after the fall. 
Hildegard does this by establishing a parallel not between Mary and Eve, but 
between Mary and herself. In the visionary persona she constructs, Hildegard like Mary 
is able to ‘conceive’ the Word of God in such a way that utilises female fertile potential 
whilst remaining sinless and physically intact. In the first Scivias vision, Hildegard 
makes numerous allusions to her own intellectual fertility. She represents her own 
ability to conceive the word of God in stark contrast to the barren and fruitless intellects 
of other scholars, reporting that she is instructed by God to: 
Cry out and speak of the origin of the pure salvation until those people 
are instructed, who, though they see the inmost contents of the Scriptures, 
do not wish to tell them or preach them… Unlock for them the enclosure 
of mysteries that they, timid as they are, conceal in a hidden and fruitless 
field. Burst forth in a fountain of abundance and overflow with mystical 
knowledge, until they who now think you contemptible because of Eve’s 
transgression are stirred up by the flood of your irrigation.
87
  
                                                          
86
 Rebecca L. R. Garber, ‘Where is the Body: Images of Eve and Mary in the Scivias’ in Hildegard of 
Bingen: A Book of Essays ed. Maud McInerney, Garland Medieval Casebooks vol. 20 (New York: 
Garland, 1998), pp. 103-132. See p. 103. 
87
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 67. ‘Clama et dic de introitu incorruptae saluationis, quatenus hi 
erudiantur qui medullam litterarum uidentes eam nec dicere nec praedicare uolunt, quia tepidi et hebetes 
ad conseruandam iustitiam Dei sunt, quibus clausuram mysticorum resera quam ipsi timidi in abscondito 
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The preface to the text establishes Hildegard’s visionary epiphany as an intellectual 
‘Annunciation’: she describes receiving a divine visitation after which she finds herself 
carrying within her the meaning of the scriptures. After a painful and arduous period of 
gestation and final delivery, Hildegard brings forth the word of God in the form of the 
Scivias text.
88
 The image which accompanies this preface likewise contains visual 
references to the Annunciation.
89
 The image depicts Hildegard seated and writing, with 
the word of God emanating in the form of light from the sky. Her scribe Volmar, 
entering through a window or door to the right, occupies the position of the Angel 
Gabriel. The overall composition of the image corresponds with many of the 
characteristics displayed in visual representations of the Annunciation during this period, 
as does the presence of emanating light from heaven, the architectural detail, and the 
fact that Hildegard is depicted, as Mary frequently was from the eleventh century 
onwards, seated and holding a book.
90
 Hildegard thus presents her authorial self as 
possessing, like Mary, a means by which to approach the God-given maternal potential 
which glorified Eve before the Fall, whilst simultaneously avoiding Eve’s legacy of 
physical disorder and fragmentation. Hildegard is ‘fertilised’ by divine knowledge, and 
is thus able to ‘give birth’ to her books in a way which is aligned with Mary’s sinless 
maternity. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
agro sine fructu celant. Ergo in fontem abundantiae ita dilatare et ita in mystica eruditione efflue, ut illi ab 
effusione irrigationis tuae concutiantur qui te propter praeuaricationem Euae uolunt contemptibilem esse’, 
Scivias, 1.1, 31 – 40. 
88
 Ibid., Protestificatio, 1 – 60. 
89
 See illustration, p. 2 above.  
90
 On the presence of these features in high medieval images of the Annunciation, see Medieval Art: A 
Topical Dictionary ed. Leslie Ross (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996) pp. 15 – 16, and Gertrud 
Schiller, Iconography of Christian Art, vol. 1, trans. Janet Seligman (London: Lund Humphries, 1971) pp. 
33 – 52.  
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CONCLUSION 
The representations of Eve as the first wife discussed here provide an excellent 
demonstration of the way in which discussion of matrimony and procreation forged a 
potentially problematic nexus between exegesis and conduct, and between prelapsarian 
and fallen human nature. As a potential archetype of motherhood and uxorial conduct, 
the twelfth-century Eve is necessarily an ambivalent figure rather than a vehicle for 
misogyny. As the ‘first’ wife and mother she represents a prelapsarian ideal. Eve is the 
‘mother of all the living’ and a participant in the sinless union which provided the 
sacramental model and scriptural ratification of matrimony.
91
 By the end of Genesis 3, 
however, these roles have become intrinsically connected with her transgression. 
Having led mankind out of paradise and into sin, Eve is condemned to fulfil her 
unparalleled maternal capacity in sorrow and in servitude. 
The institution of marriage and the begetting of children were considered 
characteristic of human existence both before and after the fall, and thus Eve’s position 
as the ‘first’ wife and mother provides a connection to mankind’s unblemished 
prelapsarian nature, and a perpetual reminder of its loss.
92
 The institution of marriage 
and the begetting of children were considered characteristic of human existence before 
the fall as well as after, and thus Eve’s position as the ‘first’ wife and mother provides 
both a connection to mankind’s unblemished prelapsarian nature, and a perpetual 
reminder of its loss. Problematically, therefore, Eve’s marital role and maternal 
potential embodied both the image of mankind as the glory of creation, and also that of 
mankind as the bringers of sin.  
                                                          
91
  ‘Mater… cunctorum viventium’, Genesis 3.20. 
92
  Genesis 3.16. 
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This image of Eve as the first wife and mother, rather than merely confirming 
extant assumptions about the supposed ubiquity of misogyny during this period, 
demonstrates that representations of Eve as the first wife and mother go substantially 
beyond well-worn tropes of wayward wives and aversion to female corporeality and 
procreation.  These representations of Eve reveal that the figure of Eve was employed as 
a means by which to address and reconcile the prelapsarian ideal of mankind with the 
reality of its fallen and supposedly tainted nature, since Eve’s uxorial and maternal 
functions provide a link between prelapsarian and fallen human nature.
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CHAPTER III 
REPRESENTATIONS OF EVE AS THE FIRST 
SINNER 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the extent to which several of the major 
twelfth-century treatments of the fall and expulsion narrative employ the figure of Eve 
as a means by which to examine the state of virtue, and the actions of temptation and sin 
within the human soul. Rather than being portrayed as an expedient model of the 
wayward woman, or as a credulous victim of diabolic casuistry, throughout the texts 
with which this thesis is concerned, exegesis of Genesis 3 emerges as a vital means by 
which to approach the theological problems posed by human capacity for both sin and 
virtue, and the entry of evil and vice into the divinely established harmony of 
prelapsarian existence. The figure of Eve is developed in this context as a fundamentally 
instructive means of scrutinising and elucidating the complex subjects of sin, temptation 
and virtue. On account of the central position that the figure of Eve occupies in the 
ethical and doctrinal frameworks which these texts construct, representations of Eve as 
the first sinner are able to illuminate some of the most complex and influential writing 
on ethics and human moral agency that this period produced. 
Eve’s encounter with the devil, and the act of sin to which she subsequently 
consents and persuades Adam to follow, form the crux of the fall narrative. However, 
the scriptural account of this formative episode devotes little attention to the exposition 
of, or motivation for, its occurrence; an issue which had been acknowledged in 
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commentary on Genesis 3 as far back as Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram.1 Genesis 
recounts the temptation of Eve with a brevity that belies its determinative significance: 
the serpent asks Eve why she and Adam cannot eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge, 
and when Eve replies that it is forbidden lest they die, the serpent assures her that not 
only will they not die if they eat it, but that they will be ‘as gods’, knowing good and 
evil.
2
 There is no explanation of why the serpent wished to tempt Eve, or of why she 
capitulated and subsequently persuaded Adam to do likewise. The serpent itself is not 
even explicitly connected with the devil, being described simply as the most cunning of 
all the earth’s animals (‘callidior cunctis animantibus terrae’).3 The actual process of 
Eve’s sin, and her persuasion of Adam to join her in committing it, occupies a single 
verse: ‘thus the woman saw that the tree was good to eat and beautiful to the eyes, and 
delightful to behold, and she took of its fruit and ate, and she gave to her husband, and 
he ate’.4 
However, these verses defined the nature of fallen mankind, and as such they 
became the subject of extensive discussion. As far as the twelfth-century interpretations 
of Genesis 3 are concerned, much of this discussion focuses on Eve’s motivations for 
sin and the interior processes which comprise the actions of temptation and sin. Flood 
has rightly remarked that high medieval exegesis of the fall is particularly concerned 
with providing ‘a more literal psychological account of Genesis 2-3’. However, Flood’s 
assertion that writing about the medieval figure of Eve necessitates remaining ‘silent 
about many of the great themes to be found in Genesis such as the nature of evil and 
                                                          
1
 ‘The place of conjecture where scripture is silent’; also Flood, Representations of Eve, p.67. 
2
 ‘Serpens... dixit ad mulierem, “cur praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi?” 
Cui respondit mulier, “de fructu lignorum quae sunt in paradiso vescemur; de fructu vero ligni quod est in 
medio paradisi praecepit nobis Deus ne comederemus et ne tangeremus illud ne forte moriamur”. Dixit 
autem serpens ad mulierem, “nequaquam morte moriemini. Scit enim Deus quod in quocumque die 
comederitis ex eo aperientur oculi vestri et eritis sicut dii scientes bonum et malum” ’, Genesis 3.1 – 5. 
3
 Genesis 3.1. 
4
 ‘Vidit igitur mulier quod bonum esset lignum ad vescendum et pulchrum oculis aspectuque delectabile 
et tulit de fructu illius et comedit deditque viro suo qui comedit’, Genesis 3.6. 
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divine providence’ is particularly questionable in this context.5  Nowhere is it more 
apparent than in twelfth-century writing on the fall that analysing the figure of Eve not 
only permitted, but demanded, exploration of these very subjects, in addition to other 
equally complex themes. Representations of Eve as the first sinner demonstrate that the 
figure of Eve was employed as a means by which to address some of the most critical 
issues raised by the Genesis narrative; namely, the nature of sin, temptation and virtue, 
human moral agency, and the more challenging questions of why human beings were 
created to be susceptible to temptation, and why God permitted the existence of sin and 
evil.  
Throughout the texts discussed here, Eve’s encounter with the serpent is 
portrayed as one in which the devil attacks the weakest part of human nature; that is, the 
part of the soul which is most susceptible to temptation, and which is ultimately 
responsible for whether or not an act of sin is committed. However, Eve is not portrayed 
in this way in order to highlight the failings of women specifically. The texts discussed 
here destabilise the assumption that twelfth-century exegetes discussed the fall in order 
to, as Newman puts it, expand their ‘arsenal of misogynist barbs’.6 Rather than being 
employed as a simplistic model of female weakness, she is employed as a means by 
which to examine human weakness and human agency. Eve is also consistently 
associated with an inordinate desire for knowledge and experience, rather than being 
presented as lustful and disorderly. More Everyman than femme fatale, the twelfth-
century figure of Eve is a case study of human sin, and her actions are examined in 
order to elucidate the process of temptation and sin which occur in every human soul, 
regardless of the gender of the body in which it resides.  
                                                          
5
 Ibid., p. 2. 
6
 Newman, Sister of Wisdom, p. 116. 
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I. THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ADVANTAGES 
OF SIN  
 
The tree of knowledge of good and evil, and the commandment which prohibited it, 
form a crucial component of the narrative of mankind’s sin and expulsion from 
paradise. Unsurprisingly, the nature of both the tree and its associated commandment 
was the cause of much debate during this period. This section will first discuss 
responses to the nature of the tree itself and the question of whether or not the 
commandment which forbade it was issued to Eve as well as Adam, since both Eve’s 
culpability and the properties of the tree itself are subjects which receive consistent 
attention. The texts discussed here present Eve as a conscious and morally active 
participant in the process of the first sin, and the tree as a mere test, which did not in 
fact possess any knowledge-giving properties. The first sin is presented by these texts as 
consisting principally in disobedience, and failure to abide by the rules of the moral test 
that the tree represented. 
The section will then discuss the most striking aspect of the way in which this 
subject is approached by the writers discussed here; namely that the tree and the 
commandment against it are employed in exegesis of the fall narrative in order to 
facilitate discussion of the notion that mankind as a whole actually benefited from Eve’s 
sin, in spite of the severity of the punishment they subsequently received. The most 
readily apparent of these benefits is that the first sin necessitated the coming of Christ, 
and without it, mankind would not have experienced the glory of redemption. However, 
several of the texts discussed here also argue that Eve’s failure to remain obedient 
increased mankind’s knowledge and understanding of good and evil, and of sin and 
virtue, by providing the human mind with concrete experience of concepts which they 
had hitherto only known a priori. Whilst the tree itself was deemed to have had no 
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inherent abilities, the moral test that it presented is portrayed as something which did 
ultimately expand human knowledge, albeit at a grave cost.  
 
THE TREE, THE COMMANDMENT, AND EVE’S MORAL AGENCY 
The forbidden tree is described in the Book of Genesis as ‘the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil’ (‘lignum scientiae boni et mali’) but no indication is given of the tree’s 
capacities, if any.7 Indeed, the devil is the only character in the narrative who ascribes 
any definite capability to the tree and its fruit, with his assertion that if Eve and Adam 
eats the fruit, their eyes will be opened and they will be as gods, knowing good and 
evil.8 
The nature and ability of the tree receives particular attention from Abelard, 
Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard. They are concerned specifically with whether or 
not the tree had any actual knowledge-giving capacity, or was simply chosen by God 
arbitrarily in order to test the obedience of Eve and Adam, with the latter answer being 
generally deemed correct. Hugh and Lombard are also concerned with establishing that 
Eve’s sin could not be excused by her ignorance, and devote some time to 
demonstrating that the commandment which forbade the tree was issued to both Adam 
and Eve. 
Before discussing the properties of the tree of knowledge and the issuing of the 
commandment which prohibited it, it worth pointing out here that Abelard makes a 
singular contribution to the exegesis of Genesis 3 by clarifying an issue that does not 
receive any attention elsewhere. Regarding the literal, physical nature of the tree, it is 
customarily assumed that the forbidden fruit is an apple. The apple, proffered enticingly 
by Eve, has come to be an iconic image of the fall of mankind. However, this was 
                                                          
7 
Genesis 2.17. 
8 ‘Aperientur oculi vestri et eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum’, Genesis 3.5. 
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apparently not unanimously agreed in the twelfth century. Abelard writes that the exact 
type of fruit in question remains unclear, since the word ‘pomum’, which is usually 
translated as ‘apple’, is ‘understood to stand in general for the fruit of every tree’.9 The 
Genesis narrative too refers simply to the tree’s ‘fruit’ (‘fructus’), and commentaries on 
Genesis tend to do the same – none of the writers of the texts discussed in the present 
study refer to any specific type of fruit.10 Abelard proposes two suggestions for which 
fruit the tree of knowledge might have produced. Firstly, he suggests figs, since Eve and 
Adam dress themselves in fig leaves immediately after their act of sin.
11
 Secondly, he 
states that it makes sense, as Jewish tradition apparently suggests, to think that the tree 
of knowledge was in fact a vine, and the fruit consumed was the grape. The fruit of the 
vine is known, Abelard says, for its ability to cloud judgement and incite lust, hence St 
Paul’s warning against wine, and it was after consuming the fruit that mankind 
experienced lust and shame for the first time.
12
 
The literal nature of the forbidden fruit does not, however, seem to have been the 
main concern about the tree of knowledge, and more interest is generally given to its 
possible abilities than to its botanical classification. Hugh of St Victor is quick to point 
out that the forbidden tree could not actually have conferred knowledge of any kind. He 
writes that the tree of life (‘lignum vitae’), mentioned alongside the tree of knowledge 
in Genesis 2.9, did indeed have genuinely life-giving properties. However, the tree of 
                                                          
9
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 61. ‘Solet quippe pomum generaliter pro omni arboris fructu intelligi’, 
Expositio, 160. 
10
 See Genesis 2.2 – 6. The Adam poet does however sometimes use the word ‘pome’, which can mean 
‘apple’ specifically as well as ‘fruit’ more generally; see for example Mystère ed. Sletjöe, 304. 
11 
Expositio, 400. 
12
 ‘Hebrei autem hoc lignum scientie boni et mali autumant uitem fuisse... Cui fortassis opinioni, illud 
quoque non incongrue attestari uidetur, quod post esum huius ligni statim senserunt incentiua libidinis. 
Calide quippe nature fructum hunc uel uinum hinc expressum esse constat, et in luxuriam maxime 
commouere, iuxta illud apostoli: nolite inebriari uino, in quo est luxuria. Secundum quem etiam luxurie 
motum in primis illis hominibus inde factum, de quo erubescentes uirilia texerunt, non incongrue uidetur 
dictum scientie boni et mali fuisse illud lignum’, Expositio, 401 - 403. The warning against wine occurs 
in Ephesians 5.18 (‘Et nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria, sed implemini Spiritu’), which Abelard 
quotes directly here. 
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knowledge of good and evil could not literally give Adam and Eve any knowledge by 
itself, and was so called for only one reason; namely, that it was intended to test their 
obedience.
13
 This opinion is shared by Peter Lombard, who cites Bede and the Glossa 
ordinaria as authorities who concur.
14
 Mankind could only have come to know and 
experience good or evil through obedience or disobedience, and not from the tree 
itself.
15
 However, Hugh continues, the tree of knowledge of good and evil could not 
actually give Adam and Eve any knowledge at all and was so called for only one reason; 
namely, that it was used in order to test human obedience.
16
 Again, Lombard agrees, 
although he seems more concerned with establishing, in habitual agreement with 
Augustine, that the tree itself was not evil; it was merely so called because of the moral 
test it was to provide.17  
In addition, Hugh and Lombard display concern with clarifying the ambiguity 
surrounding the issuing of the commandment to avoid the tree, since it is not entirely 
apparent from the scriptural account whether this commandment was given to both Eve 
and Adam, or to Adam only. The scriptural account of the instruction prohibiting 
mankind from consuming the fruit of the tree proceeds as follows in Genesis 2: ‘and he 
[God] commanded him, saying, “You shall eat of every tree in paradise. Of the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil however, you may not eat, for on whatever day that you 
                                                          
13 ‘Lignum etiam scientie boni et mali ibi fuisse narrator quod non similiter quidem ex natura sua 
scientiam boni et mali  boni et mali homini dare potuit quemadmodum lignum vite vitam in homine 
corporalem ex natura sua, et virtute sibi indita a Deo potuit conservare, sed idcirco tantum lignum scientie 
boni et mali dicitur quia ad probandum hominis obedientiam sive inobedientiam experiendam probatur’, 
De sacramentis, 1.6, 32. 
14   
 Sententiae, 2.17, 6. 
15
 ‘Sic ergo in loco isto sive boni mali cognoscendi occasionem accipere debuit, non tamen ex natura ligni, 
quia hoc homini ex se dare non potuit. Sed quia in eo vel obediendo boni vel non obediendo mali pro 
debita renumeratione occasionem accepit’, De sacramentis, 1.6, 32. 
16 ‘Lignum etiam scientie boni et mali ibi fuisse narrator quod non similiter quidem ex natura sua 
scientiam boni et mali  boni et mali homini dare potuit quemadmodum lignum vite vitam in homine 
corporalem ex natura sua, et virtute sibi indita a Deo potuit conservare, sed idcirco tantum lignum scientie 
boni et mali dicitur quia ad probandum hominis obedientiam sive inobedientiam experiendam probatur’, 
De sacramentis, 1.6, 32. 
17
 Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 75. ‘Augustinus, super genesim: arbor enim illa non erat mala, sed 
scientiae boni et mali ideo dicta est, quia post prohibitionem erat in illa transgressio futura, qua homo 
experiendo disceret quid esset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum’, Sententiae, 2.17, 7. 
152 
 
eat of it, you will die” ’.18  The commandment is issued in verses 16 and 17 of this 
chapter, and thus it is given immediately after the placing of Adam in paradise, but it 
precedes the creation of Eve in verses 22 – 23. In addition, when Eve explains the 
commandment to the devil in Genesis 3, she describes the tree simply as the one ‘which 
is in the middle of paradise’ (‘quod est in medio paradisi’), giving no indication that she 
knows the tree to have any particular significance, beyond the fact that touching it or 
eating its fruit has been prohibited ‘lest we might die’ (‘forte moriamur’). 19  This 
ambiguity presents the possibility of arguing that since Eve had not actually been 
created when the commandment was issued, her culpability is lessened because she did 
not receive the same instruction as Adam.  
Hugh of St Victor writes that although it may seem that Eve was not fully aware 
of the prohibition, she did in fact know that touching or eating of the tree would incur 
death, because this is precisely what she says to Satan when he first approaches her in 
the garden: ‘the woman herself’, he writes, ‘testifies that this was decreed to her, that 
she would not touch the tree of knowledge of good and evil’.20 He adds, however, that 
Eve did not receive this instruction from God directly, rather she received it through the 
medium of the man, because ‘she was subject to the man and by the counsel of the man 
she was to be instructed’.21  Again, Lombard agrees with Hugh on this matter, and 
repeats Hugh’s assertions that Eve herself attests her awareness of the commandment, 
                                                          
18 ‘Praecepitque ei dicens, “ex omni ligno paradisi comede, de ligno autem scientiae boni et mali ne 
comedas in quocumque enim die comederis ex eo morte morieris” ’, Genesis 2.16 - 17. 
19
 Genesis 3.3. 
20
 ‘Ipsa enim mulier hic testatur sibi quoque mandatum ut lignum scientie boni et mali non tangeret’, De 
sacramentis, 1.7, 5. 
21
 ‘Ut sermo dei primum quasi mediante ad virum fieret deinde mediante viro ad mulierem quoque que 
subiecta fuit et consilio viri instituenda perveniret’, ibid., 1.7, 5. 
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and that even if God did not instruct her directly, she received it through Adam, to 
whom she was subject.
22
 
The Mystère d’Adam likewise establishes firmly that both Adam and Eve were 
aware of the commandment to avoid the tree of knowledge, by restructuring the order in 
which the events of Genesis 2-3 occur. The Adam poet depicts God issuing the 
commandment after Eve has been created and presented to Adam, and thus whilst the 
command is addressed to Adam, she is present as it is given.
23 
Adam agrees to do as he 
is commanded, and answers on Eve’s behalf, assuring his creator that neither he nor Eve 
(‘ne jo ne Eue’) will violate his orders, particularly not for the sake of a mere single fruit 
(‘por un sol fruit’).24 
Eve is thus represented here as a subject, dependent on her husband for 
instruction. Evidently, these passages conflict with the earlier claims that Eve was 
neither inferior nor superior, but created to associate with Adam in an equal partnership. 
As the first woman, Eve is a peer and an equivalent. As the first wife, she is a subject 
and a dependant. However, Eve is also portrayed in these passages as a being in 
possession of reason and free will who consciously consented to perform an act she 
knew to be transgressive; an act for which she is thus duly held accountable. She may 
have been reliant on Adam for instruction, but the moral agency she exercised in 
consenting to and committing the first sin was entirely independent.  
On the subject of why the devil chose to appear in the form of the serpent, 
answers vary regarding the specific choice of animal. However, they agree that the devil 
needed to appear in disguise in order to proceed successfully with his deceptive act, 
since had he appeared in his own form he would have been easily recognised and 
                                                          
22
 ‘Ipsa mulier testetur sibi etiam esse mandatum, dicens: “praecepit nobis deus” etc... Quia mulier, quae 
subiecta uiro fuit, nonnisi mediante uiro diuinum debuit accipere praeceptum’, Sententiae, liber II, dist. 21, 
ch. 8. 
23
 Mystère ed. Sletsjöe, 100 – 103. 
24
 Ibid., 104 – 106. 
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dismissed. Hugh explains that the devil could only tempt mankind by resorting to 
fraudulence, adding that he would likely have preferred to appear as a dove, had this 
form not been reserved for the Holy Spirit.
25
 Lombard also refers to the devil’s thwarted 
desire to take the form of a dove, concluding that the form of a serpent was deemed a 
more suitable disguise because it was unappealing, and thus Eve should have detected 
the deceitful cunning of the tempter.
26
 Hildegard writes that the devil saw that it would 
be easy to bring down Adam and Eve but that he could not approach them without a 
disguise, and thus chose the form of the serpent simply because the serpent most closely 
resembled his actual appearance.
27
 
 
WHY THE EXISTENCE OF SIN WAS PERMITTED 
Whilst the discussions of the tree and the commandment are useful components of the 
debate which surrounded the figure of Eve during this period, the most significant 
aspect of interpretations of Genesis 2.17 in this respect is the way in which they present 
the consequences of Eve’s sin. Exegesis of Eve’s temptation in the texts discussed here 
reveals a striking degree of unanimity regarding the notion that mankind benefited from 
the first act of sin, in spite of the grievous consequences incurred by it. Before the act of 
sin itself is discussed, there is an identifiable tendency to present the argument that by 
transgressing the boundaries of divine mandate, mankind’s knowledge and experience 
increased and developed. Both the act of sin and the consequences it incurred are 
presented as processes which were damaging to mankind, but which were at the same 
time instructive, since they reinforced and augmented mankind’s appreciation both of 
God and of human nature. For Abelard, it is the interpretation of Genesis 2.17 which 
                                                          
25
 De sacramentis, 2.7, 2. 
26
 Sententiae 2. 21, 2. 
27
 Scivias,1.2, 216. 
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lays the foundations for his argument that Eve’s sin renders her dearer to God than 
many thousands of sinless men. However, this argument is not unique to Abelard’s 
exegesis of the fall narrative. Although Abelard presents the argument more forcefully 
than other commentators, as will be discussed below, Hugh of St Victor, Peter Lombard 
and Hildegard of Bingen all share his opinion that mankind as a whole benefited in 
some ways from Eve’s act of transgression, since it forced a more developed 
understanding of obedience, free will and the nature of virtue. 
Whilst it seems paradoxical to argue that the first sin was beneficial to mankind, 
this argument serves two vital purposes. Principally, it provides a satisfactory answer to 
the problematic questions of why God permitted mankind to sin, and why mankind was 
created with the capacity to sin in the first place. In addition, the argument facilitates the 
definition of virtue as a complex interior process, the value of which is defined by the 
difficulty of the struggle to achieve it. 
It is possible to identify a longstanding precedent for the idea of advantageous 
sin in Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram, which suggests that mankind was created with 
the capacity to be tempted ‘because it is an effective test and exercise of virtue, and 
because the palm for not having given in when tempted is more glorious than for having 
been beyond the possibility of temptation’. 28  Had mankind simply been unable or 
unwilling to sin, they would not have been able to experience the worthy and instructive 
process of resisting temptation; the ‘prize’ for which is virtue. Although mankind failed 
the spiritual test presented by the commandment forbidding the tree of knowledge, the 
process of being tested was still inherently valuable. Indeed, there would have been no 
point in a test that was impossible to fail. 
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  On Genesis, trans. Hill, p. 433; De Genesi ad litteram, 11.6. 
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The notion that mankind had to experience temptation and sin in order to 
appreciate virtue is most prominently expressed in the work of Abelard. Abelard 
comments on Genesis 2.17 conceptualise sin and temptation in a way that makes it 
possible for him to argue that Eve becomes more worthy and more pleasing before God 
because she consented to temptation and defied the commandment which God had 
issued. In fact, the figure of Eve emerges as a fundamental component of Abelard’s 
ethical framework. Abelard states explicitly that the sin itself - the tasting of the fruit – 
was indeed an essentially minor act of transgression (‘tam modicum peccatum de gustu 
illo pomi’), particularly given the magnitude of those frequently committed by Eve and 
Adam descendants, which necessitate neither so great a punishment nor so great an act 
of redemption.
29
 However, the human being needed to experience sin, and the 
consequences of sin.
30
 The sin lay in violating the commandment rather than the act of 
eating the fruit itself, which was merely a pretext for the establishment of a test of 
human obedience. He continues: 
But perhaps you will ask why he [God] forbade something which he 
knew they [Eve and Adam] would transgress, something in which there 
would have been no sin had there not been a command? Who will not see 
that he was almost seeking an opportunity for them to do something for 
which as transgressors they could be punished or proven guilty, [for 
which they] deserve to be condemned?
31
 
 
Abelard thus rather boldly confronts here several of the most problematic issues 
raised by Genesis 2.17; namely, the questions of why God permitted sin to happen, 
whether or not this was deliberate, whether it was predestined or at least anticipated by 
                                                          
29
 Expositio, 459. 
30
 ‘Quibus respondeo quod in illo primo etsi leuiori peccato, homo debuit experiri quantum deo grauiores 
culpe displicerent quas non corporalibus et transitoriis penis uindicaret, sed etiam perpetuis et hoc 
grauissimis, non illis mitissimis quas, ut ait beatus Augustinus, paruuli non regenerati sustinent’, ibid., 
460. 
31
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘Sed fortassis requiris cur illud prohibuit in quo sciebat eos 
transgressuros et in quo nullum fieret peccatum si non precessisset preceptum? Quis non uideat quasi 
occasionem eum querere qua tale quid committerent, in quo transgressi punirentur, uel rei constituti 
dampnari mererentur?’, Expositio, 452. 
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God, why God issued a commandment that he knew might be broken, and why mankind 
were created with the capacity to sin in the first place.  The answer to all these questions 
is, according to Abelard, that the first act of sin, regardless of the punishing 
consequences it incurred, was ultimately both instructive and beneficial to mankind. As 
a consequence of sin, mankind improved their knowledge both of the love of God, and 
of the nature of virtue and temptation, and thus through sin, mankind was made better: 
But I say: what if before the human being sinned he [God] sought an 
opportunity to make him better after sin, by seeking him through himself 
and redeeming him by his own death, and by showing us so great a love 
that, as he himself says, ‘Greater love hath no man’? For in fact from this 
supreme love, we love God so much the more, the more we have greater 
cause to love him. By loving him more after sin, we are made better, and 
by his mercy, our wickedness is turned into the highest good for 
ourselves.
32
  
 
Therefore, whilst the first act of sin was rightly and duly punished, it also made 
mankind more faithful, and more loving toward God, since it allowed mankind to 
witness and experience divine love for mankind to its fullest possible extent. 
As the first sinner, it is Eve who was responsible for initiating the improving 
processes which accompanied the devastating loss to humanity that her transgression 
incurred. Moreover however, the first act of sin made mankind more knowledgeable in a 
way that was crucially significant: Eve’s act of sin enabled mankind to become virtuous. 
The fruitful paradox of this occurrence is what allows Abelard to represent Eve as 
dearer to God than many thousands of sinless men. He explains that 
In fact, one woman [Eve] is now worth more to God, and appears more 
pleasing to him through merit than might many thousands of men, if they 
had persevered forever without sin. For if there were no fight against 
adversity, where would be the crown of victory? This is what he who 
                                                          
32
 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘Sed dico: quid si occasionem querebat ante hominis peccatum qua 
meliorem eum redderet post peccatum, eum scilicet per se ipsum requirendo et propria morte redimendo, 
tantam que nobis caritatem exhibendo, qua sicut ipsemet ait: “maiorem dilectionem nemo habet”. Ex hac 
quippe summa dilectione nobis exhibita, tanto amplius deum diligimus, quanto diligendi eum maiorem 
causam habemus. Quo uero eum amplius diligimus post peccatum, meliores ex hoc efficimur, et per eius 
misericordiam ipsum malum nostrum in maximum nobis conuersum est bonum’, Expositio, 452. 
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blesses the Paschal candle is carefully thinking as he exclaims over the 
mercy of God: ‘O wondrous condescension of your affection for us, O 
immeasurable love of charity: so that you might redeem a slave you sent 
a son. O certainly necessary sin of Adam which was erased by the death 
of Christ, O happy fault, that merited such and so great a redeemer’.33 
 
Before Eve sinned, mankind was without sin; having had no experience of it, and 
having no way to know or to define it. However, before Eve sinned mankind was also 
without virtue. Within Abelard’s ethical framework, being sinless is not the same as 
being virtuous. Prelapsarian sinlessness was a passive state, and one which was inferior 
to being virtuous, since it involved nothing more demanding than simply abstaining 
from wrongdoing in the absence of genuine temptation. 
On the other hand, virtue, like sin, is not so much a state of being as it is a 
process. In order to be actively virtuous, the soul must experience temptation and must 
consciously refrain from capitulating to this temptation. Eve clearly failed to resist the 
temptation she was proffered, and thus the first act of sin occurred. However, in 
consenting to temptation and bringing sin into the world for the first time, she also 
bought with it the means by which virtue could be identified and pursued. Eve, in her 
transgression, enabled mankind to know for the first time what sin and virtue were, and 
how virtue might be defined and achieved. This is why she was, after having sinned, 
dearer to God than many thousands of sinless men. Remaining passively and 
indefinitely sinless, immune to temptation but thus also to virtue, would have been 
much less spiritually demanding, and thus ‘the crown of victory’ would have remained 
                                                          
33 
Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘Plus quippe una femina modo apud deum ualet et gratior ei per 
meritum existit quam multa milia hominum facerent, si semper sine peccato perseuerassent. Si enim nulla 
esset aduersitatum pugna, ubi esset uictorie corona? Quod quidem ille diligenter attendebat qui in 
benedictione cerei paschalis super hac misericordia dei exclamans, ait: “O mira circa nos tue pietatis 
dignatio. O inestimabilis dilectio caritatis: ut seruum redimeres, filium tradidisti. O certe necessarium Ade 
peccatum quod Christi morte deletum est. O felix culpa que talem ac tantum meruit habere 
redemptorem” ’, Expositio, 454.  
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unattainable and undeserved. Mankind would not have had the ability or the opportunity 
to be virtuous had Eve not first defined what it meant to sin. 
It is true that Eve could also have defined virtue and sin by refusing to consent 
to the temptation she experienced. She failed to refuse and was thus punished 
appropriately – Abelard is not attempting to lessen Eve’s culpability, or seeking to deny 
the gravity of her misconduct. Eating the fruit might have been a nugatory action in 
itself, but the violation of divine mandate was a wilful error of great magnitude. 
Nonetheless, it remains clear, to Abelard at least, that in defining the process of sin, Eve 
also defined the process of virtue. She thus made it possible for mankind both to reach 
their full spiritual potential, and to experience the very fullest extent of divine love. 
As was mentioned above, it is important to bear in mind that Abelard is 
unsurprisingly singular in his articulation of this argument. None of the other 
commentators discussed here express any outright praise of Eve, and nor do they 
declare that Eve’s sin made her dearer to God. However, whilst Abelard’s generous 
representation of Eve is atypical, it should not be dismissed as an aberration. The ethical 
framework which sanctions it draws on a well established source of Patristic authority, 
and the relationship between temptation and virtue which underpins it is by no means 
unique to Abelard. Peter Lombard, Hildegard of Bingen and Hugh of St Victor all state 
that the first act of sin had some improving effect on both the status and the knowledge 
of mankind; an effect which could not have occurred had mankind remained in their 
prelapsarian state. More importantly, they all rely to varying degrees on the notion of 
experience and testing as a fundamentally instructive procedure, regardless of the fact 
that mankind failed the test of their obedience that was presented by the commandment 
forbidding the tree. 
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Whilst the arguments of Lombard and Hildegard are more cautious than those 
which constitute Abelard’s defence of Eve, they nonetheless display an equal level of 
accordance with the Augustinian precept which authorises it. Lombard’s answer to the 
question of why God allowed mankind to be tempted when he knew that they would fall 
consists entirely of quotations from the aforementioned passage of Augustine’s De 
Genesi ad litteram, as does his answer to the question of why God created mankind 
with the capacity for evil.
34
 He later argues more explicitly that it is precisely this 
capacity for evil which enables mankind to be virtuous. He offers the following 
response to the hypothetical creation of a human being who did not possess any 
capacity for evil: 
To this we say that to resist evil and not consent to temptation would not 
have gained him any merit, even if he had not consented, because there 
was nothing in him that might impel him to evil… For it is sometimes a 
merit for us if we do not do evil, but resist it, but only where a cause is 
present which moves us to commit it, because our steps are prone to fall 
due to the corruption of sin. But where no cause intervenes to impel us to 
evil, we gain no merit if we forbear from it. For to resist evil always 
avoids punishment, but does not always deserve the palm [of victory].
35
 
 
If mankind had been created without the capacity for evil, to resist temptation would 
have required no particular spiritual exertion, and thus the ‘victory’ of virtue would 
always have been inaccessible. Thus, like Abelard, he concludes that remaining sinless 
without any capacity for evil is not as worthy a process as the active resistance of sin 
where there exists an inherent capacity for evil. 
Likewise, Hildegard answers the question of why mankind was created with 
capacity to sin with the response that mankind had to be tested. As gold must be tested 
                                                          
34
 ‘Et est gloriosius non consentire quam tentari non posse…’, Sententiae, 2.23, 1. 
35
 Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 108. ‘Ad quod dicimus quia resistere malo et non consentire 
tentationi non fecisset illi meritum etsi non consensisset, quia nihil in eo erat quod ad malum impelleret… 
Nobis autem meritum est aliquando si malum non facimus, sed resistimus: Ibi dumtaxat ubi causa subest 
quae nos facere mouet; quia ex peccati corruptela proni sunt ad lapsum gressus nostri. Ubi autem non 
interuenit causa nos ad malum impellens, non meremur si ab eo declinamus. Declinare enim a malo 
semper uitat poenam, sed non semper meretur palmam’, Sententiae, 2.24, 1. 
161 
 
in fire, Hildegard explains, and precious stones must be polished, mankind, must be 
likewise be tested, and more so than all the other creatures who occupy earth, because 
mankind alone enjoys the privilege of having been made in the image and likeness of 
God.
36
 She also argues that the fall of mankind was predestined, or least foreseen, by 
God.
37
 
Like Abelard, she is certain that the first act of sin had an improving effect on 
the status and capacities of mankind. She states that mankind ‘shines brighter’ in 
redemption than in prelapsarian sinlessness:  
And thus Man [‘homo’], having been delivered, shines in God, and God 
in Man; Man, having community in God, has in Heaven more radiant 
brightness than he had before. This would not have been so if the Son of 
God had not put on flesh, for if Man had remained in Paradise, the Son 
of God would not have suffered on the cross. But when Man was 
deceived by the wily serpent, God was touched by true mercy and 
ordained that his Only-Begotten would become incarnate in the most 
pure Virgin. And thus after Man’s ruin many shining virtues were lifted 
up to Heaven.
38
 
 
Hildegard also echoes Abelard’s and Lombard’s comparison between the exertion 
involved in being virtuous and the crown or palm of victory won in a difficult battle: 
Scivias recounts Hildegard’s being told by God that fallen humanity must 
Extinguish within yourself the burning flame of lust and other things of 
this world, casting out anger, pride, wantonness and other vices of that 
sort and attaining this victory by a great struggle. These battles to Me are 
full of great beauty and much fruit, brighter than the sun and sweeter 
than the love of spices; for when you trample underfoot the burning lust 
within you, you imitate my Only-Begotten in his pains. And when you 
                                                          
36
 ‘Quomodo tam magna gloria et tantus honor qui vobis datus est, posset esse sine probatione: cum 
tamen aurum quod quasi nihil est et aliquid inane, debeat in igne probari, et pretiosi lapides in purgatione 
poliri, et hujusmodi omnia in omnibus perquiri? Ergo, O stulti homines, hoc quod ad imaginem et 
similitudinem Dei factum est, quomodo sine probatione posset subsistere? Nam homo super omnem 
creaturam examinandus est’, Scivias, 1.2, 685 - 90. Regarding gold being tested in fire, cf. I Peter 1.7. 
37
 ‘Qui te in primo homine creavit, ille haec omnia praevidit’, ibid., 1.2, 715. 
38
 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 87. ‘Et sic homo liberatus fulget in Deo, et Deus in homine; 
consortium homo cum Deo habens, fulgentiorem claritatem quam prius haberet, possidet in coelo. Quod 
non fuisset, si Filius Dei carnem non induisset, quoniam, si homo in paradiso permansisset, Filius in cruce 
passus non fuisset. Sed cum homo per callidum serpentem deceptus est, Deus in vera misericordia tactus, 
Unigenitum suum in purissima virgine incarnari voluit, atque ita post ruinam hominis elevatae sunt 
plurimae virtutes in coelo fulgentes’, Scivias, 1.2, 720 - 26. 
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persevere in this, you will attain much glory for it in the celestial 
kingdom. O sweetest flowers! My angels marvel at your struggle.
39
 
 
Again, like Abelard, Hildegard is thus particularly focused on the value of such battles 
in the eyes of God. The mention of crushing sin under foot alludes to the punishment of 
the serpent in Genesis 3.15, in which the serpent is condemned to fear Eve and the 
enmity God places between him and the woman.
40
 This allusion reinforces the crucially 
instructive nature of the figure of Eve by suggesting that her transgression is re-enacted 
in every subsequent human sin. It also indicates, however, that the consequences of 
Eve’s sin and punishment provide a means by which fallen human beings might become 
dearer to God than they could have been had they remained in prelapsarian sinlessness – 
a moral and spiritual feat at which the sinless angels, immune to temptation, can only 
marvel. 
Hugh of St Victor also concedes that sin benefited mankind, by furthering their 
understanding of good and evil. Mankind, he writes, could only have come to know and 
experience good or evil through obedience or disobedience.
41 
Lombard takes this idea 
and adds it to his Augustinian argument about the experience of temptation: closely 
following the words of Hugh, he writes that before sin, mankind already knew good and 
evil, but had not yet experienced evil:  
For mankind knew evil before he touched this tree; he knew good, 
however, through both prudence and experience, but the evil only 
                                                          
39
 ‘Cum uobismetipsis resistitis ardentem flammam libidinis uidelicet in uobis exstinguentes et alia 
saecularia quae mundi sunt scilicet iram, superbiam, petulantiam et cetera huiusmodi uitia abicientes, 
atque uictoriam istam magno certamine perficientes.Vnde tunc proelia ista magno decore et multo fructu 
clariora super solem et dulciora super amorem aromatum coram me apparent; quia Vnigenitum meum in 
doloribus eius imitamini cum ardentem libidinem tam forti certamine in uobis conculcatis.Et cum sic 
perseueratis multam gloriam exinde in caelesti regno habebitis. O dulcissimi flores, angeli mei in uestro 
certamine admirantur’, Scivias, I.2, 613-626. 
40
 ‘Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem et semen tuum et semen illius ipsa conteret caput tuum et tu 
insidiaberis calcaneo eius’, Genesis 3.15. N.b. also the image of the Virgin Mary crushing the snake under 
her feet. 
41
 ‘Sic ergo in loco isto sive boni mali cognoscendi occasionem accipere debuit, non tamen ex natura ligni, 
quia hoc homini ex se dare non potuit. Sed quia in eo vel obediendo boni vel non obediendo mali pro 
debita renumeratione occasionem accepit’, De sacramentis, 1.6, 32. 
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through prudence. He knew it also by experience, however, after his 
illicit use of the tree which had been forbidden to him, because by his 
experience of evil he learned the difference between the good of 
obedience and the evil of disobedience.42 
 
Hugh explains this rather more clearly, stating that before sin, mankind understood good 
through both abstract knowledge and concrete experience (‘per scientiam et per 
experientiam’), but understood evil through abstract knowledge only (‘per solam 
scientiam’). 43  After sin, mankind understood evil through both knowledge and 
experience.44 Had Eve not committed the first act of sin, mankind’s understanding of the 
nature of good and evil, and of virtue and sin, would forever have remained imperfect.  
Hugh and Lombard present a definition of cognition that relies on knowledge 
(‘scientia’) in combination with experience (‘experientia’) - genuine understanding is 
not possible without a reliable experiential basis with which to corroborate abstract 
knowledge. Prelapsarian mankind possessed an abstract, theoretical understanding of 
goodness, which was reinforced by concomitant experience of goodness and its effects. 
However, they possessed only an abstract understanding of evil, and had no experiential 
basis to substantiate it. Thus, before sin, mankind cannot truly be said to have 
understood the nature of disobedience, sin, or evil, because they had never experienced 
it. Eve’s sin enabled mankind to experience evil, and thus to know it fully for the first 
time. Moreover, by fully understanding evil for the first time, mankind developed a 
fuller appreciation of the significance of good and the consequences of obedience.  
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 Sentences Book II trans. Silano, p. 75. ‘Cognouit enim homo, priusquam tangeret hoc lignum, bonum et 
malum; sed bonum per prudentiam et experientiam, malum vero per prudentiam tantum. Quod etiam per 
experientiam nouit usurpato ligno uetito, quia per experientiam mali didicit quid sit inter bonum 
obedientiae et malum inobedientiae’, Sententiae, 2.17, 7. 
43
 ‘Adam ante peccatum bonum et malum scivit, bonum quidem et per scientiam et per experientiam, 
malum vero per solam scientiam’, De sacramentis, 1.6, 32.  
44
 ‘Postquam autem lignum vetitum tetigit malum etiam per experientiam cognoscere cepit atque ipsius 
mali bonum quoque quam stricte fuerat tenendum cognovit’, ibid., 1.6, 32. 
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II. ‘SERPENS DECEPIT ME ET COMEDI’: EVE AND THE 
MECHANICS OF TEMPTATION AND SIN 
 
Eve’s temptation and the subsequent sin she committed comprise one of the most 
challenging areas of the Genesis narrative. The texts discussed here provide a selection 
of different approaches to this complex material; however, there are several significant 
features that they all share in common. Principally, they all employ the figure of Eve as 
a means by which to elucidate the mechanics of sin and virtue. Despite the prominent 
conception of the figure of Eve as temptress and seducer, these treatments of the fall 
evince no interest in rehearsing misogynistic platitudes about wayward women or 
female weakness, and there is no discernible emphasis on the notion of Eve’s having 
seduced Adam. 
Instead, the figure of Eve is employed in order to define and elucidate the 
concepts of sin, temptation and virtue as they are experienced by human beings in 
general, regardless of gender. Eve is constructed as something of a case study of the 
tempted human soul, and her actions and motivations are subject to extensive and 
measured analysis. More broadly significant is the fact that representations of Eve as the 
first sinner reveal the extent to which sin was conceived during this period as a process 
rather than the external act of transgression itself, and virtue as an achievement which 
was defined by the difficulty of the soul’s struggle against temptation. In addition, there 
emerges a surprisingly consistent tendency to associate the figure of Eve with 
knowledge, or more specifically, with scientia (that is, a posteriori understanding as 
opposed to wisdom or abstract cognition). 
For all the authors discussed here, the figure of Eve provides a central 
component of the ethical and moral frameworks that they construct. They represent Eve 
not as a wayward temptress or a credulous victim, but as the spiritual and didactic locus 
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of a crucially informative scriptural event. Caught between the enticement of temptation 
and the rectitude of virtue, Eve lies at the centre of both the process of the first sin, and 
the re-enactment of this process which was deemed to occur in every subsequent human 
soul which experienced temptation. In the commentaries of Abelard, Guibert of Nogent 
and Peter Lombard, Eve forms the crux of an ethical framework in which sin is defined 
by intention and interior consent, and virtue is defined by the struggle against 
temptation. In the Mystère d’Adam, the process of Eve’s transgression forms the site of 
conflict between different definitions of knowledge, dramatising the distinction between 
understanding and experience that characterises the theological arguments about the 
advantages of the first sin that were discussed in the previous section of this chapter. For 
Hugh of St Victor, Eve is an instructive example of the way in which sin operates, and 
also of the disruption than can result from doubt and inordinate desire for knowledge. 
Hildegard of Bingen’s Scivias gives what is perhaps the least generous of these accounts 
of Eve’s fall, presenting Eve’s sin as act which induces a profound sense of disorder 
within the organisation of the cosmos and, concomitantly, within the fallen human 
being. This section will discuss these representations of Eve’s sin in the following order. 
Firstly it examines Abelard’s conception of Eve’s sin as act without which it would have 
remained impossible for mankind to exercise virtue. It then examines the authors who 
employ Eve’s sin as an allegory of the action of the tempted soul; namely Guibert and 
his representation of Eve as the will, and Lombard and his representation of Eve as the 
reason of knowledge. Subsequently it explores the representation of Eve as a different 
form of knowledge in the Mystère d’Adam. Finally, it explores Eve’s sin as an act of 
human doubt and disorder in the work of Hugh of St Victor and Hildegard of Bingen. 
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EVE AS THE WILL OF THE SOUL: GUIBERT OF NOGENT’S ALLEGORICAL 
EXEGESIS OF THE FALL 
 
As was discussed above, the early part of Guibert of Nogent’s Moralia in Genesim 
represents Eve as an analogue of the body, whereas Adam represents the soul. However, 
in his account of the processes of temptation and sin, Guibert’s representation of Eve 
undergoes significant development, and the figure of Eve emerges as a vital means by 
which to examine the action of sin within the tempted soul.  
Guibert’s interpretation of Genesis 2.24 (‘wherefore a man… shall cleave to his 
wife: and they shall be two in one flesh’) marks the beginning of this development in 
his representation of Eve.
45
 Whereas Eve previously represented the feminine and the 
corporeal, Eve now comes to signify the will (‘voluntas’) of the soul. Guibert employs 
the prelapsarian union of Adam and Eve as a symbolic representation of the virtuous 
soul, which is characterised by the harmonious co-existence of the will (Eve as the wife) 
and the intellect (Adam as the husband): 
On account of this, [Genesis] says, he who has been separated from 
bestial life will leave his father, the devil, and his mother, concupiscence, 
and will cleave to his wife, that is, to his will, ruled by reason, and they 
shall be two - evidently will and intellect - in one flesh, that is, in one 
disposition of mind.
46
  
Eve is thus no longer aligned with the body and with the base physicality which was, for 
Guibert, the root of sin, and instead represents the soul’s will. 
The will and the intellect comprise the two principal components which 
comprise the human soul, operating as two different but complementary forces 
operating within one disposition of mind (‘affectus’). An appropriately organised 
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 ‘Relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adherebit uxori suae et erunt duo in carne una’, Genesis 
2.24. 
46
 ‘Propter hoc, inquit, relinquet is, qui a bestiali semotus est vita patrem diabolum, matremque 
concupiscentiam, et adhaerebit uxori, id est, voluntati suae rationabiliter regendae, et erunt duo, 
intellectus videlicet ac voluntas, in carne una, id est in affectu uno’, Moralia, col. 70 C. 
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‘affectus’; that is, a disposition of mind in which the intellect controls the will 
successfully, will incline towards Heaven regardless of any external tempting forces: 
As soon as it begins to accommodate God, it is made to stand, willingly 
or unwillingly, toward one [i.e. it becomes focused on one thing]. And so 
they are two in one flesh, since these aforementioned two are, as it were, 
placing for themselves the seat of rule in a third [i.e. God] and they walk 
in concord toward [God].
47
   
Thus in order to remain virtuous, the will (Eve) must adhere to the guidance of reason 
(Adam), because the virtuous soul must by definition remain focused on God and 
aligned with his will. However, sin diverts the mind from God, ‘because our disposition 
of mind is never fixed in the same state [i.e. aligned with God] when it is gaping at 
worldly things’.48 Sin occurs when the will attempts to override the guidance of the 
intellect and reason, forcing the mind away from its inclination upwards toward heaven, 
and forcing it instead to move, like the serpent, super pectus.
49
 The serpent represents 
the external influences likely to persuade the will to concede to temptation, and thus 
override the guidance of the intellect. When the will thus capitulates to temptation and 
the intellect does not prevent it from so doing, the whole affectus, the disposition of the 
mind, abandons the rectitude of virtue and descends in accordance with the proffered 
temptation, thus consenting to sin. 
In contrast to Guibert’s original formulation of Eve as the flesh and Adam as the 
spirit, the action of sin and the struggle to resist it are now located entirely within the 
soul, and it is the will (Eve) which possess the ultimate moral agency necessary to 
define whether or not the soul consents to sin. Sin is defined in accordance with cerebral 
and spiritual processes subject to external stimuli - rather than being an essentially 
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 ‘Mox ut Deo vacare incipit, velit nolit ad unum sistitur. Sunt itaque duo in carne una, cum praefata duo 
quasi regni sedem sibi ponunt in tertio, et ad idem duo gradiuntur concorditer’, ibid., col. 70 C. 
48
 ‘Affectus etenim noster quia in eodem statu nunquam saecularibus inhians figitur’, ibid., col. 70 C. 
49
 ‘Super pectus tuum gradieris. In pectore cor habemus, et in corde rationem. Affectus itaque super 
pectus ambulat, quando sibi imperium rationis usurpat’, ibid., 74C. 
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corporeal phenomenon as it was previously presented, it is committed as when the mind 
in which the will has overruled the intellect and subsequently capitulated to 
temptation.
50
 The struggle against temptation has been relocated and redefined as a 
psychological, rather than physical, process. 
Whilst Guibert’s allegory of opposing factions within the soul is markedly less 
misogynistic than his representation of Eve as the flesh subordinate to the ‘masculine’ 
authority of the soul, his revised representation of Eve remains identifiably patriarchal. 
The relationship between Adam and Eve is certainly not one of equals. Adam represents 
the ‘superior’ component, and Eve must still be governed by him. The spiritual concord 
necessary for the achievement of virtue has to function as a harmonious matrimonial 
hierarchy: Adam must control and guide Eve, because the will must be an obedient 
‘wife’ to her ‘husband’, the intellect. 
However, reading Guibert’s Eve solely in terms of gender is not particularly 
illuminating, leading only to the predictable and inexact conclusion that Guibert thought 
wives ought to be obedient to their husbands. This conclusion obscures the significance 
of the text, because Guibert is not in fact concerned with literal, biological gender here; 
his concern is the human soul and the function of the will. Guibert discusses the 
prelapsarian state not as a literal model of interaction between men and women but as a 
model of the virtuous soul, regardless of the gender of the body in which it resides. 
Eve’s function in the Moralia is exegetical and didactic rather than polemical. Her 
weakness is not the weakness with which an intrinsically flawed female nature 
undermines a masculine rationality, nor is it some form of punishment inflicted on 
women generally. It is a weakness that abides in humanity as a whole – Guibert’s 
formulation of an inherently flawed disposition of mind that can never reconcile the 
                                                          
50
  Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, ‘Quod non sit peccatum nisi in voluntate…’, ‘De conceptu virginali et de 
originali peccato’ ed. F. Schmitt, Anselmi Opera Omnia, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Verlag, 1984), 2.3. 
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disparity between flesh and spirit or intellect and will is universally applicable, with no 
regard for gender. Guibert’s assessment of the consequences of sin for the human race, 
himself included, may be one that is negative to the point of misanthropy, but it is not 
one that is misogynistic - the language used to describe Eve is negative not because of 
the pernicious impulses he identifies specifically in women, but because of those which 
he identifies in himself and in the human race in its entirety.   
As such, Guibert’s developing representation of Eve’s creation charts the 
development of his conception of ethics and morality. The first representation of Eve as 
the body demonstrates that Guibert initially conceived the human being as an entity 
composed of spirit (Adam) and flesh (Eve), and his initial conception of sin and virtue 
is equally simplistic. Sin occurs when the spirit fails to ignore the enticements proffered 
to the body; virtue occurs when physical desire is overridden by the spirit. The second 
representation of Eve as the will demonstrates Guibert’s formulation of a more 
sophisticated approach to human nature and morality. The straightforward body/soul 
dualism is replaced with a symbiosis of will and intellect. Sin was initially defined as a 
failure of corporeal restraint; a failure of Adam (‘spiritus’) to reign in the desires of Eve 
(‘caro’) and prevent her from succumbing to the physical delights proffered by the devil. 
In the second representation of Eve, the fight against sin takes place within the soul 
alone, as a conflict between the intellect (Adam) and the will (Eve). Eve as the body 
was a locus for physical temptation; Eve as the will is a locus of moral agency, since it 
is the ‘Eve’ section of every human soul which ultimately dictates whether a person’s 
actions are sinful or virtuous. The representation of Eve as the will, instead of the body, 
demonstrates that Guibert has come to think of sin and virtue as questions of agency 
rather than action.  Sin and virtue are now conceived as interior spiritual processes. 
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They are characterised by internal volition rather than external conduct; they no longer 
depend on a concomitant physical act in order to define them. 
Eve as ‘voluntas’ represents the part of the soul most vulnerable to temptation, 
as opposed to being synonymous with sin itself. Eve operates instead within the 
precarious balance between vice and virtue rather than functioning as a straightforward 
representation of carnality. The flesh is no longer considered inherently sinful, since sin 
only occurs when Eve, signifying will, consents to temptation and Adam, signifying 
reason, fails to prevent this. Prior to the fall, they were to live in a harmonious 
symbiosis in which Eve willingly submitted to Adam – will governed by reason. This is 
the state of grace which was lost after Eve’s sin: ‘voluntas’/Eve became disobedient in 
Paradise and thus in all subsequent human minds. In capitulating to temptation, Eve 
ceased to be obedient to God, and thus ‘voluntas’ will not now submit willingly to 
‘ratio’. 
The representation of Eve is of central significance, since it is the direction that 
the will decides to take – either toward the divine, or toward earthly desire – that defines 
the process by which a mind becomes devoted to virtue or vice. Eve represents the will 
taking the wrong path and choosing to overrule the intellect in favour of desire, which 
why she, rather than Adam, is held responsible by Guibert for the fall. Rather than 
merely witnessing the conflict between reason and sin, interior and exterior, 
Eve/‘voluntas’ governs the relationship between the two, emerging as the deciding 
factor in the struggle between sin and virtue. Thanks to insufficient will, mankind is 
condemned to repeat the process of the Fall, even after he has seen the light of fear 
which leads to conversion. The will, and the direction it chooses to take, defines the 
action of the soul, and in the case of Eve, that of every subsequent human being. Eve is 
thus employed to elucidate the process of the first act of sin, and the process of sin as it 
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occurs within every tempted soul which is, on account of the original transgression, 
condemned to re-enact it. 
‘UBI ESSET CORONA VIRTUTEM?’: EVE’S FALL AND ABELARD’S ETHICS 
Abelard, as was discussed above, describes Eve as being dearer to God than many 
thousands of sinless men because in defining what it was to sin, Eve simultaneously 
gave mankind the opportunity to be actively virtuous as opposed to passively sinless. 
Given its neglected status in Abelard’s oeuvre, the Expositio has been overlooked in 
relation Abelard’s ethics.51 However, the text’s representation of Eve as the first sinner 
elucidates the theological framework which underpins Abelard’s understanding of 
human moral agency, whilst the figure of Eve herself is crucial to Abelard’s definition 
of virtue as an active process.  
The significance of the figure of Eve to Abelard’s exploration of sin and virtue 
is apparent not only in the Expositio, but also in his Ethics, whose representation of Eve 
provides an interesting complement to that of the Expositio.
52
 Whereas the Expositio 
employs Eve principally as a means by which to elucidate the process of the first sin 
and its consequences, the Ethics, written around the same time as the Expositio, uses 
Eve to demonstrate the way in which the actions of the tempted soul lead to sin in all 
human beings who transgress.
53
 Thus, as will be discussed below, whilst the Ethics 
explains the action of sin, the Expositio explains its very existence.  In both cases, Eve 
emerges as a pivotal figure. The representation of Eve in the Ethics elucidates the action 
                                                          
51
   Marenbon’s is the only major treatment of Abelard which mentions the Expositio within the context of 
Abelard’s ethical writing, exploring the text in relation to Abelard’s conception of free will; see ibid., pp. 
249 – 250. Marenbon even quotes the line about Eve being dearer to God than many thousands of sinless 
men, but offers no comment on this description of Eve nor any indication of the way in which the figure 
of Eve informs the definition of virtue expressed in the Expositio; ibid., p. 250. 
52
  Peter Abelard’s Ethics: A Critical Edition with English Translation, Notes, and Introduction, ed. 
David Luscombe, Oxford Medieval Text Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
53
  The text was completed during the 1130s: Luscombe suggests 1133, with which Marenbon agrees; see 
ibid., p. xxx, and John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard,  pp. 67 – 69. 
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of the first sin, and its re-enactment in all subsequent human transgression. In the 
Expositio, the representation of Eve reveals the genesis and function of sin, and the 
more problematic issues surrounding the emergence of sin and evil into the paradise of 
prelapsarian existence. 
According to the Ethics, the process of Eve’s transgression consisted of three 
stages: suggestion (suggestio), pleasure (dilectio) and consent (consensus). These stages 
are re-enacted in all subsequent acts of temptation and sin.
54
 Temptation comprises the 
first two of these stages, Abelard continues, as Eve was initially persuaded by the 
devil’s suggestions and promises of immortality, and then by the prospect of the 
pleasure that the fruit’s sweetness and beauty promised.55 However, it is the final only 
the final stage, that of consent, in which sin is comprised. Eve should have resisted her 
longing, but she consented to eat the fruit and was thus guilty of an act of sin – the 
physical act of eating was merely the conclusion to this process, and her consent would 
have surmounted to an act of sin necessitating repentance even if she had not in fact 
eaten it.
56
 Just as Eve progressed thus through the three stages of sin, so do all human 
beings reach the point of performing an act of sin; although it is the consent, rather than 
the concomitant act, in which the sin consists.
57
  
Whilst the Eve of the Ethics elucidates the action of sin, the Eve of the Expositio 
is principally employed as a means by which to understand the existence of virtue, and 
also to demonstrate that the existence of virtue is dependent upon the existence of 
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 ‘Cum ergo peccatum vel tentationem tribus modis dicimus peragi, suggestione scilicet, delectatione, 
consensu, ita est intelligendum: quod ad operationem peccati per haec tria frequenter deducimur, sicut in 
primis contigit parentibus’, Ethica, 1.21. 
55
 ‘Persuasio quippe diaboli praecessit, cum ex gustu vetitae arboris immortalitatem promisit; delectatio 
successit, cum mulier videns lignum pulchrum et ipsum intelligens suave ad vescendum, in 
concupiscentiam ejus exarsit, cibi voluptate quam credebat correpta’, ibid., 1.21. 
56
 ‘Quae cum reprimere concupiscentiam deberet, ut praeceptum servaret, consentiendo in peccatum 
tracta est. Quod etiam peccatum cum per poenitentiam deberet corrigere, ut veniam mereretur, ipsum 
denique consummavit in opere’, ibid., 1.21. 
57
 ‘Et ita tribus gradibus ad perpetrandum peccatum incessit. Sic et nos frequenter non ad peccandum, sed 
ad peccati perpetrationem, iisdem passionibus pervenimus... Cui videlicet delectationi dum assentimus 
per consensum, peccamus. His tandem tribus ad operationem peccati pervenimus’, ibid., 1.21. 
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temptation and sin. Thus whilst the Expositio has been largely neglected amid modern 
scholarship on Abelard, its representation of Eve forms a significant component of 
Abelard’s ethical framework. The Ethics conceives virtue as being dependent on the 
first two of the stages described above; that is, the experience of suggestion and the 
prospect of pleasure, prior to the consent by which sin is defined. The virtuous person 
‘represses his desire [for the proffered temptation], he does not extinguish it, but 
because he is not drawn to consent, he does not incur sin’. 58 Virtue thus presides not in 
a soul which lacks interior vices, but in one which refutes them. Conversely, sin does 
not consist of the presence of interior vices, but in consenting to perform the deeds they 
incline towards. Therefore, vice is that which makes the soul prone to sin; sin itself 
consists in the soul’s consent to that which it knows will earn damnation and guilt. 
Those who resist vice, Abelard continues, ‘have the material for this struggle, so that 
triumphing over themselves through the virtue of temperance they may obtain a 
crown’.59 Sin is dependent on internal consent to vice, and virtue on the struggle against 
it. Abelard describes the internal struggle against vice as the material by which a 
potentially sinful person triumphs over themselves and thus acquires the crown of virtue. 
The capacity for sin is therefore a necessary prerequisite for the existence of 
virtue. However, the Ethics does not elaborate on this or explain why this is the case. 
Rather, this material is discussed in the Expositio, and it is again the figure of Eve who 
is crucial both to the existence of this aspect of human nature, and to the way in which 
Abelard explains it. Abelard’s description of the ‘crown of victory’ deserved by those 
who attain virtue appears, in his description of why Eve’s sin made her dearer to God:  
                                                          
58
  Ethics, trans. Luscombe, p. 15. ‘Desiderium ille reprimit, non extinguit, sed quia non trahitur ad 
consensum, non incurrit peccatum’, Ethica, 1.9. 
59
  Ethics, trans. Luscombe, p. 5. ‘Pugnae materiam ex hoc habent, ut per temperantiae virtutem de se 
ipsis triumphantes coronam percipiant’, Ethica, 1.2. See also ‘Cum enim nonnunquam peccemus absque 
omnia mala voluntate, et cum ipsa mala voluntas refrenata, non extincta, palmam resistentibus pariat, et 
materiam pugnae et gloriae coronam conferat, non tam ipsa peccatum quam infirmitas quaedam iam 
necessaria dici debet’, ibid., 1.4. 
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But I say: what if before the human being sinned he sought an 
opportunity to make him better after sin... By loving him [God] more 
after sin, we are made better, and by his mercy our wickedness is turned 
into the highest good for ourselves. In fact one woman is now worth 
more to God, and appears more pleasing to him through merit than might 
many thousands of men, if they had persevered forever without sin. For 
if there were no fight against adversity, where would be the crown of 
victory?
60
 
 
However, whilst the crown of victory image reappears, it is here and not in the 
Ethics where Abelard explains the wider theological and cosmological framework in 
which it belongs. The capacity for sin is a prerequisite for the existence of virtue 
because virtue is itself impossible without the experience of genuine temptation; an 
experience which would forever have remained impossible had mankind remained in 
perpetual obedient innocence. The emergence of sin and iniquity into this unsullied 
prelapsarian state was thus simultaneously a deplorable lapse, and means by which 
mankind might profit spiritually. Eve is dearer to God than many thousands of sinless 
men, because she initiated the process by which mankind could ‘become better through 
sin’ and thereby attain both a greater appreciation for divine love, and a state of spiritual 
advancement in which the capacity for sin removed the possibility of perpetual 
blamelessness, but replaced it with the potential for reaching the worthier and more 
fruitful state of active, hard-won virtue.
61
 
Abelard’s conception of the prelapsarian state as perpetual perseverance in the 
absence of sin thus amounts to a form of epistemological virginity – blameless, 
certainly, but ultimately unproductive in spiritual terms. According to the Expositio, this 
                                                          
60
   Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘Sed dico: quid si occasionem querebat ante hominis peccatum qua 
meliorem eum redderet post peccatum... Quo uero eum amplius diligimus post peccatum, meliores ex hoc 
efficimur, et per eius misericordiam ipsum malum nostrum in maximum nobis conuersum est bonum.Plus 
quippe una femina modo apud deum ualet et gratior ei per meritum existit quam multa milia hominum 
facerent, si semper sine peccato perseuerassent. Si enim nulla esset aduersitatum pugna, ubi esset uictorie 
corona?’, Expositio, 452 - 453. Cf. Ethica 1.7: ‘unde premium grande si non sit quod toleremus grave?’. 
61
  Hildegard of Bingen also describes the struggle against temptation as a form of spiritual ‘fertility’ and 
fruitfulness, comparing it to the superior crop attainable from a field that has been worked intensively: 
‘Nam cum ager multo labore colitur, multum fructum profert, sicut in humano genere ostensum est; quia 
post ruinam hominis plurimae uirtutes ad subleuationem eius surrexerunt’, Scivias, 1.2, 731-3. 
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was intended to be only a temporary state; its end not merely anticipated but 
predetermined by God: 
But perhaps you ask why he [God] forbade something which he knew 
they [mankind] would transgress, something in which there would have 
been no sin had there not been a command? Who will not see that he was 
almost seeking an opportunity for them to do something for which as 
transgressors they could be punished or proven guilty, deserve to be 
condemned? ...If you were to object that no human being would have 
sinned if those first human beings had not sinned or if they had received 
no command to obey, no reason or authority can support you.
62
 
 
Whilst sin owed its origins to human free will, it was both a necessary and a foreseen 
element of the divinely established cosmos, and the execution of moral action within it. 
God did not expect mankind to remain to remain unblemished, but he did intend them to 
profit by their flaws and the punishment they incurred. 
This is possible because human propensity for sin is precisely what enables 
human capacity for virtue in Abelard’s ethical framework – sinless and untempted 
prelapsarian mankind could not struggle with temptation, and thus could not win the 
crown of virtue. Eve’s transgression enabled all subsequent human beings to experience 
the temptation necessary for them to become virtuous. Just as Eve became dearer to 
God in sinning than she was when she was sinless, all fallen human beings have the 
capacity to become dearer to God than their prelapsarian state would have allowed. Eve 
both defined and initiated this process. For Abelard, Eve has, in her failure of will, 
identified and exemplified the processes which are crucial to the understanding of virtue 
and how it can be attained. Her actions, though sinful, are crucially instructive to 
subsequent generations of the human race, because they highlight the fundamental 
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 Exposition trans. Cizewski, p. 113. ‘Sed fortassis requiris cur illud prohibuit in quo sciebat eos 
transgressuros et in quo nullum fieret peccatum si non precessisset preceptum? Quis non uideat quasi 
occasionem eum querere qua tale quid committerent, in quo transgressi punirentur, uel rei constituti 
dampnari mererentur? ...Quod si etiam obicias neminem hominum peccaturum, si illi primi homines non 
peccassent uel si preceptum obedientie nullum accepissent, nulla id ratione uel auctoritate roborari potest’, 
Expositio, 452 - 456. 
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process and apex of faith – salvation and redemption in Christ; virtue and the nobility of 
the struggle to obtain it. Rather than depicting Eve as wilful and destructively inconstant, 
Abelard constructs in the Expositio an argument about Eve which defines her actions in 
relation to virtue and eventual salvation.  
EVE AS THE REASON OF KNOWLEDGE: THE FALL OF EVE IN PETER 
LOMBARD’S SENTENTIAE 
 
Whereas Hugh described Eve simply as seeming weaker than Adam, Lombard states 
that Eve’s capacity for reason was inferior to that of Adam, asserting that the devil 
tempted the woman first because knew that ‘reason was less vigorous’ in her. 63 
However, he repeats the words of Hugh of St Victor almost verbatim in his assertion 
that Eve represents the part of human nature that is weakest and most susceptible to 
temptation.
64
 In both her literal role as protagonist in the narrative of the first sin, and 
her symbolic function as a representative of the soul’s reason, Eve is vital to the 
exploration of what it meant to sin and what it meant to be a sinner.  
This symbolic function is consistently emphasised throughout Lombard’s 
exegesis of Eve’s temptation and sin, and once again, the figure of Eve as the first 
sinner is associated with knowledge. Unlike Hugh, Lombard offers a clear explanation 
of Eve’s figurative purpose: Eve represents the reason of knowledge (ratio scientiae), 
whilst Adam represents the reason of wisdom (ratio sapientiae), and the devil represents 
sensuality.
65
 All these components exist and interact in the soul of every human being 
irrespective of their physical gender: ‘the woman, the man and the serpent are in us’, 
                                                          
63
   Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 92. ‘Unde et mulierem tentauit, in qua minus quam in uiro rationem 
uigere nouit’, Sententiae, 2.21, ch. 1. 
64
  ‘Eius enim malitia, ad tentandam uirtutem timida, humanam naturam in ea parte ubi debilior uidebatur 
aggressa est, ut si forte illic aliquatenus praeualeret, postmodum fiducialius ad alteram, quae robustior fuit, 
pulsandam uel potius subuertendam accederet’, ibid., 2.21,1. 
65
 ‘Ut enim tunc serpens mulieri malum suasit ipsa que consensit, deinde uiro suo dedit, sic que 
consummatum est peccatum; ita et nunc in nobis pro serpente est sensualis motus animae, pro muliere 
inferior portio rationis, pro uiro superior rationis portio’, ibid., 2.24, 7 - 9. Lombard acknowledges his 
debt to Augustine’s De trinitate for this model, 2.24, 5. 
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Lombard confirms.
66
 He describes sensuality (that is, the ‘devil’ component) as a ‘lower 
power of the soul, from which comes a motion which is directed to the senses of the 
body and to the appetites for things that pertain to the body’.67 Reason, however, is ‘a 
higher part of the soul’, which is itself subdivided into a higher part and a lower part. 
The higher part (the ‘Adam’ component) is the reason of wisdom, which governs ‘the 
contemplation and observance of the highest things’. The lower part (the ‘Eve’ 
component) is the reason of knowledge, which ‘looks after the disposition of temporal 
things’.68 
Within this tripartite model of the soul, Eve thus occupies a crucial position. 
Whilst her position is inferior to that occupied by Adam, she represents the portion of 
the soul which is responsible for either consenting to, or rejecting, the lure of sensuality 
which incites the soul to sin. Like Guibert of Nogent, Lombard compares the 
relationship between the soul’s ‘Adam’ and ‘Eve’ components to the marriage of Adam 
and Eve themselves. Ideally, the higher and lower portions of reason ought to co-exist 
harmoniously, and despite their different statuses within the soul’s hierarchy, ‘the man 
and the woman in us’ should interact according to the ‘natural contract’ that exists 
between them.
69
 
However, it is possible for the temptations proffered by sensuality to intervene 
and compromise the stability of this union. In the case of the first sin, Lombard writes, 
Eve was faced with three different kinds of external temptation; that is, temptations 
proffered by an external agency rather than by the mind of the potential sinner 
                                                          
66
   Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 111. ‘In nobis est mulier et uir et serpens’, Sententiae 2.24, 7. 
67
  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 109. ‘Est enim sensualitas quaedam uis animae inferior, ex qua est 
motus qui intenditur in corporis sensus, atque appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium’, Sententiae 2.24, 4. 
68
  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 109. Sententiae 2.24, 4-5 and 9. 
69
  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 111. ‘Viri et mulieris in nobis... Atque inter hunc uirum et hanc 
mulierem est uelut quoddam spirituale coniugium naturalis que contractus’, Sententiae 2. 24, 8. 
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himself.
70
 Lombard categorises these temptations as follows. Firstly, there was the 
temptation of gluttony, which impelled Eve to eat the fruit for the sensual pleasure it 
might afford. Secondly, there was the temptation of vainglory, enticing Eve with the 
promise that she and Adam might be ‘as gods’. Thirdly, there was avarice, which took 
the form of greed for knowledge and power.
71
 Eve was unable to resist the lure of this 
threefold temptation and, compelled by the pride and greed which the devil’s 
suggestions drew from her, she consented to perform the act she knew to be sinful.
72
 
It is precisely this process, Lombard writes, that takes place in the soul of every 
human being who experiences temptation and consents to sin. ‘The order of sinning or 
falling’, he explains, ‘is the same in us… the order and progression of temptation is the 
same now in a single human person as it was then in our first parents’. 73  Eve’s 
transgression, and the internal discourse which precipitated it, are re-enacted within the 
soul of every subsequent sinner. Consequently, Eve is a formative and crucially 
instructive figure in terms of the way in which human nature operates, and in terms of 
the doctrinal intricacies which accompany the endeavour of elucidating the process of 
temptation and sin. The process of sin begins when the soul’s sensuality identifies a 
source of temptation and brings it to the attention of the soul’s ‘Eve’ component (ratio 
scientiae): 
For just as there the serpent persuaded the woman, and the woman 
persuaded the man, similarly in us, when the sensual motion has 
perceived the attraction of sin, it suggests it, like the serpent to the 
woman, namely to the lower part of our reason, that is, to the reason of 
knowledge.
74
  
 
                                                          
70
   Sententiae, 2.21, 5 – 6. 
71
   Ibid., 2.21, 5. 
72
   Ibid., 2.22, 1. 
73
  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 110. ‘Talis est ordo peccandi uel cadendi in nobis, qualis in primis 
hominibus… nunc in uno homine tentationis est ordo et progressio, qualis tunc in primis praecessit 
parentibus’, Sententiae 2. 24, 6. 
74
  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 112. ‘Ut enim ibi serpens suasit mulieri, et mulier uiro, ita et in 
nobis sensualis motus, cum illecebram peccati conceperit, quasi serpens suggerit mulieri, scilicet inferiori 
parti rationis, id est rationi scientiae’, Sententiae 2.24, 9. 
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The point at which the ‘Eve’ component of the soul consents to capitulate to the 
proffered temptation is the point at which a sin is committed - ‘if the latter [that is, the 
reason of knowledge] consents to the attraction, the woman eats the forbidden fruit’.75 
At this point, no external act has occurred as result of capitulating to temptation, but the 
consent of the ‘Eve’ component still constitutes a sin, even if no physical deed 
accompanies it: the sin is ‘confined only to the pleasure of thought, without the will of 
fulfilling [the desire]’, but it remains a sin nonetheless.  
In the case of Eve in the Genesis narrative however, Eve not only consented to 
the serpent’s enticements, but persuaded Adam to do likewise. In terms of the action of 
the tempted soul, the point at which Eve tempts Adam to sin represents the point at 
which the ratio scientiae overrides the ratio sapientiae, persuading this higher part of 
reason to capitulate to temptation alongside it. This is the point at which the sin can be 
classified as a mortal sin: 
Afterwards, she gives of the same to the man, when [the lower part] 
suggests the same attraction to the higher part of our reason, that is, to 
the reason of wisdom; if the latter consents, then the man also tastes the 
forbidden fruit together with the woman… If there is present a full will 
to fulfil the desire, so that, if the occasion rises, the deed is done, then the 
man also eats, because the higher part of our reason consented to the 
attraction; and then it is a grave and damnable sin.
76
 
 
Even if the concomitant deed itself is not ultimately carried out, having both parts of the 
soul’s reason unanimously consent to perform it means that a mortal sin has been 
committed. Hence like Abelard, Lombard defines sin in terms of intention and interior 
consent to temptation, regardless of whether or not any external action accompanies it. 
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  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 112. ‘Quae si consenserit illecebrae, mulier edit cibum uetitum’, 
Sententiae 2.24, 9. 
76
  Sentences Book 2 trans. Silano, p. 112. ‘Post de eodem dat uiro, cum superiori parti rationis, id est 
rationi sapientiae, eandem illecebram suggerit; quae si consentit, tunc uir etiam cum femina cibum 
uetitum gustat… Si uero adsit plena uoluntas perficiendi, ut si adsit facultas, ad effectum perducatur, uir 
quoque manducat, quia superior pars rationis illecebrae consensit; et tunc est damnabile et graue 
peccatum’, Sententiae 2.24, 9. 
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Thus it is possible to see the way in which Lombard employs Eve in order to 
elucidate his conception of sin as a fundamentally interior phenomenon, and as process 
rather than a single act. The figure of Eve occupies a crucial role within this process, in 
both narrative of the first sin, and the symbolic re-enactment of this narrative in the soul 
of every subsequent sinner. In both cases it is Eve who defines sin and Eve alone who 
has the moral agency necessary to decide whether or not an act of sin is committed.  
 
‘SUNT MES OIL TANT CLER VEANT’: EVE AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE MYSTÈRE 
D’ADAM 
 
The Anglo-Norman Eve has been described in modern scholarship as a character 
distinguished by ‘wilful credulity’ and ‘unreflectingly sinful curiosity’.77 However, the 
Adam poet’s representation of Eve is neither as simplistic nor as disparaging as such 
criticism suggests, and more recent work has commented on the centrality of Eve’s role 
in elucidating the text’s conception of knowledge and experience, and the poet’s use of 
the etymological correspondences between the verbs ‘saver’ (‘to know’) and ‘savor’ (‘to 
taste). 78  This theme becomes more apparent when the play is situated alongside 
contemporary theological accounts of the fall: as Lynette Muir asserts, the Adam play is 
the work of a writer ‘seeking to expound a difficult problem of moral theology… rather 
than merely to dramatise the Bible’.79 The process of Eve’s transgression forms a site of 
conflict between different definitions of knowledge in the play, dramatising the 
epistemological divergence between understanding and experience that was raised by 
                                                          
77
  Rosemary Woolf, ‘The Fall of Man in Genesis B and the Mystère d’Adam’, Art and Doctrine: Essays 
on Medieval Literature, ed. Heather O’Donoghue (London: Hambledon Press, 1986) pp. 15 – 28, see  p. 
24; Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 147. 
78
  In particular, Michele Warren, ‘The Flavour of Sin in the Ordo representacionis Ade’, Neophilologus 
86 (2002), pp. 179 – 195; also Joseph A. Dane, ‘Clerical Propaganda in the Anglo-Norman 
Representacione Ade’, Philological Quarterly 62.2 (1983), pp. 241 – 52; p. 246; Lynette R. Muir, Liturgy 
and Drama in the Anglo-Norman Jeu d’Adam, Medium Aevum Monographs New Series III (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1973) p. 70. 
79
  Ibid., p. 22. 
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the arguments about the advantages of the first sin that were discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter. Read in this context, the Anglo-Norman Eve emerges not as a 
credulous victim of diabolic casuistry, but as a conscious and instructive performer in 
the moral action which comprises the process of sin.  
In a considerable departure from the tenor of the scriptural account of the 
temptation scene, and also from the representations of the tempted Eve found in the 
other texts with which this thesis is concerned, the Anglo-Norman Eve is fully aware of 
the devil’s duplicity and of his treacherous intentions in trying to persuade her to eat the 
fruit.80 The knowledge that Eve possesses is made clear in the exchange conducted 
between her and Adam after her initial encounter with the devil: 
ADAM: 
 
EVE: 
ADAM: 
 
EVE: 
Do not believe the traitor 
He is duplicitous 
I know it well 
How do you know? 
…He’ll make you change your mind 
He will not, because I wouldn’t believe 
anything that I hadn’t put to the test.81 
 
Eve thus clearly states that she knows the devil to be treacherous, and that his words are 
not capable of altering her ideas. She asserts that she will not believe anything that she 
had not tried or experienced, and whilst she is aware of what both God and the devil 
have told her about the fruit, she possesses no evidence or direct experience of its 
capacities. The words of Satan will not change her mind because they are 
epistemologically inadequate in comparison with her own potential experience of both 
consuming the fruit itself, and of the knowledge it supposedly confers.  
It is on account of this exchange that Auerbach describes Eve here as displaying 
                                                          
80
 An additional departure from the scriptural account is that Satan approaches Adam first, only 
approaching Eve after Adam has turned him away. Woolf discusses the connections in this regard with 
Genesis B, ‘The Fall of Man’, pp. 15 – 17. 
81
 ‘A: Il est traitre E: Bien le sai... A: Il te ferra changer saver / E: Nel fera pas, car nel crerai / de nule rien 
tant que l’asai’, Mystère ed. Sletsjöe, 279 – 85.  
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‘a naïve, childishly hardy and unreflectingly sinful curiosity’.82 However, Auerbach’s 
distribution of the lines to Adam and Eve in this duologue is incorrect, and this 
compromises the validity of his argument significantly. Insisting that most editions of 
the text attribute the lines in way that is ‘impossible’, Auerbach claims that line 280 is 
Adam’s in its entirety, and that it is Eve who asks the question ‘How do you know?’ (‘E 
tu coment?’).83 This question, he writes is ‘the sort of question which has been asked a 
thousand times by naïve and impetuous people who are governed by their instincts’, and 
it demonstrates that Eve has ‘failed to grasp the ethical problem’ presented by the 
apple.84 Faced with Adam’s supposed assertions of understanding (‘Bien le sai’), Eve 
‘feels she cannot cope with his clear and reasonable and manly will’, because of ‘her 
lack of any innate moral sense’.85 
However, according to the single extant manuscript witness, Auerbach’s 
distribution of these lines is erroneous – the manuscript clearly labels ‘Bien le sai’ as 
Eve’s line, and ‘E tu coment?’ as Adam’s.86 When the scene is read with the lines 
distributed as they are in the manuscript, Auerbach’s claims are rendered doubtful, as is 
Woolf’s insistence that Eve listens to the devil ‘with a wilful credulity springing from 
nascent pride’.87  
In addition to contradicting the distribution of lines in the manuscript, 
Auerbach’s reading of this exchange overlooks the significance of Eve’s role in the 
poet’s dramatisation of the action of sin. The Anglo-Norman Eve is used both to 
highlight and to exemplify an epistemological lacuna which is far more complex than a 
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   Auerbach, Mimesis, p. 147. 
83
   Ibid., pp. 147 – 48.  
84
   Ibid., p. 147. 
85
   Ibid., pp. 149 – 50. 
86
  See Appendix. Auerbach’s argument regarding these lines has received particular criticism from Muir, 
who argues strongly in favour of following the attribution of lines as it exists in the manuscript. She 
writes that ‘It is always dangerous to argue that what an author has apparently written must be contrary to 
what he meant, and although it is possible that the copyist of Adam has erred in his attribution, the onus of 
proof should be on the critic’, Liturgy and Drama, p. 68. 
87
   Rosemary Woolf, ‘The Fall of Man’, p. 24. 
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straightforward dichotomy between physical desire and spiritual rectitude; namely, the 
gulf between theoretical understanding, represented by Adam, and the need for an 
experiential basis with which to substantiate this understanding. Eve’s statement that 
she will not believe anything she has not put to the test sets the tone for the rest of the 
scene, in which Eve tempts Adam not with erotic enticements, but with the prospect of 
greater knowledge. His curiosity aroused, Adam asks if the fruit can really be so good.88 
Eve responds that he will never know unless he tastes it, and assures his consent by 
continuing to lure him with the prospect of sharing her direct experience with that of 
which he possesses only an abstract understanding: 
 
ADAM: 
EVE: 
 
 
ADAM: 
EVE: 
 
ADAM: 
EVE: 
 
 
ADAM: 
 
Is it that good? 
Eat it. You cannot know without trying it… 
Eat it and you will know both good and evil. 
I will eat it first. 
And I afterwards. 
Certainly… 
[Eats fruit] Of such flavour is this fruit! 
Of what flavour? 
Of such that mankind has never tasted. 
My eyes are open and see clearly… 
Eat, Adam… 
I will believe you…89 
Eve’s persuasion of Adam is thus not so much a seduction as a challenge from a 
different kind of knowledge; one that depends on experience rather than belief. Eve 
presents a distinct and conscious challenge to Adam’s purely abstract knowledge, 
encapsulated in Eve’s assertions that it is impossible to know something without having 
put it to the test. As Michele Warren has observed, the Anglo-Norman Eve ‘is as 
interested in knowledge as she is in flavour… [the text] draws attention to her 
                                                          
88
   Ibid., 294. 
89
  ‘A: Est il tant bon / E: Tu le saveras nel poez saver sin gusteras… Maniue ten par co saveras e mal e 
bien / Jo en manierai premirement / A : Et io apres / E : Seurement… Ditel savor est ceste pome / A : De 
quel / E : Ditel nen gusta home / Or sunt mes oil tant cler veant… Maniue Adam… A : Jo ten crerra’, 
ibid., 294 – 312.  
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individual experience, affirming an autonomy that defies her union with Adam’.90 As 
Guibert of Nogent and Peter Lombard employ the union of Adam and Eve as an analogy 
for the relationship between the components of the soul, with sin the result of disruption 
to the harmonious ‘wedlock’ of these components, the Adam poet literally and 
figuratively re-enacts this conception of the process of sin. Whilst the Anglo-Norman 
Adam and Eve recount the process of the original sin, they simultaneously rehearse the 
discourse which occurs within the tempted soul.  
‘MULIER DUBITAVIT, DIABOLUS NEGAVIT’: EVE AS DOUBT AND DISORDER 
De sacramentis and Scivias, despite their ostensible disparity, in fact have numerous 
common features which have only rarely been recognised in modern scholarship.
91
 The 
mutual points of contact between these two texts are particularly apparent in the way 
they represent the temptation and fall of Eve. For Abelard, Guibert, Lombard and the 
Adam poet, the figure of Eve is representative of universal human impulses and 
qualities. However, whilst Eve remains crucial to their examinations of the process of 
sin, and her failings are human, rather than female, failings, Hugh and Hildegard place 
more distance between the figure of Eve and the individual tempted soul as it is 
experienced by her fallen descendants. They employ the fall narrative as a means by 
which to explore temptation and sin, but they do not explicitly posit Eve as an 
identifiable aspect of human of the soul.
92
 As in the other texts discussed above, Hugh 
and Hildegard represent Eve as a means by which to elucidate temptation as a contested 
                                                          
90
  Warren, ‘The Flavour of Sin’, pp. 183 – 84. 
91
  An exception can be found in Barbara Newman, whose introduction to the Bishop and Hart translation 
of Scivias discusses the similarities between it and De sacramentis, and includes a table of contents for 
the latter in order to highlight the thematic and structural correspondences that the texts share; Scivias 
trans. Bishop and Hart, pp. 23 – 25. 
92
  In addition, the tripartite conception of the human being as a composite of soul, body and senses 
demonstrates some further similarities between the two texts; cf. ‘Porro tres sunt motus in homine, motus 
mentis, motus corporis, motus sensualitas’, De sacramentis, 1.6, 4 and ‘Homo autem tres semitas in se 
habet. Quid est hoc? Animam, corpus et sensus’, Scivias, 1.4, 609 – 10. 
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but ultimately instructive space between capitulation and resistance to sin. For Abelard 
in particular, this space provided the site of spiritually fruitful struggle with temptation. 
However, for Hugh, the tempted soul is a locus of doubt which signals divergence from 
the will of God; whilst for Hildegard, Eve’s intermediate position represents an 
unsuccessfully defended boundary between disorderly fragmentation and harmonious 
prelapsarian integrity.   
Taking the opportunity for some uncharacteristic wordplay on ‘vidit’ and 
‘invidit’, Hugh writes that the devil became jealous when he saw Eve and Adam in 
paradise, because mankind had the opportunity to ascend through obedience where he 
himself had fallen through pride.
93
 These parallels of pride, humility, ascent and decline 
are echoed in Hildegard’s account of the fall. She also describes the devil’s jealousy on 
seeing mankind reigning childishly innocent in paradise, and describes his desire both to 
vanquish them as rivals in the order of creation, and to perfect in others the malice he 
contained within himself.
94
 The devil’s desire for malice perfected in innocence 
prefigures the reversal of this process via redemption in Christ, who represents strength 
perfected in weakness.
95
 As was discussed above, these writers place considerable 
emphasis on the spiritual and epistemological benefits of sin. However, in Hugh and 
Hildegard’s representations of Eve there remains a tangible sense of misplaced nostalgia 
for the unattainable and inviolate innocence of the prelapsarian state which is more 
difficult to identify in the other texts discussed here.  
Both describe the devil’s approach to Eve as being motivated by his realisation 
that Eve was weaker than Adam. Hugh writes that Eve represented ‘the part of human 
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 ‘Vidit diabolus et invidit quod homo per obedientiam illuc ascenderet unde ipse per superbiam 
corruisset’, De sacramentis, 1.7, 1. 
94
  ‘Quia cum diabolus hominem in paradiso vidit, cum magna indignatione exclamavit, dicens: “O quis 
assequetur me in mansione verae beatitudinis?” Et ita in semetipso sciebat quod malitiam suam quam in 
se habuit nondum in alia creatura compleverat, sed Adam et Evam puerili innocentia in horto deliciarum 
degere videns, cum magno astu extulit se ad eos decipiendum per serpentem’, Scivias. 1.2, 212 - 15 
95
   ‘Sufficit tibi gratia mea nam virtus in infirmitate perficitur’, 2 Corinthians 12.9. 
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nature where it appears weakest’, and the devil thus saw that if he could prevail upon 
Eve, he might approach ‘with greater courage the other part [of human nature], which 
was stronger’, that is, Adam. Likewise, Hildegard attributes the devil’s approach to 
Eve’s more malleable and trusting nature rather than inferiority per se, stating that he 
knew Eve’s ‘softness’ to be more easily conquerable than Adam’s strength.96  More 
importantly, in both texts, the process of sin is rooted in the asking of questions and the 
presence of doubt. Hildegard writes that the devil persuaded Eve into revealing the 
nature of the forbidden tree and the commandment which prohibited it through his test 
of cunning questioning (‘secundum probationem dolosae interrogationis’), and 
discerning the truth according to the answers she gave (‘secundum responsa eorum 
adinuenit’).97 
Hugh writes that the devil had to begin by questioning Eve partially as a result 
of his cowardice in her presence, and partially because he needed to question her in 
order to test her susceptibility to temptation.
98
 However, whilst Hildegard maintains that 
Eve’s soul was innocent at this point, Hugh suggests that Eve had already begun to 
doubt.
99
 This extant doubt was what gave the devil the ability to tempt Eve, because in 
beginning to doubt, she had already begun to move away from God: 
However, the devil would certainly not have presumed to deny the words 
of God in the presence of the woman, if he had not discovered the 
woman herself to be in doubt. She who doubted therefore moved away 
from he who affirmed and approached he who denied.
100
 
 
                                                          
96
  ‘Quia sciebat mulieris mollitiem facilius vincendam quam viri fortitudinem’, Scivias, 1.2, 236. 
97
  Scivias, 1.2, 226-7. 
98
  ‘Non audet exire in verba persuasionis donec animum temptande interrogatione presenciat’, De 
sacramentis, 1.7, 4. 
99
  ‘Evam innocentem animum habentem’, Scivias, 1.2, 228. ‘Ipsam igitur secundum aliquid invocavit 
malitiam que temptatori inique persuasionis dedit audaciam’, De sacramentis, 1.7, 4. 
100
 ‘Deus affirmavit, mulier dubitavit, diabolus negavit. Nequaquam autem diabolus coram muliere verba 
dei presumpsisset negare si non prius ipsam mulieram dubitantem invenisset. Que ergo dubitavit ab 
affirmavit recessit et neganti appropinquavit’, ibid., 1.7, 4. 
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Hugh categorises the devil’s incitement to sin as a threefold temptation involving the 
promise of the fruit itself, the prospect of being ‘as gods’, and increased knowledge of 
good and evil.
101
 His conception of Eve’s desire for knowledge is particularly 
noteworthy. He characterises Eve as possessing a form of intellectual avarice consisting 
of an excessive appetite for having or possessing knowledge.
102
 Similarly, her genuine 
belief in the validity of the devil’s promises provides Hugh with the evidence he 
requires to demonstrate that her sin was greater than Adam’s.103 Whilst God had never 
prevented mankind from seeking knowledge of good and evil, Hugh continues, the 
inordinate level of desire for knowledge that Eve displayed was contrary to both human 
reason and human nature.
104
 Thus the figure of the fallen Eve is not characterised by 
lust, weakness or wilfulness, but by an intransigent desire for knowledge, and the 
capacity for doubt. Similarly, Hildegard refers to fallen human nature as being 
characterised simultaneously by desire for knowledge and an insufficiently rigorous 
grasp of the truth.
105
 
Hugh’s formulation ‘God affirmed, the woman doubted, the devil denied’ places 
Eve at the centre of the action of sin – caught between the divergent directions of virtue 
and vice, it is Eve who is responsible for disrupting the spiritual progress of mankind. 
This conception of Eve in media res in terms of the process of sin is rendered visually in 
Hildegard’s depiction of the fall in the illustration which accompanies the second vision 
                                                          
101
 ‘Humanam naturae in eam partem ubi debilior uidebatur aggressus est. Ut si forte illuc aliquatenus 
preualere potuisset postmodum cum maiori fiducia ad alteram que robustior fuit’, ibid., 1.7, 3. 
102
 ‘In persuasione igitur cibi hominem temptavit gula, in promissione deitatis et cognitionis vana gloria et 
avaricia. Immoderata namque concupiscientia edendi gula est. Desiderium autem inordinatum excellendi 
vana gloria nimius vero appetitus habendi vel possidendi avaricia’, ibid., 1.7, 6. 
103
 ‘Eva quippe seducta est. Quia uerum esse credidit quod diabolus dixit… Adam vero non est seductus 
quia quod diabolus promisit falsum esse sciebat… Vere ergo dictum est quia minus peccauit’, ibid., 1.7, 
10.   
104
 ‘Quia tamen inordinate hoc concupiscens contra rationem suam fecit quodammodo naturalis precepti 
prevaricator extitit’, ibid., 1.7, 7. 
105
 ‘Tu uero nescis quomodo creatus sis. Sed nunc, o homo, caelum et terram uis perscrutari et iustitiam 
eorum in constitutione Dei diiudicare et summa dignoscere, cum nec infima ualeas examinare’, Scivias 1. 
2, 711-12. 
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of Scivias. The image locates Eve between the serpent and Adam; a position analogous 
to her centrality within the fall narrative as the only thing standing between the ruinous 
blandishments of the devil and the harmony of prelapsarian existence. The serpent 
exhales the atramentous matter used to depict sin onto the cloud-shaped form of Eve: 
A pit of great depth and breadth appeared… from which a loathsome 
cloud spread out and touched a deceitful, vein-shaped form [the serpent]. 
And, in a region of brightness, it blew upon a white cloud [Eve] that had 
come forth from a beautiful human form [Adam] and contained within 
itself many and many stars, and so doing, cast both the white cloud and 
the human form from that region.
106
 
 
Rebecca Garber has claimed that Hildegard presents the serpent as ‘ejaculating’ 
the substance of sin onto Eve:  
The phallic nature of the snake was an established tradition…For several 
reasons, I would identify the substance [of sin] as semen. The snake 
appears as a phallic image, and the sin itself is identified… as a sexual 
act, as a seductionem[sic] serpentis, in which semen would play a part.
107
  
These are deeply questionable assertions. Garber provides no evidence of this 
‘established tradition’, and in any case, the notion that serpent is intended to appear 
phallic in this image is anatomically rather dubious. Also, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, the supposedly sexual nature of the first sin is principally a modern 
assumption, since it is widely agreed in commentaries on Genesis that procreation 
would necessarily occurred in paradise even if Adam and Eve had remained sinless. 
Moreover, there is simply nothing in the text to suggest that Hildegard envisaged the 
action of sin as analogous to ejaculation – the verb she uses is ‘afflare’ (‘to breathe’ or 
‘to exhale’). 
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  Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 73. ‘Et ecce lacus multae latitudinis et profunditatis apparuit… de 
quo etiam taeterrima nebula se extendens quasi uenam uisum deceptibilem habentem tetigit, et in quadam 
clara regione candidam nubem quae de quadam pulchra formam hominis plurimas plurimas que stellas in 
se continens exierat per eam afflauit ac illam eandem que formam hominis de eadem regione ita eiecit’, 
Scivias, I, 2, 55 – 64. 
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 Rebecca Garber, ‘Where is the Body? Images of Eve and Mary in the Scivias’ in Maud Burnett 
McInerney ed., Hildegard of Bingen: A Book of Essays, Garland Mediaeval Casebooks (London: 
Routledge, 1999) pp. 103 – 132; see pp. 113-14. 
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It is more likely that Hildegard’s depiction of the fall represents the serpent 
breathing the substance of sin onto Eve as a malevolent inversion of the process by 
which mankind was created; that is, when they were animated by the breath of God.
108
 
This reversal of the benevolent creative process by which mankind was given life is 
reflected in the sense of fragmentation and disorder that Hildegard describes as 
occurring as a result of Eve’s transgression. The hitherto harmonious concord between 
the elements of the cosmos was disrupted:   
And so all the elements of the world, which before had existed in great 
calm, were turned to the greatest agitation and displayed horrible terrors, 
because when Man chose disobedience, rebelling against God and 
forsaking tranquillity for disquiet, that Creation, which had been created 
for the service of humanity, turned against humans in great and various 
ways so that Man, having lowered himself, might be held in check by 
it.
109
 
The disorder that Eve inflicted on the fabric of the cosmos both forms and reflects the 
punishment that she herself receives as a result – the unblemished and intact fertility 
which characterises Eve before the fall, in the form of a star-filled cloud, cannot be 
fulfilled in the fragmented form of the fallen human body. 
CONCLUSION 
The texts discussed above demonstrate that the figure of Eve, and indeed commentary 
on Genesis itself, occupied a central position within debate about ethics, human nature 
and the action of sin. Eve also emerges as a means by which to approach the 
problematic issues surrounding the existence of evil, the existence of the human 
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 Genesis 2.7. 
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 Scivias trans. Bishop and Hart, p. 86. ‘Et ita omnia elementa mundi, quae prius in magna quiete 
constiterant, in maximam inquietudinem uersa horribiles terrores ostenderunt: quia creatura illa quae ad 
seruitutem hominis creata fuerat nec ullam aduersitatem in se senserat, homine inoboedientiam arripiente, 
ita quod Deo inoboediens fuit et ipsam tranquillitatem suam reliquit et inquietudinem suscepit, maximas 
et plurimas contrarietates hominibus inferens, quoniam homo se ipsum ad deteriora inclinauerat ut per 
illam coerceretur’, Scivias, I.2, 660 - 667. 
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capacity for sin, and the emergence and function of vice and temptation in a harmonious 
cosmos presided over by an ultimately benevolent creator. Far from providing a model 
of female iniquity, Eve is overwhelmingly employed as a representative of human 
nature, in both the literal and allegorical interpretations of the fall offered by the authors 
discussed. Thus, the texts discussed above present a challenge to the image of Eve as 
wayward temptress, fuelling and provoking a supposed ‘arsenal of misogynistic 
barbs’.110 Moreover, they reveal the extent to which the figure of Eve both stimulated 
and facilitated examination of the most challenging theological issues raised within the 
scriptural narratives of mankind’s creation and fall.  
The representations of Eve as the first sinner discussed above illuminate the 
ethical and theological frameworks in which they operate, both in terms of human 
action and disposition, and the wider cosmological and doctrinal context in which fallen 
mankind exists. In the first instance, there is an identifiable tendency to locate Eve in a 
central position between the incitement of temptation and the capitulation to sin, and 
she emerges as a crucially instructive case study of the process of transgression as it 
occurred for the first time, and as it occurs within every subsequent act of sin. Whether 
she provides a symbolic representation of the will, or a didactic exemplum, the figure of 
Eve is a powerful and enlightening representation of the tempted human soul. More 
broadly, Eve emerges as a vital tool for the justification and exploration of the 
paradoxical theodicy of these texts. The Genesis narrative demands that the exegete 
reconcile the notion of benevolent creator with the existence not only of iniquity, but 
with an inherent human capacity for sin. It is the figure of Eve who reconciles the 
tension between these ostensibly conflicting views, by demonstrating the incongruous 
advantages of sin and the formative benefits of the struggle against temptation.
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CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have endeavoured to demonstrate the centrality of 
the figure of Eve within twelfth-century responses to the creation and fall, and the 
concomitant utility of examining responses to Eve as a means by which to illuminate 
some of the prominent intellectual concerns of this period. The texts discussed 
demonstrate that treatments of Eve provided a crucial and informative component of 
responses to the most challenging issues raised by the narratives of mankind’s creation 
and fall. These issues include the physical composition of mankind and the created 
world, the purpose of mankind’s having been created in paradise, the existence and 
emergence of sin, the action of the tempted soul, and the development of human nature 
from prelapsarian ideal to fallen reality. Amid the twelfth century’s flourishing 
intellectual activity, exegesis of the hexaemeron provided both a vehicle and an impetus 
for submitting the enigmas of the creation and fall to systematic analysis. Thanks to 
Eve’s centrality within the debates surrounding these issues, the representations of Eve 
that these texts construct offer a valuable and previously neglected source of insight into 
the cultural and intellectual history of the twelfth century. 
The prevalent image of Eve as a credulous victim of the devil, or as an 
iniquitous temptress seductively proffering forbidden fruit, does not correspond with 
that constructed in the treatments of Genesis 1 - 3 with which this thesis is concerned. 
Rather, the various representations discussed throughout this thesis collectively 
construct a multifaceted, complex and revealing image of the twelfth-century figure of 
Eve. Eve is seen to embody, and is used to represent, not only the consequences of 
fallen knowledge and awareness, but also the perfection of prelapsarian innocence. Eve 
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embodies virtue as well as sin, compunction as well as pride, and she epitomises 
mankind as fallen and inherently sinful beings who are nonetheless indelibly and 
perpetually distinguished by the image of the creator. In short, the twelfth-century figure 
of Eve is a reflection and conceptual repository of twelfth-century ideas about human 
nature. 
For the corpus of twelfth-century commentaries on the creation and fall 
discussed above, Eve is a fundamentally formative and instructive figure. Eve’s part in 
the events of Genesis 1 -3 is viewed as one to be examined rather than condemned, 
because doing so offers the opportunity to comprehend more fully the nature of 
mankind and its world.  It is of course difficult to deny that it often falls to Eve and the 
female to represent the negative elements of human nature; equally, it difficult to deny 
that anyone looking for evidence of incipient feminism within responses to Genesis will 
likely be disappointed. However, Eve as she is depicted in these texts ultimately 
represents and embodies the faults of mankind in general rather than those of women 
specifically.  
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND ARGUMENTS 
This study began by looking at Abelard’s assertion that Eve’s sin made her dearer to 
God than many thousands of sinless men. It has endeavoured to demonstrate that this 
ostensibly remarkable claim is not an isolated or atypical occurrence, but one that forms 
part of a prevalent twelfth-century propensity to elucidate, rather than vilify, the 
transgressive actions of Eve, and the consequences they incurred for mankind as a 
whole. Abelard’s unequivocal praise of Eve’s sin does not wholly exemplify the tenor 
and mentality of twelfth-century responses to the first act of sin, but he is not alone in 
presenting a case for the benefits as well as the punishment that this sin bought about.  
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However, the depictions of Eve discussed above go substantially beyond mere 
vindication. Throughout their discussions of subjects ranging from atomic structure to 
the concept of the felix culpa, Eve emerges as a crucially informative and instructive 
figure. Representations of Eve as the first woman reveal the extent to which she was 
considered a peer and equivalent to Adam rather than feminine subordinate to be 
subjected to his superior authority. The three most prominent authors discussed here, 
namely Abelard, Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard, argue that the very process of 
Eve’s creation was demonstrated the parity she was intended to share with Adam. Her 
creation from his rib, they suggest, functioned as a demonstration directly from God that 
Eve was neither an inferior, as would have been the case had God elected to create her 
from Adam’s feet, nor a superior, as would have been the case had she been formed 
from Adam’s head.1 Instead she was taken from Adam’s side in order to signify that she 
was ‘neither a slave nor a mistress but a partner’; a phrase which finds a vernacular 
equivalent in the Anglo-Norman God’s declaration that Eve ‘is your wife and your 
equivalent’. 2  Whilst offering a less emphatic avowal of Eve’s parity with Adam, 
Hildegard’s interpretation of Eve’s creation as being facilitated by a process akin to the 
propagation of new plants through grafting emphasised her compositional homogenity 
with Adam. With the exceptions of Abelard and Guibert of Nogent, these writers also 
agreed that Eve was created in both the image and likeness of God. Despite there being 
a trend in some modern scholarship of arguing that twelfth-century theologians denied 
Eve the privilege of bearing the imago Dei, Abelard and Guibert are in fact exceptional 
cases here, and ones which have been misrepresented.  
An image thus emerges of the twelfth-century figure of Eve as an esteemed 
partner in the privileges of prelapsarian existence and the qualities which distinguished 
                                                          
1
  Abelard, Expositio, 454; Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis, 1.6, 35; Peter Lombard, Sententiae, 2.18, 2. 
2
  ‘Nec ancilla nec domain sed socia’, De sacramentis, 1.6, 35; ‘Ce est ta femme e tun pareil’, Mystère ed. 
Sletsjöe, 10. 
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mankind as the apex of terrestrial creation. However, unlike Adam, Eve is also 
employed to explain and interpret this plane of creation and its disposition and 
construction. It is the creation of Eve specifically which motivates and ratifies some of 
the most striking discussions which comprise the hexaemeral components of the texts 
discussed here, prompting Hugh of St Victor to present a discourse on the fundamental 
fabric of the universe, and Peter Lombard to identify the disparity between the world 
depicted in scripture and that manifested in observable physical phenomena. More 
generally, with the exception of Guibert’s exclusively allegorical interpretation of the 
hexaemeral narrative, Eve lies at the heart of what can be seen as an increasingly 
developed and revealing engagement with the hexaemeron as a means by which to 
scrutinise and comprehend the physical elements of the created world. Ratified by 
repeated reference to the idea expressed in Romans 1.20 that the invisible and eternal 
can be clarified via the visible and temporal, these texts present Eve as an essential 
element of, and tool for comprehending, an intelligible universe with mankind at its 
centre.3 
Representations of Eve as the first wife and mother suggest that the twelfth 
century’s reputation for hostility toward marriage, procreation and female fertility is 
something which needs to be questioned, as is the idea that the first sin comprised illicit 
sexual activity. Rather, following the ideas of Augustine, the authors here discussed 
were in agreement that procreation would necessarily have taken place sinlessly in 
paradise, even had mankind had not sinned. Before the fall, mankind was unable to 
experience lust, and thus no sin would have been committed. After the fall, mankind, as 
part of their punishment, was condemned to experience lust and various other forms of 
concupiscence, but whilst original sin was subsequently transmitted via the act of 
                                                          
3
    ‘Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur’, Romans 1.20.  
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procreation, the first act of sin itself consisted in disobedience rather than lust.  
In addition, there is little to suggest that the Pauline conception of marriage (‘it 
is better to marry than to burn’) was one widely favoured in this period.4  Rather, 
marriage was praised as a sacrament; a gift bestowed by God in order to assist and 
improve humanity. Alone of all the sacraments, it was deemed to have been established 
before the fall on account of Genesis 2.24.5 Consequently, despite the expectation that 
Eve might function as an exemplar of the perils of matrimony and iniquitous uxorial 
conduct, Eve necessarily operates as a positive and definitive exemplary wife, because 
the sacrament of marriage depends on its scriptural ratification in Genesis 2. However, 
was is also necessary to reconcile this faultless prelapsarian union with the fallen human 
state for which Eve is responsible, which complicates arguments which present Eve as 
an equal participant in the order of creation. 
As the ‘first’ wife, Eve provides a problematic connection between prelapsarian 
ideal and fallen reality. This can also be said of her status as “mother of all the living”, 
which is inextricably connected to the punishment which condemns her to fulfil this role 
in sorrow and in servitude. Modern scholars have, in response to this, frequently seen 
the twelfth-century’s conception of women as one reliant on the parallel between Eve 
and the Virgin Mary. However, both the utility and dissemination of this parallel have 
been somewhat overstated. Whilst the ‘New Eve’ idea had some currency in Patristic 
writing, and the ‘Ave/Eva’ formulation occurs as a linguistic felicity in the twelfth 
century, the Eve/Mary parallel does not appear to have provided a substantial 
theological purpose. It is difficult to find consistent or substantial evidence, in the texts 
with which this thesis is concerned or in twelfth-century writing more widely, that the 
Eve/Mary parallel was employed in order to impose an inflexibly dichotomous sense of 
                                                          
4
  ‘Melius est enim nubere quam uri’, 1 Corinthians 7.9. 
5
  ‘Quam ob rem relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adherebit uxori suae et erunt duo in carne 
una’, Genesis 2.24. 
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female identity and purpose. Even in terms of typological affinity, Eve is compared to 
the Church rather than to Mary in the texts discussed here. Hildegard presents 
something of an exception in this regard, since she does compare Eve with Mary. 
However, she does so by comparing Mary with the sinless prelapsarian Eve, not by 
contrasting her with the mother of fallen mankind, and thus it is Eve herself rather than 
Mary who provides the unattainable ideal.  
Representations of Eve as the first sinner complete the picture of Eve as a means 
by which the twelfth century’s scholars approached and elucidated some of the most 
challenging aspects of the fall narrative. In the works this thesis has discussed there is a 
consistent level of emphasis on, and consensus about, the advantages of Eve’s sin as 
well as its grave consequences. In disobeying God, Eve condemned mankind to 
mortality and expulsion from paradise. However, her sin also enabled mankind to 
understand comprehensively, and appreciate more fully, the nature of disobedience and 
divergence from the will of God; things of which sinless mankind had only an 
incomplete and abstract comprehension. Eve’s sin also bought about the necessity for 
redemption in Christ; a privilege and expression of divine benevolence of which 
mankind would otherwise not have known. 
The arguments about the advantages of Eve’s sin go beyond the notion of the 
felix culpa. In fostering the emergence of sin, Eve also fostered the human capacity for 
virtue. Had Eve not disobeyed, mankind would have remained merely sinless; a state 
less laudable than being actively virtuous, since virtue and good moral action are 
impossible without the experience of genuine temptation and without the ability to sin. 
As Peter Lombard says, avoiding temptation might ensure that no sin is committed, but 
it does not in itself bring about the crown of virtue or moral victory.6 This is why 
                                                          
6
  Sententiae, 1.23, 1. 
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Abelard describes Eve as being dearer to God than many thousands of sinless men, 
since by ensuring that mankind has the ability to sin, subsequent battles with temptation 
are spiritually and morally beneficial. By paradoxically emphasising that her weakness 
was a prerequisite of the privileges of redemption, Abelard succeeds in untangling an 
ostensibly irreconcilable contradiction. Out of this he constructs an account of the 
creation and fall which allows him to assert that Eve was created less strong and less 
wise, yet simultaneously privileged within the order of creation, and dearer to God than 
many sinless men. In this vindicating formulation, the faults which condemn Eve are 
also the merits which bring about salvation. Abelard is the only author who goes so far 
as to praise Eve for her actions, but even Hildegard of Bingen, whose Scivias is perhaps 
of all the texts discussed here the one that is most concerned with lamenting the loss of 
prelapsarian order and harmony, writes that on account of Eve’s sin, ‘mankind now 
shines brighter in heaven than before’.7   
Eve is also employed as a means of examining and explaining the action of 
temptation within the human soul.  Hence Eve is employed either as a model of the 
tempted soul, or as an allegorical representation of the part of the soul which is 
responsible for either resisting or capitulating to temptation. Following the punishment 
and expulsion of mankind from Eden, there is in the texts discussed here a sense that 
Eve’s first sin was re-enacted in the soul of every subsequent human soul which 
experienced temptation.  It is Eve rather than Adam who represents the human potential 
for both sin and virtue, and it is Eve’s sin rather than Adam’s which informs some of the 
most significant ethical discourse of this period. 
 
THE FIGURE OF EVE AND TWELFTH-CENTURY THOUGHT 
                                                          
7
  ‘Homo nunc clarior fulget quam prius in caelo’, Scivias, 1.2, 719. 
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The representations of Eve discussed above reveal a profound concern for and interest 
in the nature of mankind, and a fundamental preoccupation with explaining why 
mankind is as it is. A significant component of this concern with the reasons for the 
ways in which human beings perceive and act consists in the comparison between 
mankind’s observable fallen state and the ideal but ultimately unknowable nature of 
mankind before the fall. The texts discussed above also reveal a remarkably stable and 
consistent conception of mankind’s place and purpose on earth and their function within 
the cosmos as a whole. Whilst Eve’s sin was an act which resulted in destruction and 
punishment, there is a sense in which the fall was not considered to have fundamentally 
changed mankind’s ontological trajectory: divine love was still considered to be both 
the cause and objective of humanity’s creation. Rather, the fall might be seen as having 
reinforced the significance of this trajectory, even whilst the consequences of sin made 
it more difficult to follow. Fallen mankind might have been deemed flawed and 
condemned to experience mortality, concupiscence and inherent predisposition to sin. 
However, this made humankind’s ultimate purpose more difficult to attain, rather than 
bringing about any fundamental change to that purpose itself.  
Examinations of Eve’s creation from the rib in particular reveal a substantial 
degree of interest in analysing what was external to mankind, just as examinations of 
Eve’s sin reveal an interest in interior human machinations and perceptions. These two 
concerns are closely connected. These texts testify to an outlook which deemed the 
physical components of creation to be inherently significant and revealing, rather than 
one which deemed terrestrial existence to be characterised only by contemptible worldly 
distractions. The interpretations of Eve’s creation bear witness to a conception of the 
created world as an intelligible system worthy of study in its own right. At no point is it 
suggested that human cognition alone is sufficient to comprehend fully the way in 
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which it operated, but at the same time, human attempts to do so are considered 
eminently worthwhile.  
Connected with this is the preoccupation with sin and human perfectibility that 
these texts also reveal. They demonstrate that sin and virtue were both conceived as 
interior processes rather than static states, and that studying the first act of sin 
committed by Eve was considered a means by which these processes might better be 
understood and, in the case of virtue, pursued. Representations of Eve as the first sinner 
bring to light the extent to which both sin and virtue were defined in the twelfth century 
by internal processes and intentions rather than by the external actions which they 
precipitated. As is demonstrated by the consistent emphasis on the validity and merit of 
battles with temptation, the human soul and its capacity to engender good moral action 
were conceived during this period as having the capacity to be refined and improved. 
This process of perfecting or refining was itself considered beneficial, and is related to 
the way in which representations of Eve also demonstrate the extent to which the first 
sin was deemed to have been beneficial as well as damaging. Whilst prelapsarian 
privilege was deemed irretrievably lost, it also becomes apparent fallen mankind was 
seen to have had a fuller understanding and a more concrete appreciation of the 
magnitude of divine benevolence, in addition to possessing the means to become 
virtuous as opposed to merely sinless. 
The inherent flaws of fallen mankind are, like the physical world in which they 
are played out, presented as ultimately knowable and observable. The first sin of Eve is 
conceived as an immediate and instructive reality, not only because of the transmission 
of original sin, but because the process involved in this first sin is subsequently re-
enacted in every human experience of temptation. Eve’s failure to resist temptation is 
something which must be confronted and analysed, since its consequences shaped the 
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nature of every one of her descendants: to examine the motivations and actions of Eve is 
to examine those of fallen human nature in general. The study of the actions of 
temptation and sin are thus vital in order that these processes might be sufficiently 
understood. On account of this, Eve is often presented as a ‘case study’ of the tempted 
soul whose actions demand analysis rather than, or at least alongside, repudiation.  
Moreover, these representations of Eve elucidate also a profound concern with 
examining basic human motivations and desires; a concern which both informs and 
explains the discernible level of emphasis on moral action in twelfth-century responses 
to Eve’s temptation and fall. This concern underpins the understanding of the events of 
the Genesis narrative as universally relevant and immediate: as Peter Lombard writes 
Eve is, in a sense, an identifiable part of the human psyche.8 
The texts discussed above devote considerable attention to questions which go 
unanswered in the Genesis narrative, and whilst this is a period which reveres extant 
authorities more than it values intellectual innovation, there emerges a distinct 
preoccupation with developing the events of Genesis 1 - 3 into a convincing and thus 
instructive account of human purpose and desire. Hence the extensive discussions of 
issues such as why would the devil have wanted Eve to sin, why would Eve have 
believed what the devil said, why did Eve want to take the fruit in the first place, and 
whether or not Satan’s serpentine disguise was convincing. Whilst the attempt to 
assemble a series of plausible responses to these questions might be seen as something 
particularly characteristic of the scholastic methodology employed in, say, Lombard’s 
Sententiae, the impulse to ask and answer such questions is perhaps most readily 
apparent in the conception of the Mystère d’Adam, which exemplifies the presentation 
of Eve as an identifiably human character. 
                                                          
8
  Sententiae, 2.24, 7. 
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This sort of questioning led also to discussion of issues that might be considered 
rather more potentially problematic, such as how it was possible to create a fully-formed 
human body from a mere rib, and why God created mankind with the capacity for sin if 
he knew that they would fail to resist temptation. Whilst theirs was not an intellectual 
environment known for its tolerance of divergent or heterodox thought, there is little in 
the texts discussed above to suggest that these authors feared to raise such questions. 
Hugh of St Victor and Peter Lombard both refer, for instance, to people who were 
sceptical about the methods of Eve’s creation, and Lombard appears to see no risk in his 
identification of the disparity between the scriptural account of Eve’s creation and the 
observable ‘course of nature’.9 Likewise, questions of the motivation of God for having 
allowed mankind to be tempted and to sin are raised and answered in all of the texts 
discussed above except Guibert’s Moralia. 
In addition to functioning as a model of human tendencies in general, Eve also 
functions as a symbol of the feminine, both in the literal sense of the female half of 
mankind, but also in a more abstract sense (for example, where she symbolises the 
‘feminine’ component of the soul). Representations of Eve as the abstract feminine 
demonstrate a flexible conception of the categories of masculine and feminine as 
concepts which do not necessarily correspond with the biological categories of male and 
female. Allegorical representation of Eve as the soul’s will or reason elucidates the 
extent to which this period conceived all human beings, regardless of their biological 
gender, as entities which comprised both masculine and feminine components. In the 
less common instances in which Eve represents the body and Adam the soul, as in 
Guibert’s Moralia, this is nonetheless presented as a division which exists in all human 
beings. Likewise, exegesis of Genesis 1.27 (‘masculum et feminam creavit eos’) tends 
                                                          
9
  De sacramentis, 1.6, 37; Sententiae, 2.18, 5-6. 
202 
 
to interpret this passage as a reference to the soul only, since the body cannot bear the 
image of God, revealing that the soul was widely envisaged during this period as 
consisting of both masculine and feminine constituents, irrespective of the physical 
gender of the body in which it might reside. 
Where Eve represents the female half of mankind, she demonstrates twelfth-
century attitudes to be unsurprisingly patriarchal, but far from universally misogynistic. 
It is true that Eve is deemed weaker, more malleable than Adam, and ultimately in need 
of his guidance and  authority. It should be noted that this attitude is as prevalent in the 
work of Hildegard of Bingen as much as it is in that of the male authors discussed. 
However, there exists an identifiably consistent emphasis on Eve’s worth, significance 
and parity with Adam. In addition, the emphasis on equivalence and typological 
significance in allegorical exegesis of Eve’s creation demonstrates that the theological 
position of women during this period was characterised by an emphasis on participation 
in the privileges that made humanity the apex of terrestrial creation.  
In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that representations of Eve as the first 
wife and mother demonstrate that both marriage and procreation were considered to be 
basic human necessities during this period rather than cause for monastic horror or 
misogynistic hostility. Given that both marriage and procreation were instituted prior to 
the fall and ratified by God directly, it was not possible to consider either of these things 
to be inherently sinful from their inception. To have done so would have constituted a 
challenge to the notion of unconditional divine benevolence. It is agreed almost 
unanimously in the texts discussed above that both marriage and procreation were part 
of human life before the fall, and that only after the fall did they become associated with 
lust and the transmission of original sin, since these were both part of fallen mankind’s 
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punishment.10 For the commentators of the twelfth century, marriage and procreation 
were both divinely sanctioned necessities, and potential incitements to lust. However, 
marriage and procreation were both thought to have been established with God’s 
benedictions, lacking any inherent incitement to sin, whilst lust was decreed to be a 
problem of human making which needed to be overcome by human virtue. The broader 
implication here is that the theology of the twelfth century deemed humanity to have 
sole responsibility for its failings and also, with the assistance of grace, the 
responsibility for rectifying them. Vice was considered to have originated solely in 
human actions; that is, those of Eve and Adam. A possible objection to this, which is 
mentioned in several of the texts discussed, is that God should not have created 
mankind with the capacity to experience temptation in the first place; however, such 
objections are resolved by attributing this to God’s benevolent desire for humanity to 
experience virtue rather than the mere absence of sin. Thus representations of Eve go 
some way to illuminate the twelfth-century concern with, and resolution of, the question 
of how to reconcile the notion of an omniscient and wholly benevolent God with the 
existence of evil and the emergence of sin. 
 
THE PLACE OF THE PRESENT STUDY AND POSSIBLE FURTHER RESEARCH 
Overall, representations of Eve offer new insights into the attitudes and mentalities of 
the twelfth century, and also a hitherto neglected source of information about concerns 
that are already well documented as having been prominent during this period. 
However, despite the past few decades’ proliferation of scholarship concerning both the 
theological and intellectual climate of the twelfth century, and conceptions of gender 
during this period, there has been little systematic attention devoted to the figure of Eve 
                                                          
10
  The exception here is Guibert’s Moralia, not because it presents a divergent view but because it simply 
does not mention these issues in literal, historical terms. 
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in the twelfth century or indeed the middle ages in general, and no substantial study of 
the significance of Eve beyond the confines of attitude toward gender. Eve is frequently 
mentioned in passing amid this scholarship, but has come to function merely as a form 
of convenient and misleading shorthand for women in general and their treatment 
during the middle ages. Although Flood’s brief study has recently addressed this 
approach to Eve, he is too generous in accommodating the principal assumption which 
underpins it; namely, that the figure of Eve can reveal nothing more than the patriarchal 
nature of medieval attitudes toward gender and toward women. Consequently, there 
remains a prevalent modern conception of the medieval figure of Eve as ‘the devil’s 
gateway’ and as the less favoured half of the supposedly widespread ‘Eva/Ave’ 
formulation.  
In short, it remains widely assumed that medieval representations of Eve 
illuminate nothing more than the allegedly ubiquitous misogyny of this period. This 
thesis, whilst it operates within necessary confines and limitations, establishes that there 
exists a substantial and largely unappreciated corpus of twelfth-century material which 
poses a significant challenge to this view of Eve. A comprehensive and definitive study 
of the figure of Eve in the twelfth century (or in the middle ages more broadly) remains 
to be written; however, this thesis not only demonstrates that the material exists for such 
an undertaking, but the opportunities such study offers to elucidate twelfth-century 
thought. 
There are various ways in which the remits of this thesis could be expanded, and 
numerous texts which could be added to the corpus of present study which is 
necessarily constrained in scale. From Thomas Aquinas’s commentaries on the creation 
to the creation cycles of the later medieval vernacular Corpus Christi plays, there is no 
shortage of representations of Eve beyond the twelfth century which merit further and 
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more systematic examination. Likewise, there are Patristic and early medieval 
representations of Eve which be likely to further reward exploration. 
However, remaining within the twelfth century possibly offers the most 
potentially interesting and fruitful option for further study of the figure of Eve. As was 
mentioned above the list of twelfth-century writers who composed commentaries on the 
hexaemeron and fall during this period is a lengthy one populated by some of the most 
significant thinkers of the central middle ages. 11  These texts and their possible 
representations of Eve essentially amount to a substantial potential corpus of hitherto 
neglected material which might elucidate more consistently and comprehensively the 
twelfth century’s responses to a range of fundamental concerns and questions relating to 
virtue, sin, the existence of evil, mankind’s ontological trajectory, the place of mankind 
within the universe, and what would subsequently be labelled natural sciences. It is 
ultimately the responses to these questions that the twelfth-century figure of Eve 
illuminates.
                                                          
11
  See p.14 above. 
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APPENDIX 
Tours, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 297, f. 24v 
 
 
 
 
 
[1] Di moi muiller que te querroit . li mal  
[2] satan que te volent . E . Il me parla de nostre 
[3] honor . A Ne creire ia le traitor . Il est trai  │- 
[4] tre . E Bien le sai . A E tu coment.ʹ E Car 
[5] jo sai oi1 . De co quen chat me del veer 
[6] Il te ferra changer saver . E nel fra pas 
[7] car nel crerai . De nule rien tant que 
[8] l’asai [...] 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
  Almost every edition of the text gives a different reading of the beginning of this line. The variant 
readings are helpfully listed by Sletsjöe, as follows: Palustre gives ‘Car oï l’ai’; Grass and Studer give 
‘Car l’asaiai’; Chamard gives ‘Car jo sai oi’, Aebischer gives ‘Car l’asajai’, and Sletsjöe himself gives 
‘Car jo lai oi’; see Mystère d’Adam ed. idem, p. 21. 
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Thus the manuscript attributes the lines to Eve and Adam as follows: 
 
 
ADAM:  
 
 
EVE:  
 
ADAM:  
 
 
EVE:  
 
ADAM:  
 
EVE:  
 
 
[ADAM]: 
 
EVE: 
Di moi mulier que te querroit 
li mal satan que te volent 
 
Il me parla de nostre honor  
 
Ne creire ia le traitor 
Il est traitre 
 
                    Bien le sai 
 
E tu coment? 
 
                     Car jo sai oi 
De co quen chat me del veer 
 
Il te ferra changer saver 
 
Nel fra pas car nel crerai 
De nule rien tant que l’asai  
 
276 
277 
 
278 
 
279 
280 
 
 
 
281 
 
 
282 
 
283 
 
284 
285 
 
 
 
 
Lines 280-1 are thus shared between Adam and Eve, and it is stated in the 
manuscript that Adam should assert ‘Il est traitre’ and Eve should reply ‘Bien le sai’. 
This reply is clearly labelled as being Eve’s line. As can be seen above (see line 4 of the 
transcription), the words ‘Bien le sai’ are preceded by a capital letter ‘E’ to indicate that 
it is the character of Eve speaking here. The subsequent line ‘E tu coment’ is preceded 
by a capital ‘A’ which indicates that the line is Adam’s. 
The question at the beginning of line 281, ‘E tu coment?’, is meant to be spoken 
by Adam, and is thus preceded by the letter ‘A’, as can be seen above (line 4 of the 
transcription). Auerbach is incorrect in his attribution of this line to Eve, which is 
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unfortunate since part of his argument depends upon Eve’s having asked this question.2 
Line 283, ‘Il te ferra changer saver’, is also Adam’s line. Although there is no ‘A’ in the 
manuscript to indicate this, the ‘E’ before before Eve’s ‘Nel fra pas...’ (see line 6 of the 
transcription above) would not need to be there had the previous phrase not been 
intended for the character of Adam. Sletsjöe suggests that the missing ‘A’ was written in 
the margins of the parchment and was thus lost when the manuscript was bound.3
                                                          
2
  Auerbach describes Eve’s supposed question as ‘the sort of question which has been asked a thousand 
times… by naïve, impetuous people who are governed by their instincts’. This is part of his argument that 
the Anglo-Norman Eve is distinguished principally by ‘unreflectingly sinful curiosity’; see Mimesis, pp. 
145-47. 
3
  Mystère d’Adam ed. Sletsjöe, p. 86. 
209 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
MANUSCRIPTS: 
 
Tours, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 297. 
 
St Gallen, Codex Sangallensis, MS 95. 
 
Wiesbaden, Hessisches Landesbibliotek, MS 1 (a.k.a Rupersberg Scivias). 
 
 
PRINTED AND EDITED SOURCES: 
 
PETER ABELARD, Ethics, ed. and trans. David Luscombe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971). 
- Expositio in hexameron, ed. Mary Romig and David Luscombe, Petri Abaelardi 
Opera Theologica vol. 5, CCCM 15 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004). 
- An Exposition of the Six Day Work, trans. Wanda Cizewski, Corpus Christianorum 
in Translation 8 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011). 
- Hymnarius Paraclitensis, PL vol. 178. 
- ‘Letter 7 to Heloise: The History of Women’s Roles in Christianity’, ed. and  trans. 
Vera Morton and Jocelyn Wogan Browne in Guidance for Women in Twelfth-
Century Convents, Library of Medieval Women (Cambridge: Brewer,  2003) pp. 52-
95. 
- ‘The Letters of Heloise on Religious Life and Abelard’s First Reply’, ed. J. P. 
Muckle, Mediaeval Studies vol. 17 (1955) pp. 253 – 281. 
- ‘Planctus israel super Samson’, ed. and trans. Peter Dronke in Poetic  Individuality 
in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) pp. 121-122. 
 
ABSALON of SPRINGIERSBACH, ‘Sermo V: In adventus Domini’, Sermones, PL vol. 211. 
 
ADAM of ST VICTOR, The Liturgical Poetry of Adam of St Victor from the Text of 
Gautier Vol. II, ed. Digby S. Wrangham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1881). 
 
AMBROSE of MILAN,  Exameron & De paradiso, ed. C. Shenkl, CSEL 32, 1 (Verlag der  
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1897). 
- Hexameron, Paradise, Cain and Abel, ed. and trans. John J. Savage, The Fathers of 
the Church: A New Translation vol. 42 (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1985). 
 
ANSELM of CANTERBURY, ‘De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato’, Anselmi 
Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1946). 
 
210 
 
AUGUSTINE of HIPPO, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R.W. Dyson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
- De civitate Dei, ed. B. Dombart and A. Kalb, CCSL 47 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955). 
- De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim & De Genesi 
ad litteram liber imperfectus, ed. J. Zycha, CSEL 28,1 (Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1894). 
- De Genesi contra Manichaeos, ed. Dorothea Weber, CSEL 91 (Vienna: Verlag der 
österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1998). 
- On Genesis: A Refutation of the Manichees, Unfinished Literal Commentary on 
Genesis, and the Literal Meaning of Genesis, ed. and trans. Edmund Hill, The 
Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the Twenty-First Century Part 1, vol. 13 
(New York: New City Press, 2006). 
 
BEDE the VENERABLE, Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum, ed. Michael Lapidge 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2005). 
- On Genesis, trans. Calvin B. Kendall, Translated Texts for Historians (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1999). 
 
Joannes BELETHUS, Rationale divinorum officiorum, PL vol. 202. 
 
Petrus CANTOR, Glossae super Genesim, ed. Agneta Sylwan (Goteborg: Acta 
Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1992). 
 
Geoffrey CHAUCER, The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry Benson, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
 
Peter COMESTOR, Scholastica Historia: Liber Genesis, ed. Agneta Swylan, CCCM 191 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2005). 
 
Peter DAMIAN, Paractericum carmen de eadem sanctissima Virgine, PL vol. 145. 
- Rhythmus de St Maria virgine, PL vol. 145. 
 
Dives and Pauper ed. Priscilla Heath Barnum, Early English Texts Society Original 
Series 275 (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press: 2005). 
 
FULBERT of CHARTRES, ‘Sermo IX de annunciatione dominica’, Sermones ad populum, 
PL vol. 141. 
 
GREGORY the Great, Moralia in Job, ed. Marcus Adriaen, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 2003). 
 
Robert GROSSESTESTE, Hexaemeron, ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982). 
 
GUIBERT of NOGENT, A Monk’s Confession: the Memoirs of Guibert of Nogent, ed. and 
trans. Paul Archambaut (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Uinversity Press, 1995). 
- De vita sua, PL vol. 156. 
- Moralia in Genesim, PL vol.156. 
 
HELINAND of FROIDMONT, Helinandi ad galterum clericum epistola, PL vol. 212. 
 
211 
 
Henry of MARCY, De peregrinante civitate Dei, PL vol. 204. 
 
HILDEGARD of BINGEN, Causae et Curae, ed. Paul Kaiser (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903). 
- On Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Selections from Causae et Curae, trans. 
Margaret Berger (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1999). 
- Scivias, ed. Adelgundis Führkötter and Angela Carlevaris, Corpus Christianorum 
 Scholars Version 43 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003). 
- Scivias, trans. Columba Hart and Jane Bishop, Classics of Western Spirituality 
 (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1990). 
 
HONORIUS AUGUSTODUNENSIS, Hexaemeron, PL vol. 172. 
- Elucidarium, PL vol. 172. 
 
HUGH d’AMIENS, ‘Un commentaire scriptuaire du XIIe siècle: le Tractatus in 
Hexaemeron de Hugues d’Amiens’, ed. F. Lacoste, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et 
littéraire de Moyen Âge, vol. 25 (1958) pp. 227-294. 
 
HUGH of ST VICTOR, The Didascalicon of Hugh of St Victor: A Medieval Guide to the 
Arts, ed. Jerome Taylor, Records of Western Civilisation (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
- Hugh of St Victor on the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De sacramentis), trans. 
Roy J. Deferrari (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2007). 
- ‘De institutione novitiorum’, L’oeuvre de Hugues de Saint-Victor Vol. I, Latin text 
ed. H.B. Feiss and Patrice Sicard; French translation by Dominique Poirel, Henri 
Rochais and Patrice Sicard, Sous la règle de Saint Augustin, 3 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
1997). 
- De sacramentis Christiane fidei, ed. Rainer Berndt, Corpus Victorinum, Textus 
Historici vol. I (Münster: Aschendorff, 2008). 
 
INNOCENT III, ‘Sermo XXVIII in eadem solemnitate’, Sermones de sanctis, PL vol. 217. 
 
PETER LOMBARD, Sentences Book 1, trans. Guilio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 2007). 
- Sentences Book 2, trans. Guilio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 2011). 
- Sentences Book 4, trans. Guilio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 2010). 
- Sententiae in iu libris distinctae, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4 – 5 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2010). 
 
Mystère d’Adam: Édition diplomatique accompagnée d'une reproduction 
photographique du manuscrit de Tours et des leçons des éditions critiques, ed. Leif 
Sletsjöe, Bibliothèque française et romane (Paris: Klincksieck, 1968). 
 
ORIGEN, Origenes Werk, Homilien zum Hexateuch in Rufins I: Die Homilien zu Genesis, 
Exodus und Leviticus, ed. W.A. Baehrens, Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller 
der Ersten Drei Jahrhunderte vol. 29 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchandlung, 1920). 
 
PHILO of ALEXANDRIA, Quaestiones in Genesim ed. Charles Mercier (Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 1979). 
212 
 
 
RUPERT of DEUTZ, Commentariorum in Genesim, PL vol. 167. 
 
TERTULLIAN, De anima, ed. J.H. Waszink, CCSL 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954).  
- De cultu feminarum, ed. E. Kroymann, CCSL 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954). 
- Opera, CCCM 1, ed. E Dekkers, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954). 
- The Writings of Tertullian Vol. II, trans. Peter Holmes, Anti-Nicene Christian 
Library vol. XV (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1870). 
 
THIERRY of CHARTRES, ‘Hexaemeron’, Nikolaus M. Häring ed., Commentaries on 
Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1971). 
 
WACE, La vie de la Vierge de Maître Wace, ed. Victor Luzarche (Tours: J. Bouserez, 
1859). 
 
 
 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
Erich AUERBACH, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. 
Willard R. Trask (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
 
David d’AVRAY, Medieval Marriage: Symbolism and Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 2005). 
- and M. TAUSCHE, ‘Marriage Sermons in the ad status Collections of the Central 
Middle Ages’, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age vol. 47 
(1980), p. 107. 
 
Emmanuel BAIN, ‘ “Homme et femme il les créa”: Le genre féminin dans les 
commentaires de la Genèse au douxième siècle’, Studi Medievali, vol. 48, no 1 (2007) 
pp. 229-270. 
 
John BALDWIN, The Language of Sex: Five Voices from Northern France Around 1200 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
 
Simone de BEAUVOIR, Le deuxième sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 2000). 
 
Tina BEATTIE, God’s Mother, Eve’s Advocate: A Marian Narrative of Women’s Salvation 
(London: Continuum, 2002; reprint of Bristol University Press 1999 edn). 
 
Judith M. BENNETT, History Matters: Patriarchy and the Challenge of Feminism 
(Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
 
Alcuin BLAMIRES, The Case for Women in Medieval Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
 
Julia Bolton HOLLOWAY, Constance S. WRIGHT eds, Equally in God’s Image: Women in 
the Middle Ages (New York: Peter Lang, 1990). 
213 
 
 
K.E. BØRRESEN, ‘Imago Dei, privilège masculin? Interprétation augustinienne et 
pseudo-augustinienne de Gen. 1.27 et 1 Cor. 11.7’, Augustinianum 25 (1985) pp. 213-
234. 
 
E.M. BUYTAERT, ‘Abelard’s Expositio in hexameron’, Antonianum 43 (1968) pp. 163-
194. 
 
R. Howard BLOCH, Medieval French Literature and Law (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977). 
- Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
 
Kathleen BLUMREICH-MOORE, ‘Original Sin as Treason in Act I of the Mystère 
d’Adam’, Philological Quarterly no 72:2 (1993) pp. 125-141. 
 
Andrew Breeze, ‘Two Bardic Themes: the Virgin and Child, and “Ave-Eva” ’, Medium 
Aevum vol. 63 (1994) pp. 17-33. 
 
Christopher BROOKE, The Medieval Idea of Marriage (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989). 
 
Martha A. BROZNYA ed., Gender and Sexuality in the Middle Ages: A Reader (North 
Carolina: McFarland, 2005). 
 
James A. BRUNDAGE, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
 
Neil CARTLIDGE, Medieval Marriage: Literary Approaches 1100-1300 (Cambridge: 
Boydell and Brewer, 1997). 
 
Marie-Dominique CHENU, Man, Nature and Society in the Twelfth Century, Medieval 
Academy of America Reprints 37 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
 
Wanda Zemler CIZEWSKI, ‘Beauty and the Beasts: Allegorical Zoology in the Twelfth 
Century Hexaemeral Literature,’ in Haijo Westra ed., From Athens to Chartres: 
Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought, Studies in Honour of Edouard Jeauneau (Leiden: 
Bill, 1992), pp. 289-300. 
- ‘The Doctrine of Creation in the First Half of the Twelfth Century: Selected 
Authors [Rupert of Deutz, Honorius Augustodunensis, Peter Abelard and Hugh of 
St. Victor]’, PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, Centre for Medieval Studies, 
1983. 
- ‘Guibert of Nogent’s How to Preach a Sermon’, Theological Studies vol. 59 (1998) 
pp. 407-419. 
- ‘Interpreting the Hexaemeron: Honorius Augustodunensis’s De neocosmo,’ 
Florilegium vol. 7 (1985) pp.  84-108. 
 
Elizabeth A. CLARK, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early 
Christian Debate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
 
214 
 
Marcia COLISH, Peter Lombard, 3 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
 
Boyd Taylor COOLMAN, The Theology of Hugh of St Victor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
- and Dale M. COULTER eds, Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, 
Richard and Adam of St Victor, Victorine Texts in Translation (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2011). 
 
Mary Irma CORCORAN, Milton’s Paradise Lost with Reference to the Hexameral 
Background (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1945). 
 
Madeleine Pelner COSMAN and Linda Gale JONES eds, Handbook to Life in the 
Medieval World, vol. 3 (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008). 
 
Jacques DALARUN, ‘The Clerical Gaze’, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, A History of Women 
in the West: Silences of the Middle Ages ed. Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1994) pp. 15-42. 
 
Mary DALY, The Church and the Second Sex (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). 
 
Joseph A. DANE, ‘Clerical Propaganda in the Anglo-Norman Representacione Ade’, 
Philological Quarterly 62.2 (1983), pp. 241 – 52.  
 
Peter DRONKE, Intellectuals and Poets in Medieval Europe (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, 1992). 
- and Charles BURNETT eds, Hildegard of Bingen: The Context of her Art and 
Thought (London: Warburg Institute/University of London, 1998).  
 
Geroges DUBY,  The Knight, the Lady and the Priest: The Making of Modern Marriage 
in Twelfth-Century France, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983). 
- Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth-Century France, trans. Elborg 
Foster, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
- Women of the Twelfth Century: Eve and the Church, trans. Jean Birrell (Cambridge: 
Polity Press and University of Chicago, 1998). 
 
J.M. EVANS, Paradise Lost and the Genesis Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). 
 
Sharon FARMER, ‘Persuasive Voices: Clerical Images of Medieval Wives’, Speculum, 
vol. 61, no 3 (1986) pp. 517-43. 
 
Sabina FLANAGAN, Hildegard of Bingen (London: Routledge, 1989). 
 
John FLOOD, Representations of Eve in Antiquity and the English Middle Ages (London: 
Routledge, 2011). 
 
Gunar FREIBERGS, ‘The Medieval Latin Hexameron from Bede to Grosseteste’, PhD 
dissertation, University of Southern California, 1981. 
 
Maureen FRIES, ‘The Evolution of Eve in Medieval French and English Religious 
Drama’, Studies in Philology vol. 99, no 1 (2002) pp. 1-16. 
215 
 
 
Rebecca GARBER, Feminine Figurae: Representations of Gender in Religious Texts by 
Medieval German Women Writers (London: Routledge, 2003) pp. 33-60. 
- ‘Where is the Body? Images of Eve and Mary in the Scivias’ in Maud Burnett 
McInerney ed., Hildegard of Bingen: A Book of Essays, Garland Mediaeval 
Casebooks (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 103 – 132. 
 
Giles GASPER, Anselm of Canterbury and his Theological Inheritance (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2004). 
- ‘“Oil upon the waters”: On the Creation of Light from Basil to Peter Lombard’, 
Archa Verbi vol. 8 (2011) pp. 9-31. 
 
Simon GAUNT, Gender and Genre in Medieval French Literature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
 
Joseph de GHELLINCK, Le mouvement théologique du XIIe siècle : sa préparation 
lointaine avant et autour de Pierre Lombard, ses rapports avec les initiatives des 
canonistes; études, recherches et documents (Bruges: Éditions de Tempel,  1948).  
 
Jacques LE GOFF, The Medieval Imagination, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
 
Michael GORMAN, ‘The Commentary on Genesis of Angelomus of Luxueil and Biblical 
Studies under Lothar’, Studi Medievali vol. 40 (1999) pp. 559-632. 
- and Martine DULAEY eds, Isidorus Episcopus Hispalensis: Expositio in Vetus 
Testamentum: Genesis (Freiburg: Herder, 2009). 
 
Hilda GRAEF, Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1985). 
 
Joan Young GREGG, Devils, Women and Jews: Reflections of the Other in Medieval 
Sermon Stories (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997). 
 
Fiona J. GRIFFITHS, The Garden of Delights: Reform and Renaissance for Women in the 
Twelfth Century (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
 
Victor Y. HAINES, ‘The Iconography of the Felix Culpa,’ Florilegium vol. 1 (1979) 
pp.151—158. 
 
Susan HASKINS, Mary Magdalene: Myth and Metaphor (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace 
and Co., 1994). 
 
Ronald HENDERSON, Chana KRONFELD, and Ilana PARDES, ‘Gender and Sexuality’ in 
Henderson ed., Reading Genesis: Ten Methods (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), pp. 71-91. 
 
Jean M. HIGGINS, ‘The Myth of Eve: The Temptress’, Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion vol. 44, no. 4 (1976), pp. 639-647. 
 
216 
 
Maryanne Cline HOROWITZ, ‘The Image of God: Is Woman  Included?’, Harvard 
Theological Review vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 175-206. 
 
Kevin HUGHES, ‘St Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron: Fractured Sermons and 
Protreptic Discourse’, Franciscan Studies vol. 63 (2005), pp. 108-129. 
 
Tony HUNT, ‘Wordplay Before the Rhetoriquers’, De Sens Rassis: Essays in Honour of 
Rupert T. Pickens ed. Keith Busby, Bernard Guidot and Logan E. Whalen (Amsterdam: 
Editions Rodopi, 2005) pp. 283-296. 
 
Grace JANTZEN, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). 
 
Robert JAVELET, Image et resemblance au douzième siècle de saint Anselme à Alain de 
Lille, 2 vols (Strasbourg: Letouzey and Ane, 1967). 
 
Eileen KEARNEY, ‘Peter Abelard as Biblical Commentator: A Study of the Expositio in 
hexameron’, Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142): Person, Werk und Wirkung, ed. Rudolph 
Thomas, Trierer Theologische Studien 38 (Trier: Paulinus, 1980) pp. 199-210. 
 
Edward KING and Jacqueline SCHAEFER eds, St. Augustine and His Influence in the 
Middle Ages, Sewanee Medieval Studies, No 3 (Tenessee: Sewanee Medieval 
Colloquium, 1988). 
 
Erik KOOPER, ‘Loving the Unequal Equal: Medieval Theologians and Marital Affection’ 
in Robert Edwards and Stephen Spector eds, The Olde Daunce: Love, Sex, and 
Marriage in the Medieval World pp. 44-56. 
 
Henry KRAUS, ‘Eve and Mary: Conflicting Images of Medieval Woman’, Feminism and 
Art History: Questioning the Litany ed. Norma Broude and Mary D. Garrard (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1982) pp. 79-100. 
 
Gerard LUKKEN, Original Sin in the Roman Liturgy: Research into the Theology of 
Original Sin in the Roman Sacramentaria and the Early Baptismal Liturgy (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1973). 
 
John MARENBON, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 
 
Barbara MACHAFFIE, Readings in Her Story: Women in Christian Tradition 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1992). 
 
Jo Ann MCNAMARA, ‘Review: Women of the Twelfth Century by Georges Duby’, 
Speculum vol. 74, no. 3 (1999) pp. 732-33. 
 
June Hall MCCASH, ‘Mutual Love as a Medieval Ideal’, ed. Keith Busby and Erik 
Kooper, Courtly Literature: Culture and Context, Utrecht Publications in General and 
Comparative Literature vol. 25, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990) pp. 429-438 
 
Peggy MCCRACKEN, The Curse of Eve, the Wound of the Hero: Blood, Gender and 
Medieval Literature (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
217 
 
 
Eleanor MCLAUGHLIN, ‘Equality of Souls, Inequality of Sexes’ in Radford ed., Religion 
and Sexism pp. 213-267. 
 
Kevin MCNAMARA, ‘Review of La Nouvelle Ève II-III’, Bulletin de la Société Française 
d'Études Mariales, 1959 in The Furrow vol. 10, no 4 (1959) pp. 268-69. 
 
Shannon MCSHEFFREY, Gender and Heresy, Women and Men in Lollard Communities, 
1420-1530 (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995). 
 
Constant MEWS, ‘On Dating the Works of Peter Abelard’, Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du moyen âge vol. 52 (1985) pp. 73-134, pp. 118-19. 
- ‘Religious Thinker: “A Frail Human Being” on Fiery Life’, Barbara Newman ed., 
Voice of the Living Light: Hildegard of Bingen and Her World (California: 
University of California Press, 1998) pp. 52 – 69. 
 
Paul MEYER, ‘Les manuscrits français de Cambridge, ii: Bibliothèque de l’Université’, 
Romania vol. 15 (1886) pp. 236-357. 
 
Kate MILLETT, Sexual Politics (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2000). 
 
Wendy MORGAN, ‘ “Who was then the Gentleman?”: Society, History and Linguistic 
Codes in the Mystère d’Adam’, Studies in Philology vol. 79, no 2 (1982) pp. 101-21. 
 
Lynette R. MUIR, Liturgy and Drama in the Anglo-Norman Adam, Medium Aevum 
Monographs New Series III (Oxford: Blackwell for the Society for the Study of 
Mediaeval Languages and Literature, 1973). 
 
Brian MURDOCH, Adam’s Grace: Fall and Redemption in Medieval Literature 
(Cambridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2000). 
The Fall of Man in the Early Middle High German Biblical Epic: The Wiener Genesis, 
the Vorauer Genesis and the Anegenge (A. Kümmerle, 1972). 
- The Medieval Popular Bible: Expansions of Genesis in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2003). 
- The Recapitulated Fall: A Comparative Study in Mediaeval Literature (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1974). 
 
Barbara NEWMAN, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist (Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995). 
- Sister of Wisdom: St Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine (California: University 
of California Press, 1987). 
 
Julia O’FAOLAIN and Lauro MARTINES eds, Not in God’s Image: Women in History from 
the Greeks to the Victorians (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). 
 
Jaroslav PELIKAN, The Growth of Medieval Theology 600-1300, The Christian 
Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978). 
 
218 
 
Elizabeth Ann ROBERTSON, Early English Devotional Prose and the Female Audience 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990). 
 
Frank Egleston ROBBINS, The Hexaemeral Literature: A Study of the Greek and Latin 
Commentaries on Genesis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1912). 
 
Henri RONDET, Original Sin: The Patristic and Theological Background trans. Cajetan 
Finegan (Shannon: Ecclesia Press, 1972). 
 
Paul ROREM, Hugh of St Victor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
Leslie ROSS ed., Medieval Art: A Topical Dictionary (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 
1996). 
 
Jay RUBENSTEIN, Guibert of Nogent: Portrait of a Medieval Mind (London: Routledge, 
2002). 
- ‘St. Anselm’s Influence of Guibert of Nogent’ in Anselm: Aosta, Bec and 
Canterbury. Papers in Commemoration of the 900
th
 Anniversary of Anselm’s 
Enthronement as Archbishop ed. G. R. Evans and David Luscombe (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1996) pp. 296-309. 
 
Miri RUBIN, Mother of God: A History of the Virgin Mary (Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 2009). 
 
Conrad RUDOLPH, ‘In the Beginning: Theories and Images of Creation in the Twelfth 
Century’, Art History vol. 22, no 1 (1999) pp. 3-55. 
 
Rosemary Radford RUETHER, Mary: The Feminine Face of the Church (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1977). 
- ed., Religion and Sexism: Images of Woman in the Jewish and Christian Traditions 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974). 
- Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Minnesota: Beacon Press, 
1983). 
- Women and Redemption: A Theological History (London: SCM Press, 1998). 
 
Catherine SANOK, ‘Women and Literature’, A Concise Handbook to Middle English 
Literature ed. Marilyn Corrie (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009) pp. 54-76. 
 
Gustav SCHERRER, Verzeichniss der Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek von St. Gallen 
(Halle: 1875). 
 
Gertrud SCHILLER, Iconography of Christian Art, vol. 1, trans. Janet Seligman (London: 
Lund Humphries, 1971). 
 
Richard W. SOUTHERN, The Making of the Middle Ages (London: Pimlico, 2007). 
- Medieval Humanism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 
- Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe II: The Heroic Age (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001). 
 
219 
 
R. N. SWANSON, The Twelfth-Century Renaissance (Manchester: University of 
Manchester Press, 1999). 
 
Augustine THOMPSON, ‘Hildegard of Bingen on Gender and the Priesthood’, Church 
History 63.3 (1994), pp.349-364.  
 
Phyllis TRIBLE, ‘Eve and Adam: Genesis 2-3 Reread’ in Eve and Adam: Jewish 
Christian and Muslim Readings on Genesis and Gender, ed. Kristen E. Kvam, Linda S. 
Schearing and Valarie H. Ziegler (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999) pp. 431-438. 
- ‘Depatriarchalising in Biblical Interpretation’, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion vol. 41, no 1 (1973) pp. 30-48. 
- Texts of Terror: Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narrative (Norwich, SCM-
Canterbury Press, 2002). 
 
Joseph W. TRIGG, Origen (London: Routledge, 1998). 
 
Marie TURCAN, ‘La tradition manuscrite de Tertullien à propos du De cultu feminarum’, 
Revue des Études Latines vol. 44 (1966) pp. 363-372. 
 
Rosalynn VOADEN, God’s Words; Women’s Voices: The Discernment of Spirits in the 
Writing of Late Medieval Women Visionaries (York: York Medieval Press/Boydell and 
Brewer, 1999). 
 
Sally VAUGHN, ‘St Anselm and his Students Writing about Love: A Theological 
Foundation for the Rise of Romantic Love in Europe’, Journal of the History of 
Sexuality vol. 19, no 1 (2010) pp. 54-73. 
 
Marina WARNER, Alone of All Her Sex (New York: Vintage, 1983). 
 
Michele WARREN, ‘The Flavour of Sin in the Ordo representacionis Ade’, 
Neophilologus 86 (2002), pp. 179 – 195. 
 
Anders WINROTH, The Making of Gratian's Decretum (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
- ‘Marital Consent in Gratian’s Decretum’, in Martin Brett and Kathleen G. Cushing 
ed., Readers, Texts and Compilers in the Earlier Middle Ages: Studies in Medieval 
Canon Law in Honour of Linda Fowler-Magerl (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) pp. 111-
2. 
 
Mary WOLLESTONECRAFT A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. Sylvana Tomaselli, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
 
Rosemary WOOLF, ‘The Fall of Man in Genesis B and the Mystère d’Adam’, Art and 
Doctrine: Essays on Medieval Literature, ed. Heather O’Donoghue (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1986) pp. 15 - 28. 
 
Johannes ZAHLTEN, Creatio mundi: Darstellungen der Sechs Schöpfungstage und 
naturwissenschaftliches Weltbild im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979). 
 
 
220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
 
222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 
 
 
 
 
  
 
225 
 
 
